



Managing collective violence around public events: an international comparison





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Foreword

On the evening of August 22, 2009 a dance event (Veronica Sunset Grooves) took place on the beach of Hoek van Holland in the Netherlands. The free event, which was organised for the second time, was attended by an estimated 30,000 to 50,000 visitors. In the course of the evening, incidents developed which eventually resulted in an estimated 150 to 300 individuals attacking and threatening a group of approximately 20 police officers. The group continued to threaten and attack the officers, throwing different kinds of objects that were at hand at them (including bottles filled with sand). The officers withdrew 150 m from the fenced-off area into the dunes. During the confrontation, which lasted 12 minutes in total, police officers fired numerous shots. The investigation after the incident made clear that 21 officers fired a total of 76 shots. Most of these shots (63) were warning shots, in 13 cases aimed shots were fired into the attacking group, mainly at the legs of attackers. Seven people got hit by police bullets, one of them fatally. This was the first time in the Netherlands since World War II someone was killed by a police bullet in the course of a public order incident and the violent attack on the officers led to a media outrage. On the basis of an investigation by state investigators, the public prosecutor concluded that all shots were fired in self defence by officers who were confronted with excessive violence and who felt their lives were in danger. The official evaluation of the incidents, commissioned by the mayor of Rotterdam (Hoek van Holland is part of the municipality of Rotterdam) concluded that events in Hoek van Holland were unique because of the extreme nature of the way in which police officers were tested, provoked and attacked, and because of the alleged organised and planned nature of the violence: a relatively large number of the attackers included known Feyenoord Rotterdam football hooligans. At the same time, the investigators concluded that the way in which the event was prepared for and handled was deficient in many ways. The investigators came up with a total of 31 recommendations for the organisation of future events. These regarded the municipal policy for events and the conditions under which an event is to be

allowed to take place (6 recommendations), preparations for events (8 recommendations), the organisation proper of events (5 recommendations), information related to events (2 recommendations), implementation (8 recommendations), and after-event measures (2 recommendations).

Before the results of the evaluation were known, the question came up whether the incident was exceptional or whether it was the expression of a new trend or phenomenon regarding (the threat of) collective violence against police officers (and others) during large scale events. To answer this question, the municipality of Rotterdam and the Dutch Interior Ministry commissioned a study into public disorder and collective violence in relation to large-scale events. Parallel to this study, the Dutch programme Police & Science commissioned the Police Academy of the Netherlands to conduct an international comparative study. To this purpose, a separate research proposal was formulated. The supervisor of the international study consulted with the researchers of the Dutch study and commented on drafts of the Dutch report. A summary (in Dutch) of the results of the international study was included in the Dutch report.

This report is the result of this exploratory comparative study into collective violence during events, carried out in Germany, Great Britain and Sweden. It would have not been possible without the participation of the following individuals and institutions:

- ☐ Saskia Bierman, from the public order management research group of the Police Academy of the Netherlands (Great Britain, phase 2 only)
- ☐ Elaine Brown, PhD student at the University of Liverpool and linked to the public order management research group of the Police Academy of the Netherlands (Great Britain, phase 1 only)
- ☐ Jörg Dietermann, Fachhochschule für öffentliche Verwaltung NRW/ Institut für Polizeiwissenschaft
- ☐ Carsten Putz, Fachhochschule für öffentliche Verwaltung NRW/ Institut für Polizeiwissenschaft
- ☐ Martina Schreiber, Fachhochschule für öffentliche Verwaltung NRW/ Institut für Polizeiwissenschaft, attached to the public order management research group of the Police Academy of the Netherlands
- ☐ Ronald van der Wal, public order management research group of the Police Academy of the Netherlands (Great Britain, phase 2 only)

- ☐ Jürgen Zeitner, Fachhochschule für öffentliche Verwaltung NRW/ Institut für Polizeiwissenschaft
- ☐ Police Research Centre of the University of Uppsala (Sweden).

I would also like to thank all police experts in Germany, Sweden and the UK who were willing to be interviewed for this study.

Otto Adang



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Introduction

As indicated in the foreword, events in Hoek van Holland and the question of whether this violent outburst could be regarded as the expression of a new trend or phenomenon regarding (the threat of) collective violence against police officers (and others) at large scale events formed the starting point for this study. It was not immediately obvious what types of events could and should be included in the international study. Should the study restrict itself to Hoek-van-Holland type events (i.e. dance events and other types of festivals or festive events) or should other types of events such as sport events or protest events be included as well? It was decided that it would be a pitfall to focus exclusively on Hoek-van-Holland type events, because there was no reason to assume that there is an exclusive or self-evident link between this type of events and collective violence. There was no theoretical reason to assume this, and a cursory media-analysis also indicated that, in practice, different countries had different “watershed” experiences linked to different types of events/ incidents that had a big impact and led to a rethinking of the way in which public order around events was maintained and managed.¹ It was therefore decided to focus this study on expressions of collective violence during large scale incidents of public disorder, regardless of the type of event or where they occurred.

The following research questions, as addressed in the Dutch study, served as a starting point for the international study:

- 1 Which major riots and public order incidents have occurred at mass events during the last five years?
- 2 What kind of disturbances occurred? What are the particular characteristics of the offenders?

¹ Tellingly, no recent “Hoek-van-Holland” type incidents were found in composing the inventory.

- 3 What types of violence have been used against police and security services during major events in the last 5 years and what patterns can be recognised?
- 4 What are the characteristics of individual offenders and of violent groups?
- 5 How do individual offenders and of violent groups behave during mass events?
 - ☐ How can the behaviour of individual offenders and violent groups during mass events be described?
 - ☐ Are there reasons/ triggers apparent for the violent behaviour?
 - ☐ Is there an indication that violent behaviour has been planned? If so, how?
 - ☐ In what way is the violence exercised?
 - ☐ Which weapons or fire arms are being used?
 - ☐ Which communication channels do the offenders use?
 - ☐ What is the role of drug and alcohol use?
- 6 Which measures are taken by the police, justice, administration, organisations and others in order to prevent and control public disorder and violence from individual offenders and of violent groups at mass events? Which interventions are effective in preventing and controlling major riots and disturbances at mass events? Under which circumstances?
- 7 How is the risk of major disorder and riots during mass events assessed? Which models of risk assessment are used (including early signals and judgements about the probability of displacement effects)?
- 8 Which legal measures are taken and by whom in order to prevent and control major violent incidents. How effective are these measures?

Compared to the Dutch study, the international study was less comprehensive. It was exploratory in nature and basically sought to answer the following questions:

With what forms of (collective) violence are authorities being confronted in relation to events, how do they deal with these (including preventive measures) and what lessons can be deduced for the management of public events in the Netherlands?

2 This concerns in particular measures relating to the use of alcohol and drugs.

The study sought to look for developments and principles that might have a broader applicability, and dealt with characteristics and tactics of violent offenders on the one hand and intervention practices on the other hand.

For the international comparative study, the choice was made to include three countries that are, in a cultural sense close, to the Netherlands, making it more likely that meaningful comparisons could be made. Based on this principle, the UK, Germany and Sweden were selected, for the following practical reasons:

- ☐ the expectation that there are recent events, relevant to the study, for which published studies are available and which have led to changes in the way in which events are managed or policed in these countries
- ☐ the expectation that police forces in these countries would be willing to cooperate with the investigation
- ☐ the possibility to use researchers that speak the language of the country concerned.

In the first phase of the investigation the following activities were undertaken in each of the three countries.

- 1 In relation to research question 1 and based on a media analysis, an inventory was made of potentially relevant incidents (large scale incidents of public disorder).³
- 2 A selection was made of incidents that could potentially be included in the study, based on relevance to the topic of research, the availability of independent studies and the possibility to contact police experts that would be able to provide additional information.
- 3 On the basis of this and in consultation with Police & Science, for each country a go/ no go decision was made based on the possibility to gather meaningful material to answer the research questions and a selection was made of the incidents that were to be included in the study.

The decision was made to continue with the investigation in the three countries selected and to focus on the following events:

- ☐ Germany: events in relation to May 1st in Berlin (1987-2009) and (the policing of) events in North Rhine-Westphalia

3 For the purpose of the inventory "large scale incidents of public disorder" had to include at least one of the following: instances of collective violence, several injured or dead civilians/police officers, extensive damage.

- Sweden: the EU-summit in Gothenburg (June 2001) and recent escalations in suburbs in Malmö and Stockholm (2008-2009)
- UK: the G-20 summit in London (April 2009) and events related to manifestations and demonstrations of the English Defence League (EDL) (2003-2009).

For each of the three countries, a two-tier approach was chosen: a “high-impact” event was selected that had been independently investigated and recent events were chosen that had posed specific challenges. The “high-impact” events were studied using available documentation. In some cases additional interviews were conducted with police officers with first-hand knowledge of the events. The other “challenging” events were studied by interviewing police experts from different levels and positions with first-hand knowledge of these events. Also, some additional document analysis was performed. It is important to note that no separate in-depth case studies were conducted and no separate study was made of the profile of violent perpetrators (as was done in the accompanying Dutch study). It is also important to note that the study did not try to make a complete and thorough analysis of the events included in the investigation, but was aimed at gathering comparable information. Except for the independent investigations and media publications being used, the information gathered was one-sided in the sense that only police experts were interviewed. The aim was to gather “police knowledge” with regard to collective violence occurring during large scale incidents of public disorder. The study was exploratory in nature and undertaken without preconceptions about possible outcomes, basically letting respondents talk about their experiences with and perspectives on (dealing with) collective violence. The study was also limited in the sense that the focus was not so much on the overall “dynamics of disorder” but on the (perceived) nature of collective violence and (perceived) characteristics of (groups of) violent perpetrators (irrespective of the initial causation of the violence) as well as on the situational and organisational context and on interventions by police.

In the second phase of the investigation the following activities were undertaken in each of the three countries:

- documentation was gathered and analysed
- contact was made with police organisations to ask for additional material and for “experts” to be interviewed. Where needed, formal permission was sought

- ☐ interviews were held according to a common structure (Appendix I)
- ☐ the results of the analyses and interviews were put down in a report.

In all three countries the researchers received a lot of cooperation. In North Rhine-Westphalia the Interior Ministry formally gave permission to interview the police experts. All interviews lasted around 90 minutes, were taped with consent from the interviewees and later transcribed.

In the course of the investigation, the research team met four times (in Stockholm, Amersfoort and twice in Apeldoorn) and exchanged their experiences and findings. The country reports were edited by the supervisor/ main author, who also wrote the introduction, discussion and conclusions and the summary in Dutch. He also wrote the final version of the Swedish report.

1.1 Material

Below, a short summary is given of the material included in the study. In each country chapter, detailed references are given where applicable.

1.1.1 Germany

Every year since 1987, a tradition of riots and collective violence against police has taken place on May 1st in Berlin, characterised by large scale police deployment, numerous arrests, extensive damages and many injured. Over the years, different strategies and tactics have been used to prevent or contain the violence. Significantly, since 2009 mention is made of so-called event-oriented perpetrators, who are not ideologically motivated but who use the events as an opportunity to commit acts of violence. The research into the yearly May 1st events in Berlin is based on publications in police magazines, reports from the office to protect the constitution, media publications (including forum discussions, blogs and YouTube videos). Of special interest was a report from the Free University of Berlin made after the 2009 riots. In addition, two interviews were carried out, one with the head of the Berlin police anti-conflict team and one with a very experienced gold commander, who also authored several publications on the topic.

In the next step of the study eight police experts (gold commanders, heads of intervention units and police officers acting as advisors) from North Rhine-Westphalia were interviewed. The experts were suggested to the researchers by the police section of the NRW home office, and were interviewed individually. Interviews were carried out by the first author of the chapter, in five cases together with the second or third author. The interviews did not focus on a particular event but on the situation concerning violence around public events in general. A semi-structured interview schedule was used, a German version of the schedule that had been developed for the overall international project. Also, police documents, most of them secret, were used. These were consulted by the second, third and fourth author of the chapter and summarised so that they could provide the necessary information for this report. The chapter was initially written in German and then translated into English.

North Rhine-Westphalia is a German state that is comparable in many ways to the Netherlands which hosts a large number of different types of events, festive and sportive as well as protest events. Large scale violence is most common around football matches (especially derbies and other risk matches) and protest events. It is also common in demonstrations simultaneously involving radical left and right wing groups. Also, demonstrations with Palestinian or Kurdish participants are said to be accompanied by violence relatively often. In addition, incidents occur during festive events such as the Love Parade (organised in Essen in 2007 and in Dortmund in 2008), carnival in Cologne and during unorganised events (e.g. related to the night-time economy in Düsseldorf or on May 1st near Dortmund).

1.1.2 Sweden

During the Euro summit held over several days in Gothenburg in June 2001 many demonstrations were held that passed off without incident. In addition, there were four incidents of major disorder.

- ☐ The first incident followed the encirclement by police of a school that housed demonstrators. From within the encirclement, activists threw objects at police lines following which riots developed. After negotiations took place, over 600 activists were collectively detained.
- ☐ On the morning of the next day a group of 300-400 activists blocked an intersection. After an intervention by dog handlers, the situation escalated

and serious riots developed resulting in large scale destruction of property and a high number of injured demonstrators and police officers.

- In the evening of the same day, a street party and an anti-EU demonstration were attacked by a group of neo-Nazi's belonging to the hard core of IFK Göteborg football hooligans. In the end, the neo-Nazi's were chased away by activists. Police interventions were directed at left-wing activists. At some point police officers fired aimed shots and one activist was seriously wounded by a police bullet.
- Following these incidents, 400 activists were encircled on the basis of the rumour that one of them was carrying a gun. Also, a school where activists resided was stormed by a special police unit.

To this day, events in Gothenburg form a traumatic reference point for Swedish police as a whole, not just for police in Gothenburg. The Swedish police was confronted with an event to which it was not used, with a type (and number) of activists to which it was not used either in a context (violence that had occurred at previous summits in other countries) that led to a lot of uncertainty. The organisation of the large-scale police operation knew many shortcomings. The events and incidents were studied intensively, with a large report of the parliamentary Gothenburg committee as the most prominent result. The conclusions of the Gothenburg committee left no doubt about the many failings and its findings were the starting point for a process of change within the Swedish police that is still continuing today. For this study, use was made of the most relevant reports and scientific publications.

In the next step of the study, 11 police officers in Malmö and Stockholm were interviewed about disturbances that took place in migrant areas between the end of 2008 and the end of 2009 and where collective violence was directed at police officers. Members of the police in different functions were interviewed: command and operational officers (~~kommanderings- and insatschef~~); criminal intelligence (KUT), precinct and dialogue police (~~närpolis dialogpolis~~), as well as the security police. Altogether ten interviews – with eleven persons – were conducted, six in Malmö and five in Stockholm; ten men and one woman, who were all around forty years of age. The police officers were chosen by the police authorities in Skåne (Malmö) and Stockholm counties, respectively.

While the disturbances in Malmö were very concentrated in spatial terms – the Herrgård block of the Rosengård district – the events in Stockholm

spanned most of the western part of the county, from the Södertälje district Ronna in the south to the Stockholm district Tensta in the north. In both cities, the first incidents started after police interventions. The major outbreak in Rosengård/ Herrgård followed an eviction on December 19th 2008. In Stockholm the major outbreak followed a violent police operation in mid-September 2009. The police response was also different. While in Rosengård, the police basically relied on a conventional tactic (uniformed police in protective clothing acting in groups), in Stockholm plain clothes police dominated the scene. While reinforcements from both Stockholm and Gothenburg were needed in Malmö, in Stockholm only police officers from the county proper were needed. Media coverage drumming up violence was a substantial problem in Malmö, much less so in Stockholm.

Subsequently, more police interventions were provoked by setting fire to cars or the erection of barricades. The suspicion was that drug-dealing criminal gangs were involved in the disturbances in some way. Contrary to expectations at the start of the study, the interviews did not provide information about violence in relation to events. As a result, in the remainder of this report, references to results from these interviews will only be made sporadically.

1.1.3 UK

A lot of commotion ensued after the death of a man during a large scale protest around the G-20 summit held in London in April 2009. Several reports were published, most notably two reports from HMIC and a report of a joint parliamentary commission. For this study, use was made of these reports and of YouTube footage and publications in the media. In addition, interviews were held with three police commanders of different levels who were involved in policing operations during the summit and a visit was paid to the Public Order Intelligence Unit of the Metropolitan Police. It is clear events around the G-20 would not have gotten as much attention as they did were it not for the death of an uninvolved citizen. On the contrary, in that case, mention would only have been made (as was done initially) of a highly successful police operation. Yet, each of the different reports identifies a large number of shortcomings and emphasises the need for change.

In the next step of the study interviews were held with four police officers of three different English police forces (Greater Manchester Police, West Mid-

lands Police, Thames Valley Police) and the National Police Improvement Agency NPIA. Topic of the interviews were events in relation to demonstrations of the extreme-right EDL (English Defence League) and associated counter-protests by left wing UAF (Unite Against Fascism). Use was also made of information collected from EDL and UAF websites and from the media (press clippings, TV coverage of events). In addition we could make use of a restricted NPIA report on Defence League demonstrations.

The English Defence League emerged in March 2009 when a group of Muslims protested as the Royal Anglian Regiment paraded through Luton on its return from Afghanistan. A counter-demonstration under the name of United People of Luton led to arrests. Local football supporters subsequently formed English Defence League “divisions” run by football supporters in Luton, north London, Bristol, Portsmouth and Southampton, Derby, Cardiff and the West Midlands. Especially individuals that are banned from attending football matches are involved. At a local level, migrant youths are attracted to the counter demonstrations organised by UAF.

Some examples of EDL-related events are the following.

- ☐ On September 7th 2009 a confrontation occurred in Birmingham between EDL and UAF supporters. The police made 90 arrests.
- ☐ On October 10th 2009 a confrontation occurred in Manchester between EDL adherents and police. 55 persons were arrested.
- ☐ In January 2010 an EDL rally in Stoke-on-Trent led to a violent clash between EDL-adherents and police after EDL adherents forced through a police cordon to get at UAF supporters.
- ☐ During an EDL protest in Dudley on April 3rd 2010 fights evolved among rival hooligan groups that had joined the protest.



Martina Schreiber

Germany: May Day in Berlin

2.1 Background

May Day in Germany, also known as Labour Day has been celebrated for more than 100 years and still has political significance. Particularly the capital Berlin is the place of numerous yearly May demonstrations, held by trade unions, political parties, organisations and campaigns. In addition, this holiday is characterised by various public and private open air events such as street parties, picnics and concerts, often organised by local organisations and neighbourhood initiatives. However, in the previous 20 years, May 1st in Berlin has also become famous for its recurring May-riots and as such is associated with burning cars, flying cobblestones, street fights, water cannons and heavily armed riot police. What by now has become a tradition once started rather unexpectedly, in 1987. In 1987 the German political and social context was affected by strong debates about a census of the population. In particular alternative left wing groups engaged in anti-census-appeals and the ensuing boycotts and the start of the riot were in some way linked to the fact that Berlin police had forced open the office of an anti-census group in Berlin-Kreuzberg and searched the rooms in the early hours of May Day 1987.

2.1.1 The catalyst: May Day 1987

The initial May Day riot took place in 1987 around a street-party at Lausitz-square in Berlin-Kreuzberg. Sources do not provide a distinct picture about the order of events at that day, however, police as well as citizens agree that the riots and the strength of the fights was surprising to all sides. The party at Lausitz-square was organised by several left wing groups (LÖPA, 2010) and joined by Kreuzberg locals and tourists. Though the atmosphere was initially peaceful, members of the left wing groups were frustrated by the fact that police had forced open the office of an anti-census group in Berlin-Kreuzberg and searched the rooms in the early hours of that day. In the afternoon of

May 1st police was called to Lausitz-square, apparently because a local resident had complained about the noise. While the officers spoke to this person, their police car was pushed over (No author, 2010). At first there was no direct police reaction with regard to this incident. People were irritated but stayed on the street-party. In the early evening two construction site trailers were moved onto the street and some isolated incidents occurred. At Görlitzer Bahnhof (an underground station opposite the square), for example, a group of punks threw bottles towards a police van and dispersed, with some of them hiding at Lausitz-square. Also, when a demonstration started at the northern part of the square, a police car passed by and stones were thrown at the car (No author, 2010). Police initially reacted situationally to the different incidents and eventually stormed the square, using heavy gear, batons and tear gas. However, the visitors resisted. Barricades were raised, stones and bottles thrown. Eventually in the later evening police withdrew from the scene (Wikipedia, 2010). The subsequent hours were characterised by acts of violence and pillages. The aggression was targeted against cars, supermarkets, little shops, stations, public transport, and people even hindered the fire brigade from entering the scene to extinguish the fire of the burning supermarket. The message of the riot got around quickly and more and more people joined in. Participants were not only drawn from the alternative left scene, also normal citizens actively took part in attacking the police and in acts of pillage and destruction. Several hours later, the police, – heavily equipped – returned, and eventually ended the riot, using water cannons and armoured vehicles. About 100 people got injured and 46 arrests were made. However, none of the persons arrested that night was a member of the alternative scene (Gerber, 2007). Huge parts of the alternative left wing movement subsequently claimed the success of that night: having achieved a legal vacuum – at least for some hours.

“First of May, 1987. A party was taking place on Lausitz square in Kreuzberg, part of the former West Berlin. Some fighting happened and a police van was destroyed. Autonomes subsequently recommended withdrawal as retaliation was expected. While the Autonomes went home, Kreuzberg and other Berlin locals stayed on. When supporting police arrived, people spontaneously raised small obstacles. Like a trigger, this led to the build up of real barricades. People did not leave; more and more seemed to arrive, normal folk. Rather than occasional throwing of stones, whole showers of stones were tossed, hundreds at once. Police officers

were noticeably afraid. Disobeying orders, they removed slowly and then fled in panic. Kreuzberg was freed for a moment. People plundered a supermarket, normal folk. Turkish grannies with aprons 'went shopping'. Later the shop was burnt down. The electric power supply for the square was switched off. The rhythmic hammering of stones sounded like music in the Kreuzberg night. The victory was achieved, if only for one night." (Translated and adapted from Jan Wedding, 2003.)

Though left wing people later criticised the alcohol abuse, sexual harassment, plundering of small shops and uncontrolled violence, the main achievement of that night (i.e. chasing the police out of the area) was perceived as a victory, it let them claim this date and initiate the "Revolutionist May 1st Demonstration" at May 1st 1988. Police – on the other hand – admitted bad conduct. As a reaction to the Kreuzberg riots of 1987, the Home Senator of Berlin, Wilhelm Kewenig, of the conservative Christian Democrats introduced a special unit/ anti riot squad, the so called EbLT: Unit for special situations and deployment-based training, Einheit für besondere Lagen und einsatzbezogenes Training. The team consisted of 62 men and 2 women between 20 and 30, recruited from riot-police units. Their primary task was to deliver decisive proofs of committed crime and to counter violent actions at hot spots. Officers were fully equipped with helmets, shields, batons, protective gear and ice hockey gum shields and received additional physical training. In order to counter street fights they had riot control vehicles at their disposal that were equipped with solid rubber wheels, reinforced side walls and a radiator grill, that was armoured with a piling device.

2.1.2 Starting the tradition: the first Revolutionary May Day demonstration 1988

1988 was the starting point for the independent Revolutionary May Day demonstration. It was organised by alternative left-wing groups and was regarded as a counterpoint to the traditional demonstration of the Federation of German Trade Unions. 6,000 to 8,000 people joined the first march that led through the districts of Neukölln and Kreuzberg in former West Berlin. While the march proceeded peacefully, riots started in the late evening, when an off-licence shop was plundered, close to the Lausitz square where the previous riot had taken place. 300 to 400 persons were said to have participated in this riot, lots of them youths, drunks and tourists; however, in contrast to the

withdrawal in 1987, police reacted heavily, using teargas, water cannon and armoured vehicles. The special anti-riot unit, EBLT, that was also deployed, was afterwards strongly criticised for indiscriminate use of force and brutality. It was reported that also three leading police officers who had observed the deployment got beaten up by their own staff. Independent reports reveal the deployment of 1,500 police officers, more than 100 casualties and 134 arrests (LÖPA, 2010; rbbonline, 2007).

2.1.3 The May Day Scenario

From 1988 onwards the May riots became a tradition in Berlin, while the typical scenario also covered events that took place on April 30th, the so called “Walpurgis Night”. Characteristically, the biggest event was the main May demonstration held by the Federation of German Trade Unions (DGB). However, riots and violent clashes often occurred around the Revolutionary May Day Demonstration, that was organised from 1988. Over the years the demonstration ran through Berlin-Kreuzberg/ Neukölln/ Friedrichshain/ or Mitte. It was organised by left wing alternative groups. However, incompatible opinions and beliefs between groups sometimes resulted in violent conflict during the marches. From 1991 to 1993 for instance, frictions between Revolutionist International Movement (RIM), a communist organisation, and other participants led to violent clashes, so that from 1994 onwards the RIM started a separate protest march. Other organisations also registered for their own demonstrations. Still the Revolutionary May Day Demonstration activated the most participants, with 10,000 people on average. Due to disagreements and frustrations about the fights in the preceding years, no Revolutionary Demonstration was organised in 1994 and 1995, also in 2001 the march did not take place as the Home Senator Werthebach decided to ban the demonstration as a reaction to violent actions coming from the demonstrators. Still, single street fights occurred. In spite of the deployment of 9,000 officers and 600 arrests made, the number of casualties was high, as were the operational costs. May Day 2001 marked a negative record in the history of this event.

Street parties provided a further focus point for crowd action and became an issue for public order. Though many open-air events were set up all over the city, the parties and concerts in the districts of Prenzlauer Berg, Friedrichshain and Kreuzberg, attracted thousands of people. Organised by groups from the alternative left scene, these sites often served as the begin-

ning or end of a march. Often, violent actions would start around a street party, sometimes leading to widespread riots. Since 1987 street parties had been organised annually, apart from May Day 1992, when people apparently had given in to the reoccurring violence of stones and tear gas that had happened in the previous years (LÖPA, 2010). In later years street parties and open-air events had increasingly been used as a tool of crowd management, for instance in 2000 the police organised games for teenagers to provide alternative options for engagement and to keep them away from violent actions. From 2003 local citizens and the administration in Kreuzberg and Friedrichshain organised the MYFEST, in order to create a peaceful alternative for the riots, “reclaim the space” from the rioters (Wikipedia, 2010) and for people to celebrate peacefully in their neighbourhood. Since 2003 MYFEST takes place every May Day, with an attendance that started with 5,000 and went up to 50,000 visitors in 2007.

Fights and riots generally developed in the late afternoon or evening, around the demonstrations or street parties and sometimes lasted until late at night or early morning. The typical picture showed the throwing of cobblestones, plundering, building and burning of barricades and burning of cars. Police reaction varied from loudhailer announcements, cordoning off of streets to the deployment of intervention and arrest teams, the use of water cannon, pepper spray and tear gas. Obviously, different views of responsibility for the particular incidents of violence were uttered. One side accusing “chaoten”, rioters, others blaming unprovoked and indiscriminate use of force by the police. The number of arrests ranged from 47 in 1987 to 616 in 2001; the number of police officers deployed ranged between 400 (in 1987) and 9,000 (2001). Variations of the scenario occurred in the number and the route of the demonstrations, the composition of groups, of participants in fights and in police strategy and tactics. Political changes, particularly in government and responsibility had an impact on policing strategy, with de-escalating approaches being linked to a social democratic Home Senator and more repressive strategies associated with a conservative government. Also the reunion of Germany played an important role, firstly, simply due to an extension of the area that had to be policed and also because of additional marches and parties being organised, now also in former East-Berlin. Within the group of protesters, changes became obvious through disputes about the course of the march or the representation of different groups within the demonstration; this mainly affected the May Days in the early '90's. As a secondary effect to the unification, Nazi-groups became empowered and also registered for

marches on May Day. This in turn mobilised anti-fascist groups and accounted for further frictions. While the very first group of rioters was composed of alternative left wing activist and locals of Berlin-Kreuzberg, more teenagers, including young migrants and visitors took part in later years.

2.2 The phenomenon

2.2.1 Who is involved on an individual/ group level (locals, travellers, national, international)?

Although the May 1st riots initially developed from a conflict between left wing activists and the police, even the first riot in 1987 was not just a battle between these groups, as also normal visitors of the street party, local residents, teenagers and even Turkish grannies took part in the riot; the destructions of cars and shops and the raid of a supermarket. None of the 46 persons arrested that night was a member of the alternative scene (Gerber, 2007). Similarly, a recent report from Berlin's office for the protection of the constitution claims that only part of the violent acts conducted at May 1st can be ascribed to politically motivated violence (Senatsverwaltung für Inneres, 2009).

In 2009, 289 arrests were made of which 267 were men, 262 of German origin. The majority of these people were described as rather unobtrusive young adults who were neither left extremists nor had a police record (Küpper, 2009). The deeds had occurred from inside the black block. The home secretary spoke of "opportunity delinquents and left radicals who give them an opportunity". (Küpper, 2009).

2.2.2 Age (arrested in 2009)

93% Of the persons in 2009 arrested were male. The average age of the persons arrested was 22.5.

The vast majority of the persons arrested in 2009 had German citizenship (87%). 8 Percent had another citizenship and 3% have dual citizenship. These numbers refer to 215 of the arrested persons. The majority of the arrested persons was registered in Berlin (76%), 10 percent in Brandenburg (the state surrounding Berlin) and 14 percent in other German states. (Hoffmann-Holland, 2010:37).

Table 1: Percentage of arrested persons in different age groups in 2009

Age of arrested persons (N = 289)	Percentage
14 – 17	18
18 – 20	24,5
21 – 25	31,5
26 – 30	15
> 30	11

Source: Hoffmann-Holland 2010: 34 and 35

2.2.3 What indications are there for organisation and planning of the groups?

There is no indication for planned violence. The fact that most violent acts at demonstrations are conducted without physical means, indicates that violence is likely to be an issue of opportunity (SfI, 2009:34). Further, reports of arrests reveal that offenders are more acting individually. However, it also seems that the framework of a demonstration, the anonymity of the crowd and the black block in particular, is used as a platform to conduct violence.

An analysis of the action files of accusations in 2009 revealed that in 7 percent of the files information was given on the political background of the respective offender. This number does not allow to draw meaningful conclusions with regard to forms of organisation and political backgrounds of the accused. (Hoffmann-Holland, 2010: 53).

In 31 files that contained information about an offender's motivation, it was revealed that the motivation to commit an offence developed situationally (Hoffmann-Holland, 2010:53).

2.2.4 Who is involved in organising and planning?

There is a connection between some left radical activists and members of the Die Linken party of the Berlin Senate with regard to joint mobilisation of demonstration participants and the registration of demonstration (Senatsverwaltung für Inneres, 2009: 51). Recently, however, members of the senate have distanced themselves from violent behaviour at the demonstration (Küpper, 2009).

2.2.5 Are there specific tactics being used by the groups? Violent and non-violent ones?

Some citizens' groups publish photographs of plain clothes officers on the internet. Mms messages are used to display and distribute pictures of police informants and plain-clothes officers. Portraits are printed and distributed amongst the crowd. Also signs are used to directly point at these persons once they are recognised inside the crowd. (No author, 2007; Interview Berlin office for protection of the constitution, 2009).

Refusal of communication with the police is a further tactic, small group tactics involve the sudden running of small groups. The "black block" is used as a demonstration tactic. Persons dress up uniformly in black clothes (usually this involves black trousers and a hooded jumper). In this way they appear as one single mass and the similar look makes it difficult for police to distinguish individuals. Often, black block participants disguise themselves further, using balaclava and sun glasses, aimed at preventing participants from being recognised. The black block is a means also used by offenders to hide and to conduct criminal acts, such as the throwing of items using the coverage of the masses. By placing banners around the group of demonstrators police interventions (especially arrests) are made more difficult.

Int: Are there specific parts of the demonstrations where the violence starts?

"That is the black block, definitely. Those who build the black block and who are disguised, massively disguised. And, yes, that is the questions always, that police should make their point (to prosecute illegal covering), the legal principle, but interests, appropriateness of measures, if that's worth the price? But there are many, many who are disguised. And those are also the offenders."

Some participants have rather clear ideas of how to throw stones. In order to prevent injuries of crowd participants it is suggested to only throw stones when the target (the police) is visible and only from the first line of the demonstration (justsomelousyhippie 2009). Announcements from a loud speaker call on the demonstrators not to throw stones at members of the own group (DemoWatch 2009a).

2.2.6 Kinds of offences

Half of the offences committed during demonstrations are breach of the public peace (50%). 35 Percent regard bodily harm; 12 percent are cases of civil disorder/ obstructing a police officer in the course of his duty, and another twelve percent regard arson (Senatsverwaltung für Inneres, 2009: 18,19). Especially cases of breaching the public peace are carried out by groups bigger than 10 persons. In more than half of the cases one offence is carried out by a big group. However, 37 percent of offences are carried out by one single person.

Table 2: Accusations against civilians in 2009

Number of accusations	Offence
27,1	massive breach of the peace
7,2	breach of the public peace
26,1	dangerous bodily harm
2,7	bodily harm
19,1	resisting a police officer in the execution of his duty
9,5	Against Right of Assembly (disguising)
4,7	Damage to property
3,6	other

Source: Hoffmann-Holland, 2010:20

Table 3: Number of suspects per offence in 2009

Number of suspects per offence	Percentage
> 10	55
6-10	2
3-5	4
2	2
1 (individual offender)	15
1 (out of a group)	22

Source: Senatsverwaltung für Inneres, 2009: 39.

53 % Of the 2009 arrested persons had no previous criminal record (Hoffmann-Holland, 2010: 47).

2.2.7 What are the aims/ goals of the groups?

Motives for violent acts from some members of left radical groups relate to hate of the “system and the cops” so that for some people violence at May Day demonstrations is in part politically motivated. The aims comprise inducing social unrest and expressing social distortions caused by the credit crisis. From these positions perpetrators justify attacks on police officers. However, there are huge discussions about the pros and cons for the use of violence among left activists. Reporting on the 2009 riots, Küpper (2009) suggests that police dealt with a “diffuse mass” of 400 to 700 persons without apparent political intentions. Bottles and stones were thrown from the crowd but there was no apparent group cohesion.

Part of the offenders are also called “event-oriented” youngsters which do not necessarily act in terms of a political background but are more motivated by the excitement of conducting violence and challenging the police.

2.2.8 What are the targets?

Violence on May Day in Berlin is most frequently targeted at police officers. (Senatsverwaltung für Inneres, 2009: 37). In 75% of the cases police officers deployed at demonstrations are targeted. 8% of violence was directed at the “general public” and 5% against the political enemy – this usually being right extremist groups or individuals (Senatsverwaltung für Inneres, 2009: 58).

2.2.9 The use of communication channels

Before the event especially internet is used to transport information for example on demonstration routes. Groups also use the internet and mobile phone technology for the distribution of photos of police officers and political enemies (see above). Mobile phone technology is also used to capture actual happenings within the crowd, especially conflictual situations between crowd members and the police. Such footage is later found on internet platforms such as YouTube (for example Lecktfetz 2009). From the official demonstration loudspeaker telephone numbers are communicated to be used in case of arrests (to inform the organisers or to get help from attorneys).

Discussions after the event are made via internet platforms, for example

indymedia.org. Equally such platforms are used to mobilise people to take part in further demonstration or actions. It is used for news concerning demonstration routes and times of rallies. Sometimes mobile phone tickers are provided or participants make use of Twitter. Sometimes activists make use of a radio station (Aktionsradio).

2.2.10 The use of weapons

More than half of the violence (59%) is carried out without weapons or other items. In 31 percent of the cases offenders threw missiles such as bottles or stones, the remaining cases involve fireworks and other items (Senatsverwaltung für Inneres, 2009: 35). In one case a person carried a gun (Hoffmann-Holland, 2010:45).

2.2.11 Impact of alcohol and drugs

Evidence for drunkenness of the offenders is only given in 8% of the suspects (71 of 810). The validity of these numbers is therefore not sufficient. (Senatsverwaltung für Inneres, 2009: 36). 57% of all arrested persons were said to have been under the influence of alcohol. The validity of these numbers is weak because there have not necessarily been exact measures. Measures of the arrested persons were taken in half of the cases (n=110). About 50% of the arrested that were under the influence of alcohol had a value of maximal 1,0‰ or less, 30% between 1,01 and 1,50‰; 15% between 1,51 and 2,00‰ and 3% more than 2,00‰ (Hoffmann-Holland, 2010: 43). The data do not allow to draw definite conclusions about whether or not alcohol had an impact on the offence. However, from those numbers which are available Hoffmann-Holland (2010:45) it can be assumed that the impact is small. The use of drugs was only stated in 6 cases (Hoffmann-Holland, 2010:46).

2.2.12 What is the context in which the incident occurs?

The incidents traditionally occur when the demonstration meets a group of police officers or passes symbolic objects, for example at May Day 2009 paint was thrown against the building of the Ministry of Finance. (Senatsverwal-

tung für Inneres, 2009: 66). In 2009 some witnesses stated that the first withdrawal of police after having been attacked by protesters was seen as encouragement for further attacks (Hoffmann-Holland, 2010).

2.2.13 How do the groups use the media?

Many demonstrators react in a hostile way toward the media as they see their personal rights being violated when they are photographed or filmed when taking part in a demonstration. Interviews are often rejected or people make sure that their face is covered. However, meanwhile there are alternative uses of media. As a reaction to police video teams, there are small groups or individuals who (claim to) document the happenings during the event from a more objective position or from a position that takes the view of the demonstrators more into account, such as DemoWatch (2009a-h).

2.3 Intervention

2.3.1 Legal and organisational context

The basic law for Assemblies and rallies in Germany (Versammlungsrecht and the Brokdorf verdict) emphasises the right of assembly. The verdict obliges police forces to act “assembly friendly” and take concrete measures of de-escalation. In particular, the authorities must establish early contacts between the parties, exchange information and cooperate in a trustful way. Part of the verdict also comprises close cooperation between the police and the organisers of the demonstration for example by pre-event meetings or the provision of security staff that would then cooperate with the respective police force.

The law of assembly is used in order to minimise aspects of risk, for example by optimising the routes of sensitive demonstrations or by requirements that are aimed to reduce the misuse of banners or posters (Senatsverwaltung für Inneres, 2009: 69).

Police conduct, responsibilities of the different parties around assemblies, rallies and demonstrations, for example meetings beforehand, ways of communication, tactical issues and aims and aspects of risk assessment are described

in the police service directive PDV 100 (Polizeidienstvorschrift, see also part NRW). Although the separate German states all have their own legislations, the norms and regulations for interventions that apply to crowd events are more or less similar.

The Berlin police is responsible for the policing of the event, however, with regard to the high risk of the events generally additional supporting units are used, coming from other German states which will then operate under the legal system of the state of Berlin.

2.3.2 Policing

Philosophy, basic approach

The “concept of the outstretched hand” is an inherent part of the strategic approach of Berlin police. Its underlying idea is that the May Day riots are not simply a policing issue, but rather a socio-political problem that needs to be tackled jointly by different social groupings and it therefore particularly considers the role and the impact of local residents, campaigns and organisations in the pursuit of peaceful events (Klug, 2003). These features of cooperation with the neighbourhood residents and local organisations are then combined with a concept of communication and awareness training prior to the event and a balanced policing on May Day that is adjusted to the particular situation on the ground (Knape, 2003:188).

The concept was initially developed as a reaction to a heavy handed policing approach at May 1st in Prenzlauer Berg.

“From 12 noon Prenzlauer Berg was occupied by slowly rising numbers of officers. Everybody who walked along was checked and then each citizen ... was controlled for the sixth time. A state of siege was accomplished in Prenzlauer Berg. [...] And this led to the highest emotions and eruption-like actions of violence from the left scene, which had only been waiting for something like that.”

The development of the new concept was related to a change of personnel in the direction of that district, where the new director saw the need “to conceive of something”. He immediately set up a working group of 10 people

that exclusively dealt with the question of “how can we do things differently?” Bit by bit the new approach was built up. A first step was to impose a state of normality to the area and to re-establish trust with local citizens.

“We wanted a completely different strategy and first we had to (fight) against huge prejudices. In the first year we did not succeed at all. In the second we did. Because all the shop owners closed their businesses one day before the event. Do trust us, leave the shops open. We must keep up a state of normality for as long as possible.”

Restoring normality also involved a different police presence: As opposed to massive presence of riot police, officers in normal uniform with baseball hats were deployed and instructed to speak a lot with citizens, while the riot police units were kept from the scene for as long as possible. Berlin police advertised for the new approach using prominent persons and talks at radio stations and involved local politicians and football players in their campaign.

Characteristics of the current concept of the outstretched hand

The concept allows to counter and to adjust to the dynamics and risks that may evolve during the May Day event. It focuses on measures aiming to reduce conflict and of discrete presence in peaceful situations. (Senatsverwaltung für Inneres, 2009: 36). In order to provide for flexibility, Berlin police makes use of different units – such as communication officers, units in normal uniforms, plain clothes officers, intervention and riot police units – which can then be deployed along different levels of risk. Berlin police has defined such phases that describe certain situations to which the deployment can be adjusted accordingly. Initially, deployment was carried out covering three phases of escalation:

Phase 1: Patrol cars, limited presence of units in normal uniforms or plain clothes officers. Setting up areas of low or no police presence, in close cooperation with organisers.

Phase 2: (Increasing aggression, single violent incidents). Increasing use of patrol cars, moving riot police units to bases that are close to the site (in order to prepare for phase 3).

Phase 3: (Immediate imminent or already violent conflict, in particular building of barricades, throwing over of cars, physical aggression against officers).

Quick, compact offensive intervention of strong units in areas that had been allocated beforehand. Low threshold of intervention, use of all means of force up to cordoning off and closing in.

In 2003 the deployment was reduced to two phases which were applied like this since.

Phase 1 involves the deployment of AKT (anti conflict team) officers in standard uniforms and plain-clothes officers. The policing of small, spatially limited incidents is possible, also the use of intervention units.

Phase 2 will be introduced when widespread conflict is expected or conflict spreads around several areas or in cases where the intensity and number of offenders requires broad police presence, covering all areas of responsibility (Klug, 2003). AKT officers will be withdrawn and the deployment of the intelligence & intervention unit is restricted as they do not wear full protection. But they can still work at the periphery. The riot police will be working in the centre of the violence, together with an observation team.

The main reasons for the reduction of phases are seen in the danger that officers would be subjected to during the former phase 2: "Because it was realised it is too dangerous. Either it stays calm so that we can go on with phase 1 or it turns around completely and then phase 3 must be applied. Well, phase 2 has not been practicable."

Dialogue teams

The Anti Konflikt Team, AKT, is a tactical option of the gold commander. The officers have undergone specific training. They wear normal uniforms with "Anti Konflikt Team" printed on yellow vests and baseball hats. AKT police do not wear protective equipment. Their main task is to speak using everyday language. "You must talk like the street." Officers pro-actively make contact with participants, local residents, visitors and media representatives with the aim to prevent conflict, to mediate and break the cycle of violence but also to explain measures and account for transparency of policing. They are not deployed at violent situations, but around those locations and situations that bear a potential of risk, trying to detect warning signals at an early stage. The officers have a range of action within which they can act independently. Target groups are not the hard core offenders or the black block, as these mostly refuse to communicate with police, but those around this hard core. The offi-

cers aim to prevent the “ambivalent masses” from joining in violent actions. So they may point out that participants may be used as “cover” and that they will be made responsible for offences if they do not withdraw. A further target group are young people from a bourgeois background, school kids who see 1 May as a framework to engage in drinking, throwing bottles or conducting other kinds of violent behaviour. During May 1st, for example at Myfest, AKT officers approach such groups, talk to them and discuss with them the consequences for example of “What happens when you throw a stone?” Other tasks involve assuring that restrictions for demonstrations are being complied with, for example when specific photographs are illegal.

Intelligence and Intervention unit (A+I)

The Intelligence & Intervention unit (A+I from Aufklärung + Intervention), was derived from an anti-Hooligan unit which Berlin police had initially set up for the World Cup 2006. The unit consists of 100 officers who are particularly trained to detect offenders and violent acts at an early stage and provide for timely arrests. These officers wear civilian clothing; a blue vest, displaying “Aufklärung und Intervention” (for Intelligence and Intervention). They are fully armed and protected (e.g. fire weapon, baton). These officers are specifically deployed during tense situations that bear the danger of escalation. They have a wider repertoire of intervention techniques at their disposal, starting with addressing people, in particular ring leaders, but they are also permitted to use force and to arrest people. They operate in a team of about 100 and are openly present. Officers are physically fit and meet with a certain respect within the scenes of participants. They are deployed around different events, like football games and demonstrations. The A+I unit can be seen as in-between the Anti Konflikt team (see below) and the usual riot units.

The role of media, local residents

The approach further involves close cooperation with local residents, organisations and administrations both before and during the event. Activities of Berlin police in the start-up phase of the event comprise of information and “street work” in order to explain the approach, direct talks and “warning” of known criminals and potential offenders not to engage in violence (see also “intelligence”). In order to target special groups (“gefährdete Gruppen”), in particular teenagers, also from a migrant background, police visit schools and cooperate with community workers and different organisations.

In an attempt of local residents to reclaim the space back from violent rioters the street-party MYFEST was founded in 2003 by the local administration of Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg, organisations and residents (rbb online, 2007; Fischer, 2007). The initiative is recognised and subsidised by the Senate of Berlin. It was the intention of the organisers to express their respect for political demonstrations on the one hand, but also to put across their disapproval of any violent behaviour. MYFEST organisers are also cooperating with Berlin police in connection with the “Outreach” concept and the new de-escalating strategy. The active participants of MYFEST mirror a good deal of the local society, comprising churches, single shops, film companies, (Turkish) sport clubs, fire brigade, initiatives and many more. In the first years the party had to be broken up due to fights at or in the vicinity. However, even though a party cannot directly prevent all violent acts, clear messages were sent out and commitments to non-violent behaviour were made, leaving violent offenders marginalised. This intent was supported and facilitated by a graded policing that made officers able to adjust deployment quickly to the relevant situation, however, showing a low-profile, wherever there was low risk. As a result of the heavy riots of 2009, MYFEST founder Silke Fischer announced her withdrawal from the initiative (BZonline, 2009).

In the meantime the following behavioural profile is standard for officers in Berlin:

Behavioural profile

Speech is a tactical means of the police also in virulent phases of deployment. Transparency should be applied as much as possible. Only when it is clear that offenders prevail, more forceful means are used. There is a constant training and discussion of this approach throughout the year.

Deployment of different units at the different stages

Officers of the AKT are not armed and do not wear protective gear. When the situation escalates they must immediately be withdrawn as they would be at risk otherwise. The next level of escalation would then be the A & I units. These officers have a comprehensive training, they are armed and protected and dispose of a large variety of intervention techniques, starting from communication, like “stop that nonsense” up to forceful interventions and arrests. In case of a further escalation of the situation these officers are

also withdrawn. At this stage riot police take over, together with civilian observers. They may focus on specific persons and say:

“This did not work that did not work, well we have 3,4 offenders that we concentrate on, and you go that way now and then the (riot police) units move with them. And then you sometimes wait ... for hours, sometimes until the end of the demonstration until you find a suitable moment to take them out.”

Information/ intelligence

Before the event

Persons that were already at the police's attention (in general because they had committed violence at previous events) are targeted. Police officers visit them at their house to let them know that they are under surveillance.

During the event

During the event, intelligence is gathered by intelligence officers and observers (Tatbeobachter, Aufklärer) in plain clothes, belonging to sub section “Täterorientierte Bearbeitung” (perpetrator oriented work). They are deployed close to the event and to (potential) offenders or risk groups. However, their potential is limited.

“Well, the Achilles heel of every police action is the question: When should we intervene? And when you are member of a pure intelligence unit you must actually not carry out interventions and arrests. Firstly it does not work because they have no protection gear, secondly one would immediately be uncovered and thirdly one is nicely close by but then you need to allocate (other) officers.”

In order to avoid delays, the intelligence officers and observers work in close cooperation with arrest and intervention units (1 - 2 Festnahmehundertschaften) which are also allocated to the same overall section “Intelligence”. These units are composed of specially trained officers. The units are deployed and act when some relevant information has been gathered or criminal acts are observed by the observer officers. A further component is formed by the “Intelligence and intervention” unit (see above).

Risk analysis

Risk analysis is partly constructed from reports supplied by the “office for the protection of the constitution” and information from the scene “I do not want to tell more about this”.

Outcomes of the concept and actual developments

The concept has been refined and further developed: Concerning arrest numbers and casualties there have been varying levels of success but changes in behaviour and acceptance were visible. In 2004 police noted a decrease in violence in Kreuzberg and in the following years May 1st was as peaceful as ever (rbb online, 2009). However, another peak was reached in 2009, when 273 police officers were injured in Kreuzberg, 289 persons were arrested and 44 warrants were served, four of which for attempted murder (Zeit online, 2009). Other than at previous events, violence did not start in the dark but erupted massively around 7 pm. A main problem with respect to escalation was seen in the fact that the demonstration ran through the Myfest which made it impossible for police to enforce pre-event searching and offenders were able to hide within the huge masses of the Myfest. Bearing on this, changes were made for the following event:

Change of tactics between 2009 and 2010

On an organisational basis the demonstration in 2010 was clearly separated from the Myfest. In 2010 police further showed clearer presence and was in close proximity to the marching groups.

“Being closer by, earlier intervention and arrest, pre-event controls, no waiving of controls ... This time (the demonstration started) away from the Myfest, therefore more intensive controls, (officers) close by right from the beginning. Man lebt in der Lage (untranslatable, MS). From this May 1st (2009) was learned: Trust is good, control is better.”

Loudspeaker vans

Loudspeaker vans are an integral part of the riot police units. They are used as a means to address larger groups of people. They are used for de-escalation announcements and to explain police measures. During escalating situations

they are particularly used to de-anonymise offenders and to explain police interventions so that rumours are prevented. “You, over there in the corner, with the yellow sweatshirt and the baseball hat, you are committing a crime. And appealing to the crowd to distance from that man.”

The speakers receive specific training. They use everyday language. However, it was stated that members of the left scene do not accept the loudspeaker but rather shout at it.

Water cannon

Water cannons are deployed when the use of violence is openly announced or propagated by participant groups. However, they are only used when officers are attacked by stones, bottles, cans or Molotov cocktails or a bigger crowd and the police is not able to keep a distance using any other means. The use of a water cannon is more an act of self defence. Another possible use is indicated in case of arson, for extinguishing fire. Altogether however, water cannons are regarded as more counterproductive. Targeted and evidence proof arrests are an integral part of the Berlin policing approach, rather than dispersing the crowd by the use of water cannons.

Stewards

The law of assembly prescribes demonstrating groups to provide for their own security guards. Also police is obliged to cooperate with them. However, current data do not provide information on if and how such cooperation works.

Arrests (summary of above sections)

The Berlin police emphasises the tactics of targeted and evidence proof arrests, rather than mass arrests (see below). In order to accomplish this, they make use of a variety of units which act in various situations. Intelligence officers and observers, work in plain clothes and cooperate with specifically trained arrest units. A+I officers are openly visible, observe, set limits and arrest. Loudspeaker vans are used to openly address and uncover offenders. Observers integrated in riot police units sometimes follow offenders until there is a good opportunity to arrest them.

Enclosures and mass arrests

Enclosures of groups larger than 50 and mass arrests are more seen as a last option for police to act. Berlin police prefer to apply a concept of decisive arrests of individual offenders. Enclosures are time and staff consuming and are not seen as suitable means and should only be used as a last resort. They further contradict the aim of Berlin police to provide for targeted and evidence based arrests.

“We (Berlin police) rather carry out targeted interventions against ring leaders and that we take them out and our politics and tactics are targeted ‘pinpricks’ and targeted arrests. Mass arrests, we did not have good experiences with that in Berlin and nationwide ... I know we can do it, we would be using it in case it is absolutely, absolutely, absolutely necessary to bind a bigger group of violent offenders. But then police are also obliged to act. Immediately start to work. You need to check Ids, you cannot hang on waiting, you must immediately work with concepts and you are obliged to time regulations, therefore ... I regard the enclosure of groups bigger than 50 as tactically very problematic. Because it binds too many officers which I need at other locations.”

At the end of their report Hoffman & Hoffmann conclude that, while the available data have a lot of limitations, the events of May 1st 2009 in Berlin comprised a complex social whole, that is interpreted in different ways by the different actors. These interpretations lead to diverse interactions and social dynamics, where police actions are of considerable relevance. Participating civilians often viewed police action as undifferentiated and sometimes as disproportionate.

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Germany: policing escalating crowd situations in North Rhine-Westphalia

3.1 The phenomenon

Being asked about the kind of events during which violent escalations take place in North Rhine-Westphalia, the interview partners referred to two main areas: demonstrations and football games. With regard to demonstrations in particular those situations were mentioned that contain a clash between right and left wing groups or those demonstrations that involve Palestinian or Kurdish groups. While the latter types of demonstrations could in principle be regarded as peaceful events, experiences showed that whenever a police measure had to be carried out, the group reacted with massive resistance with several hundred people becoming violent so that the deployment of riot police at this kind of event is also considered necessary.

Another range covers football games in different leagues, in particular risk games and derbies. Beyond that the interviewees named festive events such as the Love Parade, which up to now have taken place in Essen (2007) and Dortmund (2008)¹ and Carnival in Cologne as well as other unorganised events. The unorganized events concern in particular arguments and fights in Düsseldorf old town and recurring incidents at the Cappenberg lake, north of Dortmund, where on May 1st several thousand persons gather. Together with strong consumption of alcohol this event regularly turns violent. In addition, increasing resistance against police officers was stated as a trend, so that even in everyday situations the employment of riot police units becomes more and more necessary.

¹ After this report had been completed, bad crowd management of the 2010 Love Parade held in Duisburg led to the death of 21 people and several hundred people being injured. These events are still under investigation.

3.1.1 Characteristics of offenders

Who is involved on an individual/ group level?

Across the different events it is stated that especially younger and male persons engage in violent actions, the age breakdown covers about 15 to 35 years. “The bit that starts moving and causing problems, those are the younger ones.”

In connection with violence involving groups from left wing autonomous groups, more females are involved than was the case in the past, in particular with regard to group dynamic situations, when participation is seen as an expression of group membership. Football violence, however, is nearly exclusively committed by males. Difficulties to identify problematic groups were reported, as violent offenders do not necessarily act as one single group so that risk assessments are difficult to obtain.

Developments toward violent actions have particularly been observed around far right wing groups. Initially these were hardly been noticeable; they used to cooperate with police and comply with restrictions. Since about five years, however, so called “National Autonomes” are adapting tactics which have been used by left wing autonomous groups, such as forming black blocks, covering up and use of pyrotechnics. Violent action is directed against the political opponent but also massively and purposely against police officers.

Offenders from the left wing were found to be connected with different subgroups: Antifa, Antideutsche, Punker, MLPD, Die Linke, Die Falken, Kurdish organisations and a small proportion of bourgeois left wing oriented citizens and citizens from a Kurdish background.

Since two or three years groups of youngsters coming from areas with a high proportion of migrant background were found to attend carnival events in Cologne with the aim to engage in fights. They are not drunk, they initiate violence by provocations and jostles. Police have adapted to this phenomenon by raising the number of officers deployed, particularly focusing on hot spots.

“Well first they (the troublemakers) observe the situation; they may be looking for potential opponents, which they then jostle. They provoke situations, intervene in the happenings. Sweets are thrown, then they go in between and then the first disputes start. And when one gets agitated or ‘what are you doing here. Go away! You do not come from here’, especially at these street carnivals everybody knows each other well. Everyone

knows his or her place. And when there are suddenly foreigners around, that is really a foreign body. And that is how the troubles start.”

Besides the actual offenders there is a grey area of participants which accept or tolerate violent acts or resistance. In doing so they supply both a justification for offenders and a tactical base from which action can be conducted. However, this is closely connected with the respective event. With regard to right/ left wing demonstrations in particular it is reported that there is an increasing non-acceptance and incomprehension within society about the legitimacy of rallies and demonstrations from extreme right wing groups. It is not only local politicians who are calling for measures to prevent these events from taking place. The variance of such actions is broad and they can also involve criminal acts. People from a bourgeois background and also pupils may get involved. They do not regard their actions as illegal but as legitimate protest against the right wing groups. Within this context there is often a negative attitude towards the police with openly uttered accusations as they are seen to be protecting the right wing.

Developments concerning violent offenders are also mentioned with regard to football games. While in the past it was generally hooligan groups engaging in violence, these days offenders more often come from ultra groups. In contrast to hooligans, ultra groups are far more heterogeneous and not all of them can be classified as offenders or troublemakers. However, it was stated that within ultra groups there are offenders and a great deal would engage in violence if given the opportunity.

“...amongst them (ultras) there will be such who you should actually have a man-for-man marking. And because these people cannot be clearly distinguished as you could do that earlier with the hooligans, when they were running around with their Chevignon or Chiemsee or Tommy Hilfiger, Burberry jackets, never drunk, because when you want to fight you have to be sober. Today you cannot distinguish like that.”

The spectrum of offenders around football games are seen to be 90% male, the age ranges from 14 to 40, whereby the group of the younger ones generally come from the ultras while the others are hooligans. There are also connections between sport offenders and political groups. However, these may be locally determined. In Dortmund, which has a rather broad Nazi scene, 4 of 5 problematic fan groups come from a right wing background and 125 of the

145 C-fans belong to right wing groups. In Gelsenkirchen connections were reported between football fans and rocker clubs.

3.1.2 Organisation

What indications are there for organisation and planning of the groups?

There is an indirect indication of violence when people carry weapons or wear protective gear, when there are depots of missiles on a demonstration route or missiles are stored in a room inside the stadium.

A connection was seen between the size and duration of an event and the planning of protest action, as longer and bigger events allow for a detailed planning and creative actions. “That is well prepared, nothing spontaneous. That is why they sit there for days in their camps discussing and thinking of how to act.”

Planned actions are seen within both right and left wing groups. In particular counter protest against right wing demonstrations is well organized. There is no umbrella organisation for left wing groups in NRW; the planning is conducted locally. Organised meetings often take place before an event, mostly in connection with a right wing demonstration. Right wing groups are organized as comradeships. Single planned and organised attacks from right wing groups were reported in Dortmund. In 2006 and 2007 leftist pubs were attacked by groups of around 25 persons. On May 1st 2009 a demonstration of the Confederation of German Trade Unions was attacked. Initially the group had indicated that they were on their way to Siegen, however, they did then not board the train but entered the city centre and deliberately attacked the demonstration.

Football

The classic hooligan fights are always planned and organised. The participants use body protection and make appointments using SMS or chats.

Actions from ultras such as choreographies in the stadium or marches in the city centre (generally at away games) are very well prepared and organised. Planned violence and deliberate, targeted actions against opponent fans are not seen. It is assumed, however, that fights are accepted and that potential offenders expect to meet like-minded people, but a difference to the planned action from hooligans was clearly stated.

“My personal thinking is: The people go there for an adrenalin kick. They want to have fun. And then they look for somebody to fight. That can also be the police. Besides, by now, even when we talk reasonably, police action is less and less accepted. If you arrest somebody or you only take him out of this group in order to give a summons, there can quickly be solidarity and there may be substantial physical conflict, both in football and at demonstrations.”

Who is involved in organising and planning?

There was a general lack of information concerning the involvement into the planning.

With regard to left wing groups it was stated that those persons who register a demonstration do not function as organiser of violent action.

What is the context in which incidents occur?

Two contexts can be distinguished: On the one hand there are events that involve opposing groups, such as right/ left wing demonstrations or risk football games. Here police are not necessarily the opponent but may become an opponent if the other group cannot be reached. They can serve as a substitute or as a target that needs to be overcome in order to get at the actual enemy.

On the other hand there is clear, direct conflict between citizens and police. Typical situations where a broad range of citizens opposes the police are anti-atomic protest and castor transports of nuclear waste. “It involves all age groups, professions and classes. From the artist to the politician and there is no difference in men or women.”

Direct clashes also involve situations where police action is not accepted or when there is a massive resistance against police in normal everyday situations. Here it was reported that there is also solidarity from initially uninvolved persons. Further a connection is assumed between the willingness to engage in violent actions and press reports that convey an expectation that violence may occur.

“...when you read that again, something like: ‘a huge number of police, situations close to a civil war’ that attracts some of these simple characters who will say: ‘Wonderful, let us go there and see what happens!’”

With regard to demonstrations further contextual factors are seen in the location of the event, the surrounding and the duration. For example city centre versus country side, which again has an effect on demonstration tactics and which needs to be accounted for in risk assessments.

In football situations violent actions especially occur around derbies, and between fans of rivaling clubs in general during the pre- and post game phase.

What are the aims/ goals of the groups?

Non-ideological offenders

Intentions and aims of the groups and offenders are seen in individual interests and in a satisfaction of personal needs by violent acts. It was assumed that it is a kick to challenge the police or to fight other people.

“Personally, I think that youngsters undergo a phase where they may become criminal. And there are more and more persons, probably also those without perspective, professional perspective – I relate this to societal phenomena – who do not have much of a feeling of success. And then they run around like the big bosses, accompanied by police. They are important, all others are afraid of them. They are important, respected. And they are looking for a stage. And this stage can be right or can be left or it can be football. And now my personal opinion: (the trouble) has shifted towards football because at demonstrations we are deployed in high numbers and because we have concepts of separations that work quite well so that a direct clash does not happen anymore.”

Left wing

Aims of left wing offenders are to prevent events of the right wing scene, breaking through cordons and barriers but also to satisfy adventurousness and a hunger for excitement to challenge the (political) opponent and the police. If clashes with the right wing groups are prevented, fights may occur with police or others as a substitute.

Right wing

Breaking through lines and barricades. Attract attention. Display a specific ideology and propaganda.

Football

Around football games, actors aim to demonstrate the strength of the local scene. This may – but not necessarily so – be reached by using violence. A direct “kick” to engage in violence is more seen among hooligan groups.

What are the targets?

Violent actions are aimed at (political) opponents, but also against buildings for example when screens are smashed. Violence against police is committed when police acts between opponent groups or when there is no other opponent. In addition, respondents talked about violence and resistance against interventions in general. Not only interventions from police but also from rescue services and fire brigade. These phenomena were especially apparent among persons intoxicated by alcohol or drugs, for example at the Love Parade or during every day situations.

For both football and demonstrations, increasing attacks against police officers which are not connected to the actual event were reported. “People target single police officers in order to attack them.” The offences involve kicking, boxing, pushing.

“Three police officers are deployed at a tactical spot, observing. They are uniformed, with the riot police uniform and body protection. And then they stand a bit off-side, maybe they talk to each other, maybe they are distracted and then somebody shoots off from a group of hooligans or ultras which are passing by around such a football game. Kicks him (the officer) in the back and disappears again inside his group.”

Are there specific tactics being used by the groups?

Specific tactics used by groups involve the following:

- ☐ Setting up depots of missiles along the demonstration route has particularly been seen as a reaction of some demonstrators to pre-control measures by the police which would prevent them to carry dangerous items with them.
- ☐ Groups of demonstrators conduct their own intelligence activities and observations of other groups: The competing or opponent group and also the police. Information is gathered for example about movements, barricades. Often the groups use bicycles to move quickly within the area. The information is put forward by mobile phone.

- Tactical symbols and flags are used in order to guide subgroups within the demonstration area and to conduct actions.
- Small group tactics involve quick movements of small groups, often connected with quick withdrawal. The aim is to bind police officers to a specific area, to distract and possibly to prepare other actions. Often persons are involved who have a good local knowledge.

“...in principle you cannot be quick enough. Because they jump onto a train, go with the underground, jump off and go back with the opposite train, jump off again, move somewhere else. Yes that is very quick. And we are not flexible enough for that.”

- 5-finger strategy: A moving crowd dispersed into smaller subgroups, moving into different directions. The groups can be led by a guide carrying a flag or another distinct item.
- The black block tactic involves uniform black appearance of participants, usually by wearing black trousers and hooded jumpers. It suggests group cohesion and unity even though participants may not know each other. It also serves to be less detectable by political opponent groups and/ or the police. There is a thin line between this tactic and a facial cover up as participants may further wear sun glasses and scarves.

“...they wear in part such hoods or scarves, and sun glasses, which can basically be used to disguise personal identity. Which is close to being illegal and which is also used for provocation.”

- Red Clown Army: Activists dress up as clowns and imitate police officers or other persons. The actions are often carried out in very close proximity to the respective person and may be perceived as disturbing and distracting and trigger overreactions of officers.
- Luring means the initiation of illegal actions, for example setting fire, in order to provoke police action.
- Blockades range from simple sit-ins to huge blockades using tractors or chaining or welding of persons onto rail tracks in order to prevent transportation.
- Demonstrators allocate grid squares to an area in order to manage movements more easily. In NRW this has not been reported but it has been observed in other cities.

“...I know from Berlin or Hamburg, where troublemakers are guided via these blogs, up to working with grid squares. Well the police also follow this on the internet. For example: ‘At E4 that is where we will kick up a fuss.’ So that the police know 10 minutes later where E4 is because that is the place that is burning.”

- ~~Acting from the crowd, mass as defilade~~ Individual offenders or small groups use the wider context as defilade in order to conduct illegal action. They also egg others on to do something while they then quickly withdraw. It was reported that such persons also make use of the inexperience of very young demonstrators who are attracted to walk within the black block. While the offender quickly withdraws, the crowd is left behind.

“Sometimes when we stop some hundred persons, enclose them and have a look at who we are dealing with? I do not want to call them harmless followers but these are the really young ones, the really stupid ones, those with little experience, life experience as well as with demonstrations and violence. But still they are the ones we net while we do not find so much the ones who pull the strings.”

- ~~Dissolving~~ the assembly when the distance to the opponent is small.

“When I get to the point where the distance to the opponent is very small, the person (heading the event) will officially dissolve the assembly. He then makes an end to it and says: ‘Well the event is finished.’ And then it goes off heavily. And all are prepared for that, atmospherically, and then it really goes off and then all these bad things happen in the area then.”

- Further tactics refer to massive ~~complaints and reports~~ from citizens, used to mellow down police, ~~refusal of communication~~ with the police, ~~simulating injuries~~ in order to emotionally influence the surroundings and to accuse police of illegal and unprovoked conduct.

Most tactics mentioned above are used by left wing groups. In the mean time, however, right groups, particularly right wing national autonoms have taken over such approaches, in particular the black block tactic, so that groups can hardly be distinguished. But also the use of flags or own intelligence measures can be observed among right wing groups.

The use of communication channels

Left wing groups name meeting points and telephone numbers of agencies that may provide legal help and support. Loudspeaker and megaphones are means of direct communication and information during the event, in order to address a whole crowd. This tactic is being used around demonstrations as well as by(?) ultra groups.

“Those who want to engage in violence as well as the peaceful ones or the bourgeois, who do not directly aim to use violence, but who want to disturb actions, those who want to blockade. They inform each other, be it SMS or via Twitter: Here is a meeting point and there is a weak point.”

Individual persons are addressed via mobile phones, SMS, Twitter and internet portals. Often such information comes from people who gather information using bikes which makes it possible to act very quickly even in dynamic situations. These channels are used for general information but also for the planning of criminal acts.

“... ‘the right group is not here but there’ and then you can see immediately, the information is spread and then the whole bunch changes direction and they manage this rather, I would say remarkably well. Because everybody who ever commanded such an event using three to four thousand staff knows how difficult it is to influence an organization in such a way that you deploy your officers targeted.”

The use of weapons and other items

Passive arming involves tooth protection, gloves filled with sand (Bleistaub), protective vests, nose spray. Weapons found among offenders were: tear gas, batons, pyrotechnic, knives of all sorts, slingshots, PET bottles with dangerous liquids, Molotov cocktails, flag masts and items found in the area like stones. “...when we enclose people somewhere, (all such items) can be found on the ground and can not be allocated individually.”

Impact of alcohol and drugs

In connection with planned offences, people rather avoid the use of drugs and alcohol, there may be use of analgesic sprays as prophylaxis for pain. The

use of drugs was only mentioned in connection with big parties such as the Love Parade or May Day, whereby negative impact is seen in connection with situative violence. The inhibitive impact of alcohol is seen as influencing factor for the engagement in violent acts. This refers particularly to Punk groups and to situations around football games. During demonstrations both alcohol and drugs hardly play a role for the initiation and escalation of violence.

How do the groups use the media?

All different groups use the internet in order to display their own reports and publications. There does not seem to be a direct link between the groups and the media. But there are media that sympathize with organizers or with particular groups and it is assumed that protesters expect media to read the reports that they give on the internet, so that there may be an indirect influence.

Further points that can account for the initiation and escalation of violence

External factors for the escalation of violence could be aggressive music, density, darkness and opportunities for offenders to withdraw. With regard to football the interviewees mentioned problems that occur in connection with stadium bans as ultra groups become increasingly influential within the clubs. Sensational media reports may attract offenders.

3.2 Intervention

3.2.1 Legal and organisational context

Policing events as they are mentioned in the above section are regulated with the federal policing directive PDV 100 (PDV 100, 1999, Stand 2008). It regulates general policies of deployment, tactical objectives and tactical and technical-organisational measures that need to be considered for the policing of rallies, events, and gatherings.

The state of Northrhine-Westphalia (Landesteil zur PDV 100, Stand 2009) has issued additional regulations concerning:

- ☐ the policing of football (part E, see below)
- ☐ measures for handling right-extremist events (mit Öffentlichkeitsbezug) (part G)

- ☐ violent actions (part I, applicable to all events mentioned in the above section).

The legal framework of the Federal Republic of Germany has an important impact on policing crowd events. The right of assembly has constitutional status according to article 8 of the Basic Constitutional Law.² Assemblies in the open air can only be restricted according to a statute. The legislation is down to the federal states. As NRW does not dispose of an own law of assembly, the Federal Law of Assembly applies (Art. 125 a GG).

It is dependent on the kind and purpose of the event whether the Law of Assembly applies. This has important implications for policing. Assemblies according to the Basic Constitutional Law are local gatherings for collective debates and manifestations with the aim of participation in the shaping of public opinion. In this respect, festivals, fairs, mass entertainments and also football games are no assemblies and are subjected to a different legal framework (BVerfGE 104,92 (p.104 f.)). When an event qualifies as an assembly, police can only apply measures that are in line with the Law of Assembly. Bans or dissolutions of assemblies are only possible under strict conditions. Therefore, given that there is no indication that a demonstration will as a whole turn out disorderly or that the organizer and their followers aim for disorder, protection of the right of assembly is guaranteed for peaceful participants, even when disorder from individuals or small minorities is likely. A preventive ban of the entire event would have to comply with a very strict risk assessment and all possible means have to be applied to ensure the realisation of basic rights for the peaceful participants (BVerfGE 69, 315 ff, so called Brokdorf verdict). State authorities as the police have to act in an “assembly-friendly” and co-operative manner toward the organisers. The general laws of policing³ only apply after an assembly has been dissolved. This general law of danger prevention also applies to other mass events that are mentioned above, such as festivals or football games. This law allows police more far-reaching legal and tactical options. More specifically, police work within a legal framework that enables them more easily to enclose people, to conduct preventive arrests or to set up banning orders for a specific area.

² Article 8 states that “All Germans shall have the right to assemble peacefully and unarmed without prior notification or permission”.

³ Das allgemeine Gefahrenabwehrrecht.

NRW approach to policing assemblies

In the mid-eighties NRW government enacted a specific NRW approach to the policing of assemblies. With regard to experiences with violent assemblies, in particular in connection with squatted houses and anti-nuclear demonstrations the NRW approach was formulated, with as main aspects:

- ☐ strict neutrality
- ☐ cooperation with organisers
- ☐ constant talks and contacts with involved and uninvolved persons
- ☐ extensive information of all officers
- ☐ considerateness and calmness towards provoking comments and actions
- ☐ cautious and calculable policing helps to calm down the situation
- ☐ thorough differentiation of peaceful, verbally-radical and militant participants
- ☐ openness towards media
- ☐ qualified preservation of evidence.

In general it is aimed to exhaust all means of cooperation and de-escalation, on the other hand to deal consistently with violent offenders and gather evidence. It is particularly the gathering of evidence that is tactically very complex, so that concepts have been developed which are still being refined.

Regulations concerning the policing of Football games in NRW

The guidelines for policing sports events and football games in particular set up a tactical framework for police in dealing with risk games. It demands the cooperation of all parties involved, in doing so, police must comply with their role to contribute to safety and security, while on the other hand they must make sure that they do not take over tasks of private institutions. Further the guidelines points at the issue of rituals which may be used by fan groups. These do not necessarily bear the need for police intervention; rather, fans should be accompanied by de-escalating communication of all officers.

Police Spotters

Police spotters are officers with a specific knowledge of and close contact to the fan scene. Main tasks are the allocation of intelligence about planned actions in order to provide for timely and targeted counter measures and to prevent violent actions. Further tasks involve the escort of fans and to be accessible contact persons for fan groups.

Local Football Information Point (LIS)/ National Football Information Point (ZIS)

Local football information points (LIS) and the Federal Police collect information on fan behaviour, travel routes, movements and expected numbers of trouble makers/ risk fans. This information is then transferred to the national football information point (ZIS). ZIS collates the information and sends back an assessment of the situation via LIS to the local police authorities. In addition, ZIS is responsible for the national data base of football offenders. It collects data on persons that have been registered in connection with violent actions around football games. Responsible for actualisation and deletion of the data is the authority that is in charge at the crime scene. The information gathered by ZIS during one football season is intended to facilitate a flexible handling of future developments. For this reason, seminars of gold commanders policing Bundesliga matches are held on a yearly basis.

Local and national board sport and security

The guideline for the policing of football games further stipulates that existing concepts are updated after each season to make use of the actual assessment of the situation in the “local board for sport and security”.⁴ This board checks and (if necessary) modifies the effectiveness of policing concepts. Findings that are of national relevance are forwarded to the national board for sport and security, which collects experiences, updates concepts and develops alternative choices of actions. These again are referred back to the local board where they serve as a base for successful handling of events.

Stadium bans

Stadium bans are issued by the clubs, on the basis of their domestic authority. A ban is issued from the club at whose premises a (criminal) act has been committed. Personal information and information on the case is generally provided by the police. According to the guidelines of the German Football Association (DFB), Bundesliga clubs are obliged to report a stadium ban to the DFB when it has been issued in relation with severe deviance. The DFB transfers the data to the other Bundesliga clubs so that they can also issue a ban to the respective person (Arbeitsgruppe NKSS, Düsseldorf, 1992).

4 The board consist of members from police, club, owner of the stadium, fan project, local and legal authorities, fire brigade, private security, public transport, rescue services, Federal police.

Alcohol bans

The “national concept sport and security” NKSS (1992, Appendix E), contains a model of house rules for stadia, which suggests banning alcoholic drinks inside stadia on match days. In practice, however, such bans are only issued around risk games.

Proof of evidence and arrests at violent crowd events in NRW

NRW police regards the consistent prosecution of violence at crowd events as an essential part of their policing concept. Policing potentially violent crowd events in NRW is regulated in an additional part to the PDV 100 (see above).⁵ It consists of a graded concept which aims to:

- ☐ accomplish a high probability of detection of offenders and troublemakers
- ☐ isolate offenders
- ☐ ensure appropriate and timely handling of arrests and evidence
- ☐ ensure evidence-proof prosecution by using an ongoing chain of evidence.

In order to deal with problematic and escalating situations, officers from riot police are deployed which are prepared, equipped and trained. They are able to carry out a high number of arrests quickly and orderly. In order to provide for evidence-proof arrests, NRW police deploys observers who observe criminal acts, spot possible offenders and report these to the arrest teams. These officers are part of a section of “intervention officers”.

The Section “Prosecution/ provisional prisons” has the necessary personnel and material at its disposal to provide for a quick and qualified handling of a high number of arrests. It must, however, ensure evidence proof arrests.

3.2.2 Societal impacts

The role of media, citizens, locals

With regard to the high societal impact of media, press and public relations are seen as very important. “Well, press relations are important, very important of course. It is the media which make policing good or bad.”

⁵ It is called part J of the NRW part (Teil J -VS-NfD- des Landesteils NRW zur PDV 100).

The importance of media work is mirrored in the fact that the organisational structure has a separate section for media and public relations, which does sets up its work far before the actual event. Press- and public relations work consists of communication and information of the public and to explain and to inform about police measures using different channels, such as press releases, internet, service telephone numbers, visits to schools or the liaison with media during the event. In doing so, police seek to inform the public about their aims, the legal situation and about their efforts to assure the safety and security of the public. Further, police communicate that they aim to set up measures so that they do not affect uninvolved persons and they appeal to the public, not to engage in violent or other illegal action. Such messages are also published in press releases, however, it was reported that media do not necessarily make use of such information. Establishing trust with the media is seen as a significant feature, which is particularly important in local circumstances. Here media relations are easier to handle because the relevant persons know each other from other, less tense events which makes it easier to establish a trustful relation. If there is certain openness between the parties it may also be possible to inform media and ask them to hold back certain information.

A further point was mentioned with regard to the connection between media and politics. In particular with regard to right/ left wing demonstrations police is often criticised – via media – that the demonstration has not been prohibited. Also certain politicians expect that police prohibits a demonstration, irrespective of the particular legal background.

Parts of the media describe police action rather negatively. They tended to highlight weaknesses, describe measures in a biased or even wrong way. In connection with political events some interviewees spoke of a biased coverage in favour of leftist offenders while – on the other hand – media accuse police of political right wing tendencies. “...once you are branded that you don’t act sufficiently as police, every situation that bears a Right/ Left character becomes a media situation against the police.”

A problem is seen in the difference between announcements or releases from organisers and those from the police. While organisers or participants issue information in a timely manner, before it is verified, police information must always be verified and involves a far longer process. As a result of this, police versions of a situation may be overlooked or not taken into account because other news has already been published.

Is there acceptance in society for the actions of the police?

The fact that a large number of citizens reject even legal gatherings or demonstrations of extreme right groups bears huge problems for police work. Such attitudes often go along with a moral justification to prevent such events even by illegal means. While some years ago it was possible for opposing groups to meet along demonstration routes and opponents had been able to express their protest, it is now difficult for the public to accept that the right wing groups are able to demonstrate at all. As a result legal right wing demonstrations have to be secured by police. This in turn created accusations of police – not least by media – protecting right wing groups and it facilitates the build-up of a negative relationship between counter-protesters and the police. This situation has an impact on the use of violence in that the rejection of right wing demonstrations by society may lead to an acceptance of violence against right wing groups and against the police. Such engagement has not been observed around football games.

Ways to solve conflicts of this kind without the involvement of the police

Communication is seen as a necessary condition in order to tackle conflict. During the event it may be possible that key persons of societal or church organisations moderate between opposing parties. On a more long term basis use can be made of round table talks between the different groups. Concrete examples were given from football situations: It is suggested that the cooperation with the club should be used, in particular their access to problematic groups “...because they can set up their fan projects and are able to communicate in a completely different way with the fans.”

Cooperation between clubs and media is seen as very important, especially around high risk games, as this makes it possible to impact on fans and to appeal for positive behaviour. In connection with stadium bans, councils may be set up in order to decide on ambivalent cases and to discuss alternative ways of punishment, for example the reduction or replacement of the ban in connection with community service. This would set ways of rehabilitation and counter the accusation of undifferentiated behaviour: “Besides prosecution, this would be a way to handle fans differentiated and to counter the accusation that police always act undifferentiated against each and everybody.”

Similar developments are reported from another city where stadium bans have been suspended.

“We said that they (the stadium bans) cannot be abolished, but we accept that this is a new way to show the people: when you prove yourself then we will come towards you. They (the bans) are now suspended with the hint: when you relapse, they will be put into practice again. That is not a new case but the club just says: ‘The suspension is abolished’ and then they are active again. And the result is that of more than 90 less than 10 had to be activated again. All other stadium bans are still abolished, so they have been proved.”

Dortmund police together with the city of Dortmund and the local football club arranges fan parties around international football games. In doing so an infrastructure is set up that allows for the two fan groups to meet on a friendly basis, for example on a square in the city centre. Often this involved music events, information leaflets in different languages and an information hot line for visiting fans.

3.2.3 Policing

Risk assessment

For football games, see above.

For organised mass events the local police authority sets up an information gathering point (ISA), which collects all information concerning the event, such as mobilisation of the different groups, travel routes and other issues. The risk assessment is carried out by the preparing staff, which is also responsible for coordination talks with the organisers. Results from these talks (for example about the expected number of participants) form further part of the risk assessment. Tactic and strategy, the organisational structure, the estimated number of staff is then determined, based on this risk assessment. During the event information is gathered on participants and (potential) offenders, internet blogs or Twitter and pictures from the helicopter. At football games, information from spotters further adds to the general risk assessment.

Some of the interviewees see the information they get from the “special branch”⁶ and from the office of the protection of the constitution for example about ring leaders or problematic groups and individuals as very unsatis-

⁶ Polizeilicher Staatsschutz.

fyng. “For years this has not been not working.” Only little information is said to be given about background structures and there is hardly any information from the scenes. Particularly information about the left scene that is valuable for handling the event is rare.

“Well, we are lacking reasonable undercover intelligence from the scene, from the office of the protection of the constitution. About the validity of the information, who is coming, where do they come from? What is their intention? And sometimes I have the feeling that from the mere intuition of a riot police officer, who is constantly present at such events, that you know sooner what is going on than the actual risk assessment does.”

Risk assessments from spotters that are issued around football games, on the other hand, are seen to be overtly negative.

“I do not want to wrong somebody, but the spotters often describe scenarios, where you may think it’s the end of the world, where in principle nothing happened. Well in football we often made the experience that it was overestimated.”

As a reaction to insufficient or delayed information from the “intelligence” section, police commanders take their own measures for example by using information from motorbike officers or by internet specialists that research the communication channels of activists.

Intelligence

See above.

Crime investigation on the spot

See also above.

In order to provide for evidence-based arrests, NRW makes use of plain clothes observer teams who are deployed close to risk groups. The officers observe and document criminal acts so that offenders can eventually be arrested. The teams work closely with evidence-gathering units.

“When they observe a criminal act, and idealistically an evidence-team can be called and then he commits another crime and they can prove it and then he will get arrested later, often simply by laying on hands.”

Behavioural profile

See above: NRW guideline.

Water cannon

In some way the deployment of water cannons is a political issue, and was hardly thinkable during the Red/ Green government (between 2000 and 2005). Since the change of government in 2005 however, water cannons have been openly deployed at a number of events but up to today only in a symbolic way. The decision of the actual use of the water cannon can only be made by the gold commander. The use of water cannons is seen as a means to secure a barricade, to keep a distance and, on a more indirect basis, to show strength and to frighten off offenders. The need for cooperation of the individual organisational section was emphasised; the deployment must be carried out differentiatedly and must fit within in the overall policing concept.

“...before you say ‘charge’ it is still possible to move a bit forward. Start the engine, move. That is one thing: Oh what happens now? So you are using steps of escalation or intervention, I regard that as important. Not taking a sledgehammer to crack a nut but first testing and reacting step by step. You can do that with this thing in the same way as with other means, it just has to fit in general.”

Dialogue Teams

Some police forces make use of communication officers or dialogue teams. The officers wear normal uniform, no helmet, no protective gear. Some wear a vest, saying “Police communication”. The deployment of these officers around problematic groups or persons is seen as critical. This refers to the security of the officers but also with regard to the effectiveness to reach these groups.

“There are, let’s say 5,000 participants, bourgeois, others, and there is a black block of about 100 persons. I may not be able to reach them, but I can reach the others and can aim that these do not provide a stage for the black block and do not get used as a cover and so on. Of course that depends on the situation. In Duisburg, at the anti Islamic demonstration it is easier to reach the bourgeois than at an event in Gorleben where it is all about preventing atomic waste and where they are much more involved.”

Loudspeaker van

Loudspeaker vans are part of the technical deployment units (TEE) of the three riot team departments of NRW. They must be requested in order to be deployed at a crowd event. The decision about the use of a loudspeaker van is made in the respective section. A loudspeaker van is regarded as an important instrument for communication. It is used for giving information, directing masses, for announcements of welcome but also to set up behavioural limits and to explain the application of police intervention, for example by defining what is understood as illegal covering up (*Vernummung*). In cases of escalation, loudspeaker vans can be used to address the participants or the organisers.

“We always aim to communicate via loudspeaker first: why we act in a certain way, when we arrest somebody, to make it transparent that somebody has been throwing stones at us, or done something else. That we now arrest somebody and that this was the consequence and that we now ask the others to keep on protesting peacefully, otherwise we would keep on arresting consequently. Such announcements.”

The loudspeaker van is also deployed when an announcement must be made concerning legal aspects, for example to announce the dissolution of a demonstration or a blockade.

Private security

The interviewees saw good use of private security when they comply with specific standards, because well trained staff has a good knowledge of the visitors or participants and on how to deal with them. A number of good examples were named in connection with football situations.

Around demonstrations the organiser is obliged to provide for his own

stewards. Generally, the contact person of the police is allocated to the head of the demonstration. For this task often a bronze commander is chosen with a good legal knowledge. He or she is highly visible, wearing a fluorescent vest. Ideally mutual trust builds up between these persons so that via the head of the demonstration, stewards can be reached. However, the organisational standard of these teams is rather low because they do not consist of trained professionals.

“We had some good experiences, especially around Kurdish demonstrations, because the head of the demonstration and the stewards are really making sure that everything runs peacefully. It is the hotspurs that they are also not able to deal with. And then we try via the head of the demonstration and the stewards to influence these hot spurs. It works very well. Even with the Right groups there are heads of the demonstration who exert influence because they do not want to be involved in criminal acts and they know how we would react in that case.”

Arrests

See above.

What have the police done to prevent similar events, or to handle them differently?

☐ Change of tactical concept

A police tactic may turn out to be critical when it aims to protect a legal event but in fact this event is prohibited by large numbers of counter protesters enclosing police and the other event. As a reaction to this, policing should aim for a higher flexibility:

“We want to try not to get enclosed, which had been the case then (at another demonstration): When I come against a ring, when I build a fortress, then I have a lot of pressure from outside and the pressure rises and everybody comes there because that is where something happens. This ring or this blockade, that is the problem. I get enclosed myself, I cannot get out, then I am like in the medieval times. Of course I have to hold the barricade. But when I try from behind to loosen up, to come in from the back, that is not nice for those on the one side and on the other side I can always prevent these masses to

build up. That means I need graded deployment that I keep the people moving and I must avoid the tendency that the area is closed off.”

☐ Deployment of more officers

“Three years ago we deployed 500 officers around the derby. At the last one we deployed 1,700.”

☐ Deployment of riot police around normal policing situations

“In the old town riot police is deployed because one concluded that police in normal uniform is not respected anymore when they need to take measures. Only when there is riot police in riot uniform with batons and protection gear, so that it is known: okay they make their point. Where have you seen things like that, that police had to withdraw with normal patrol officers because they could not win recognition? For sure there are many aspects for increasing disrespect, less law abidance and higher levels of violence.”

- ☐ The implementation of a new, legally sound, concept of video control during demonstrations aims to improve evidence based footage. The concept further involves an additional subsection “intelligence”. The video control is set up at 30 to 40 locations that are seen as possible hot spots. Cameras from the whole country are used.
- ☐ Operation guidelines: Cologne police have issued operation guidelines for dealing with clowns in crowd situations.
- ☐ Decoding tactical symbols as they are used by demonstrators is a necessary condition in order to deal adequately with this group.
- ☐ As a reaction to increasing problems with ultra marches of visiting fan groups, one police force decided to ban such marches.

Is there anything you would like to add that would make your work easier?

Tendencies that mass events are used for party political aims of single politicians are seen as critical.

“We would like to see that politics are backing us up. But then police has to carry the can for arguments among politicians...”

Little acceptance is seen for the policing around right/ left wing demonstrations.

“That’s the problem police deal with; and you cannot discuss this on a reasonable basis with most people, that we do not defend the right groups. That we do not approve of their opinion but that our task is to enforce a democratic state, Article 8. And I would like to make a wish that politicians also comply with their own laws and their own basic laws. And it is also politicians who call for actions that do not comply with the decisions of the Federal Constitutional Court. And that makes life even more difficult for police.”

More intelligence about right and left scenes by covered investigations. Problems are seen concerning the fluctuation of experts and expertise within the force.

“Firstly, we make a huge point of our evidence gathering techniques and that we become constantly more qualified and better. But we have the problem within the riot police that you stay here generally for three years, maybe four or five years. And when you then think that somebody who has been with the riot police for one year, that you tell them: ‘You could do evidence gathering’. The extensive courses and then they leave after four years. He or she looks: ‘Can I maybe become a group leader?’ In order to step up the career ladder. In that respect fluctuation is counter productive, of course.”

Measures of other parties

Glass bans

No glasses or bottles are sold in stadia. A ban of glass items at other mass events, for examples for a whole area or a whole city are currently being discussed among different city authorities.

3.2.4 Prosecution

Police put much effort in evidence based arrests, while this is not necessarily related to a subsequent prosecution of suspects in court.

“Even when they are arrested, many cases are dismissed by the public prosecution or the courts so that the risk to be prosecuted is rather calculable and very low. What we talk about at the moment is whether ‘breaching the public peace’ can actually be committed.”

Some interviewees speak of differences in prosecution of right and left wing offenders. It is perceived that breach of the public peace is hardly prosecuted among suspects coming from a leftist background.

Differences regarding legal consequences around football matches are reported. In a case in Gelsenkirchen accused fans were sentenced to 9 months, placed on probation. According to police spotters, this led to consequences within the fan scene and the following derby. “...even with moderate strength you could probably produce a preventive character, which would help us all; but police only has conditional impact on that.”

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Otto Adang¹

Sweden: Gothenburg

June 2001: the dialogue that failed

4.1 Background

Sweden became a member of the European Union in 1995. In January 2001, the Swedish government for the first time accepted a period of chairmanship of the union. In the previous years, the top level meetings of the EU and other organisations (most notably in Seattle in 1999, Prague and Washington in 2000) had been subject both to large labour union demonstrations pressuring for the so called social contract, and to some extent also violence both from the police and from protesters. One notable example was at the top-level meeting in the Dutch capital city Amsterdam, which ended in mass arrests on disputable grounds. However, it was clear that regardless of the global movement that was created in Seattle, the conflicts around wage dumping, social rights and migration control within the quickly expanding European Union would continue to create unrest around its top-level meetings. So would the police tactics that had been tested in Amsterdam (and were repeated in Washington).

There were a number of serious disturbances around the EC summit in Gothenburg. However, these disturbances did not affect the major demonstrations that were held. There were incidents: at the “Bush not Welcome” demonstration on Thursday, June 14th, some of the participants broke out of the demonstration in order to participate in a manifestation outside the Convergence Centre at Hvitfeldtska Gymnasiet, which had been encircled by the police. In the event, a group of dialogue police officers felt so threatened that they left the spot to seek safety. The Anti-EU demonstration on the evening of Friday, June 15th, was disturbed by an attack by organised neo-nazis, who were given free way both to and away from the spot by the police (probably not by intent but due to bad internal communications) (Oskarsson,

¹ Based on material provided by the Police Research Centre of the University of Uppsala.

185-186). This had consequences for a near-by Reclaim the City street party, which was then attacked by the police, but the demonstration could continue without further problems (SOU 2002:122 625-627). At the biggest demonstration, in the morning of Saturday June 16th, a police attack was avoided at the last moment by a quick re-scheduling of the demonstration sequence and by counter-rumour reports based on observations by the convening team and dialogue police in concert (SOU 2002:122 620-622; 636-642, Abrahamsson, 74-76). Thanks to these measures, and to disciplined actions by hundreds of voluntary manifestation guards, the demonstrations could be carried through largely without disturbances. However, a number of serious events took place elsewhere. Serious crimes were committed, some people, both police and protesters, were seriously injured and exposed to extreme stress. In addition to the incidents mentioned above, there were four major disturbances in Gothenburg, which took place only after a police intervention.

- The first one followed on the encircling and de-facto arrest of more than 600 people in the Convergence Centre at a central school, Hvitfeldtska Gymnasiet, in the morning, day and late night of Thursday June 14th. During the afternoon there were skirmishes in the park outside the school, where activists were throwing stones or whatever they found at police officers guarding the encirclement. After a couple of hours of negotiating, the police suddenly decided to “ride down” the line of several hundred activists that had formed inside the school yard in preparation for a peaceful exit. The consequence of this was a brief riot inside the school yard, where the activists threw a large number of stones at the mounted police while making their way to the security of the school building. The stone throwing stopped as soon as everybody was secure. After a new interval of negotiations the building was emptied and over 600 people were collectively taken into custody (Polismyndigheten i Västra Götaland, 75-85, Abrahamsson, 90). This action has subsequently been criticised as illegal by the Swedish Helsinki Committee (Swedish, 12).
- In the morning of Friday, June 15th, 300-400 people, at the end of a manifestation at the central square Kungssportsavenyn, marched down on the crossing with Berzeliigatan, and blocked the road before the European Council meeting at Svenska Mässan. This minor demonstration, called the Anti Capitalist March, was led by the small Trotskyist Rättvisepartiet, which several times had negotiated with the police about how the demonstration should be organised. They had about 70 demonstration guards, who kept

the demonstration still several meter before the line of police officers that were posted before the roadblock. However, suddenly a patrol of police dog handlers broke into the demonstration from the side with the aim to “sack in” a group that from the colour of their clothing were identified as trouble makers (a small number of people were also seen with stones in hand, but nothing had been thrown at the police before the attack). Several people who had until then behaved peacefully were beaten by sticks or bitten by police dogs. After a couple of minutes the first stones were thrown against the police, and a severe riot broke out that left several protesters and police officers injured, and left the square open for politically inspired vandalism (SOU 2002:122: 600-615).

- In the evening of Friday 15th, a street party was planned by the activist organisation Reclaim the City, in a crossing close to the Vasa park in central Gothenburg. About the time when an anti-EU demonstration was passing, both the demonstration and the party were attacked by a group of neo-nazi activists, belonging to a hard-core IFK Göteborg hooligan group. Some activists were beaten before the neo-nazis were chased away towards a police road block. The neo-nazis could freely pass by by the police officers, who did not make any effort to take them in for the crimes that they had committed. This, together with the fact that peaceful party attendees were bitten by police dogs and beaten, caused a low-intensive riot which ended when a policeman shot into the mass of people, seriously injuring a young boy (who miraculously survived after a major blood transfusion) (SOU 2002:122, 624-632).
- As a result of rumours spread among the by this time exhausted police staff, about 400 young people were encircled at Järntorget allegedly because the police suspected that one of them was armed with a shot gun (SOU 2002:122 650-654, Abrahamsson, 76-77). Additionally, the national storm trooper's team stormed another school, Schillerska Gymnasiet, and forced peaceful young people to lie more or less naked on the grass outside the school for several hours while being beaten and subjected to verbal abuse of a sexual and racial nature (Abrahamsson, 77-79; SOU 2002:122, 642-646).

4.2 The phenomenon

4.2.1 Who is involved on an individual/ group level? Locals, travellers, national, international?

The activities in Gothenburg were organised by two networks of organisations, the smaller Nätverket (the Network) Göteborg 2001 and Göteborgsaktionen (the Gothenburg action) 2001, comprising about forty and eighty organisations, respectively. The split in two networks was an effect of the strong resistance against the EU that prevailed in large parts of Swedish organisational life. As one of the networks expressly demanded a Swedish exit from the union as one of its goals, another network was necessary for the organisations that were either for the union (although critical to some aspects) or otherwise undecided on the issue. Since the Nätverket Göteborg 2001-network was dominated by the remnants of the old campaign organisation from the EU referendum in 1994, together with the locally important marxist-leninist KPML(r), there were also other differences between the networks, that would have consequences for the development that followed. Since Nätverket Göteborg 2001 was led by old-fashioned member organisations, and in the case of KPML(r), even an organisation characterised by democratic centralism, that organisation was characterised by a rather hierarchical and outwardly orderly posture. Researchers have referred to this organisation as “modern” protesters, to differentiate them from the “post-modern” or “transgressing” kinds of protesters that gathered in the other umbrella organisation, Göteborgsaktionen 2001, which nominally was the least radical of the two (not comprising any marxist-leninist organisations and not demanding a Swedish exit from the EU) (on transgressing protesting, cf. Noakes & Gillham, 103-105). It could be argued that the tactics sported by the network-kind of organisations were just as “modern” as any, deriving from the spontaneism and situationism that were just as characteristic for the 1968 uprising when most of the “modern” organisations had been created. However, more important was that the “modern” organisations had a hierarchical leadership, that could function as a symmetrical counterpart to the police negotiators. That was not to the same extent the case with the network-like organisations belonging to Göteborgsaktionen 2001 (SOU 2002:122 56-61). Nätverket Göteborg 2001 for instance banned all kinds of masks in their demonstrations, Göteborgsaktionen 2001 did not (while banning all violence and other law-breaking) (SOU 2002:122 435).

Apart from the networks, the French organisation Attac –working for the creation of a tax on transnational currency flows, and founded by the editors of the French magazine *Le Monde Diplomatique*–, agreed to a formal although not complete co-operation with Göteborgsaktionen 2001. The University of Gothenburg also sponsored a number of dialogue initiatives, including video-carried discussions with the Swedish Prime Minister and other members of the European Council. The university project derived from the concept “Confrontative Dialogue”, developed by conflict researcher and Attac member Hans Abrahamsson. His idea, which to some extent related to the *Ya Basta!* strategy, was to arrange debates where the lack of a common ground is stated from the outset, to make sure that also radical critique can have its “political space” in the public sphere (SOU 2002:122 484-490; Abrahamsson, 19-28; 50-52).

The difficulties – both from the police and the protesters – were to some extent the subject of discussions in the so-called “Monday Club”, a series of meetings between the protest conveners and the police that was started in April 2001 in order to smooth things out. Also members of the university staff and Attac participated in the meetings. Although the main purpose of the meetings was to discuss the practical arrangements around the demonstrations, the arrangements around the accommodation facilities for the protesters were discussed as well (SOU 2002:122 432-435; Abrahamsson, 52-56). After initially being critical to the arrangements made by the city to make a number of school buildings, close to the events available for travelling protesters, the police leaders concurred to the city policy (SOU 2002:122 286-288). One subject that came up during the meetings repeatedly was the police tactics that had been used during a meeting of the foreign ministers in Malmö in April 2001. At that point, part of the demonstration, 266 out of around 2 000 protesters, had been subject to a “sack-in” action, that was also accompanied by violent behaviour and sexist harassment (with utterings such as “fucking little communist cunt”) from some of the police officers on the spot (SOU 2002:122 237-257). The networks of protesters complained that they did not want a repetition of this tactic in Gothenburg, and they also asked the police to avoid any show of force close to the demonstrations (SOU 2002:122 221-269; Abrahamsson, 40-41). Much has been said about these meetings after the events, and the networks have asked why the police officers that attended did not take up the fears for a violent outcome that were being discussed in the police headquarter at the same time (see below).

Closer to the events, the networks started to censor their participation, out of fear that the main purpose of the meetings in fact was to gather as much information as possible about the networks – which, according to command order 27a, was in fact the main purpose (SOU 2002:122; 432-435; Oskarsson, 145-149).

Violence was not discussed at all at the Monday meetings (for reasons referred to above). Hans Abrahamsson has mentioned occasional talk among protesters about the advantages that a “real riot” would have for giving a greater publicity for the protester’s view (Cf. SOU 2002:122 499; 584). However, it is clear from both research and legal verdicts, that no violent attacks against either the EC meeting, or other targets in Gothenburg (including the police itself) were planned before the meeting. The closest thing to such plans were a question that allegedly was posed by German Antifa activists during a general meeting at the Convergence Centre (Hvitfeldtska Gymnasiet) in the night between Wednesday June 13th and Thursday June 14th. However, this issue was immediately put to rest by members of the Swedish Antifa group (AFA Sverige), who steadfastly argued against any kind of violence during the different actions and demonstrations. By doing this, the Swedish Antifa upheld the principles of Göteborgsaktionen (of which it was a member) (SOU 2002:122 531, Oskarsson, 151-152). But there was more to it – already before the summit the Swedish Antifa group had publicly associated itself with non-violent civil disobedience (Abrahamsson, 42; 91-92).

Ever since the protests of the WTO-meeting in Seattle in 1999, the critical globalisation movement had struggled with the problems of small groups who on the fringes of non-violent, yet illegal, actions (such as sitting blockades) pursued vandalism and attacks against the police. This was an even larger problem on the European scene – and made the non-violent actions of the bulk of the protesters hard to carry out, since even marginal violence could cause counter-violence from the police. During the protests against the IMF meeting in Prague in September 2000, the convening party had tried to solve the problem by creating a physical separation between, as it were, the three strands of the movement. At those protests, three separate demonstrations, “blocs”, were created. One of them, the pink-silver bloc, adhering to completely non-violent tactics, was dominated by organised protesters, and led by activists organised in musical and dancing bands. The second bloc, the yellow one, was led by largely Italian activists belonging to the Ya Basta!

movement, which made theatrical although symbolic break-through attempts against the lines of Czech riot police at the town bridge leading to the summit centre. The third bloc, the blue one, was led by Czech and German Antifa groups and made a violent break-through attempt, which was avoided only after a massive use of water cannons (SOU 2002:122 169-172). The actions by the blue bloc were severely criticised afterwards for the wave of repression that it caused against the Czech left, and, although the same tactic was tried to some extent at the EC-meeting in Nice in December 7th-9th, 2000, by the time of the Gothenburg meeting it had been completely abandoned (SOU 2002:122 176). In the plans for the protests in Gothenburg, only the tactics of the pink-silver and the yellow blocs figured (Abrahamsson, 44-46).

4.2.2 What indications are there for organisation and planning of the groups?

The Monday meetings were the most well-known part of the open character of the planning process of the protest networks. The networks were comprised of experienced organisation activists from all parts of Swedish society, including the youth organisations of most of the Swedish parliamentary parties. This was a guarantee for a minutely and well thought-out planning that could guide tens of thousands of people through the city during a series of demonstrations. The networks also organised a number of arrangements that included debates, dialogues through TV monitors and non-violent symbolic demonstrations. A great number of these constitutionally guaranteed arrangements were more or less sabotaged by police actions, some of which were after the events severely criticised by a parliamentary committee (SOU 2002: 122). The networks were fully aware that for instance the meetings at the convergence centre were observed by the secret intelligence of both the open and the security police (dressed as building workers).

The break-in preparation was preceded by an expansion of the part of the area that was considered part of the protected zone. Since this expansion was not communicated to the conveners of the demonstration, that meant that the demonstration, more or less from its first step, found itself in an area where entrance was not allowed, and where the police could intervene at any minute, with any means (Oskarsson, 174 n 134). This meant that a “close combat” tactic was almost unavoidable – and with that, the more or less uncontrollable consequences that follow from using sticks and dogs as a means

for the establishment – or rather, securing – of order (Oskarsson, 178-179). As Mikael Oskarsson emphasises, it was these circumstances, not a grand plan on the side of the protesters, nor of the police, that led to the major riot on Friday morning (Oskarsson, 181).

4.2.3 Who is involved in organising and planning?

As already indicated, the organisations under the umbrella of Göteborgsaktionerna 2001 to a larger extent consisted of networks, while those in the Nätverket Göteborg 2001 were ordinary member organisations. The difference is however not clear-cut, in both umbrella organisations the majority consisted of member's organisations of an ordinary kind.

4.2.4 Are there specific tactics being used by the groups? Violent and non-violent ones?

As already mentioned, only non-violent actions were planned for the protests. Apart from the demonstrations, the non-violent network planned a symbolic break-in (Komma in-aktionerna, Friday morning at eight), the Ya Basta! planned a similar attempt although using their tactic of pressing themselves against the police lines to demonstrate the extent of the violence that is needed to uphold the ruling system (as they would have it). The Anti-Capitalist March of Friday, June 15th, would halt just before the police lines and by standing there chanting for about ten minutes demonstrating the isolation of the politicians from the broad public. On the evening of Friday June 15th, a street party arranged by the Reclaim the City-activists would block traffic in a low-traffic part of the city centre, to demonstrate an alternative to the automobile centred street design (as they would have it). The “Confrontative Dialogue” arranged on big TV-displays by Attac and the University of Gothenburg was also a non-violent tactic to demonstrate the need to break the isolation of the power elite and the need to broaden policy formation.

4.2.5 What are the aims/ goals of the groups?

It is accepted by everybody who has done research on the subject that the goal of both the police, the protesters' organisations and the leaders of the

city of Gothenburg was to create space for a great number of protests, while at the same time guaranteeing the integrity of the EC meeting. The networks did not plan any actions that would endanger the EC summit or mean a threat to the participants. All actions that were planned were only symbolic.

4.2.6 What are the targets?

There were no targets in any normal sense of the word, since all actions that were planned were only symbolic.

4.2.7 How: what communication channels were used?

The most well-known feature of the network communication structure was the so called “Sambandscentralen” (The Connection Central). This central consisted of nine young people who sat in an apartment with a police radio and a laptop computer. The central was fully official – it had been mentioned during the Monday meetings with the police attending and names and phone numbers had in total openness been collected at the Convergence Centre. Nonetheless, when the police stormed the apartment in the evening of Thursday June 14th, it was alleged to be a centre intended to lead violent attacks against the EC meeting. During the trials against the young people it was alleged that they had sent SMS messages on a mass scale to incite people to attack the police officers that were encircling the Convergence Centre. This a matter of interpretation; the messages could just as well be interpreted as requests to show solidarity, they contain no references to violence (Polismyndigheten i Västra Götaland, 95-96).

In 2001, cell phones were already in most young peoples' pockets. Much has been said about the violent language of some of the home pages and posters sported by some of the organisations involved, but as sociologist Hans Abrahamsson puts it, this was basically the kind of language that is usual for young people's organisations, and should not be taken literally (Abrahamsson, 2004). The Swedish tabloids, that were writing on the basis of police information and leaks before and during the Gothenburg events, used a language that was no less violent (Olausson).

4.2.8 Impact of alcohol and drugs

Some of the people that took part in the street party on Friday June 15th had been drinking to some extent, but apart from that there is no sign of drug use out of the normal for a city weekend in Gothenburg.

4.2.9 What is the context in which the incident occurs?

The larger context is described in its basic details in the introduction. It is important to note that all incidents occurred after a police intervention (Wahlström, 390). Another important part of the context is, as mentioned, an increased level of violence from both sides during the preceding years, together with a heightened level of suspiciousness and the spreading of stereotyped understandings. The suspicion that the mass arrest in Malmö in April was just a way to test the tactics that would be used in Gothenburg is a case in point.

4.2.10 How do the groups use the media?

The Swedish media, including public service, used the rising tension before and during the Gothenburg events to create sensationalist reporting on a level that had not previously been seen in Sweden. Research made after the events show that the level of trust for the media clearly decreased after the Gothenburg event – regardless of how the persons interviewed had understood and valued the events themselves. In fact, the Swedish Police had, according to testimonies, already before the Gothenburg events gone to the Picture agencies and told them that there “would be trouble” during the summit (Erkéus, 4).

4.3 Intervention

4.3.1 Information/ intelligence

The acquisition and spreading of intelligence has been one of the most hotly contested issues of the whole police operation. Generally, intelligence had three sources. The security police (SÄPO) had focused on the anti-capitalist

left long before the EC summit, and had observers on many of the – open – planning meetings. For instance, it had observers during the general meetings at the Convergence Centre. However, since 1995, it met competition from the criminal intelligence unit (KUT), which apart from its normal objects (organised crime) also observed the anti-capitalist left (Oskarsson 118-119). As it happened, information from these two authorities did not always converge, and the operation staff sat uneasily with SÄPO (which represented the dreaded national police authority (RPS)), in contrast to KUT, which was part of the regional entity. Apart from giving different kinds of information, the intelligence authorities also put forth so called “Threat Scenarios”, where the threat was graded into one out of five degrees.

Apart from this information, the police also received information from abroad. This kind of information was transferred through a number of different channels. One of them was of course the visits paid to other places that hosted summits in the year preceding the meeting in Gothenburg. Another was the information received by SÄPO from its contacts abroad. It has been argued that important parts of the information that is assembled by foreign intelligence services is never given to the security police, simply because it is part of the police, which means that some information given to them could be used operationally, disregarding the consequences for the integrity of the intelligence network. It seems that the Swedish military intelligence instead transferred some of its information to the US-American Secret Service, which followed US president George W Bush on his one day visit at the EC summit on Friday, June 15th. In its turn, the Secret Service then informed the police commander in chief, and his staff – which may also have been informed directly by the Swedish military intelligence (Abrahamsson, 261-263; 268-280). This way information from abroad on the most militant groupings, such as the Antifa groups and, allegedly, Ya Basta!, could have been transferred to the police commander. There is no actual research on this issue, that could give a detailed picture of the intelligence material that was at the disposal of the police commander.

4.3.2 Risk analysis

The Swedish security police warned against the renting out of the Schools already in November 2000, and repeated that warning until just before the

meeting (SOU 2002:122 288). The risk analysis in Gothenburg was based on on three series of threat pictures: the general and specific (relating to life guard missions) from the security police, as well as general pictures from the regional KUT (SOU 2002:122 324). The threat pictures were graded from 1 (low level) to 5 (high level threat). Already in April 2000, the summit was given the level 3, for “Considerable” (SOU 2002:122 325). In the pictures given by the security police, much was said about militant anti-fascists (AFA), who during the 1990s had been at the centre of attention from the security police (SOU 2002:122 324-329). After a preparatory EU meeting in Norrköping in January 2001, however, the security police also acknowledged that there was a threat from the extreme right. (SOU 2002:122 330-331). The regional criminal intelligence group was formed in the beginning of 2001, from a pre-existing structure that had at the same time studied both the extreme right, the left, animal protection and rockers gangs (!) (SOU 2002:122 322-333). In the reports, it was noted early on that non-violence trainings, central information centres and mixed tactics (the different-coloured blocs) were important features (SOU 2002:122, 333-334). However, in a report from March 2001, it was estimated that there was a considerable risk of violent actions. Although no such planning could be detected, it was argued that such a decision – by whom, was never stated – would only be taken shortly before the event (SOU 2002:122, 334). In April, Friday 15th was understood as the day of action, with risks for riots around the summit area (SOU 2002:122 336). In May, in a new report, it was also argued that as “revenge” for the sack-in action in Malmö (see above), activists would do damage to the Kungsportsavenyn square. More important, in this report the threat was upgraded from a 3 to a 4, which meant a warning of a kind that is very unusual for Swedish conditions (SOU 2002:122, 337). At that point, the police appointed a dialogue group, something that at this point was more or less an experimental action – the group was, with a reference to American criminology, labelled the “psycho-tactical group” (SOU 2002:122 338). It is important to note that in the report given by the security police a couple of weeks later, May 22nd, the grading was only on 2 out of 5 (SOU 2002:122 339).

In the report given by the Security Police, much emphasis was still put on militant antifascists, and it was also emphasised that antifascists could be engaged for other causes as well (SOU 2002:122 329). Also, it was argued that militant antifascists would in different ways try to disturb police activities, and to create a central information centre (SOU 2002:122 341). Without

substantiating that in any way, it was even argued that several of the activists “wanted riots to take place also in Gothenburg”. The warnings had a tendency to blur the differences between violent and anti-violent actions, thereby preparing the way for preventive police actions (SOU 2002:122 342-343). In June, a little more than a week before the summit, the security police upgraded the risks to 4 concerning actions against the borders to the summit area and vandalism on the Kungssportsavenyn square (SOU 2002:122 344; Polisen i Västra Götaland, 51-52). The regional police leaders chose to play down the threat pictures, with one important exception. A video film allegedly depicting Yä Basta! activists throwing Molotov cocktails in Prague was shown to the police staff, and eventually also to members of the special forces. This view of the Yä Basta! as rioters is confirmed also in the official report from the regional police authority, where the symbolic action planned by Yä Basta! was designated as a planned attempt to “violently” (*måtvåld*) force their way into the summit area (Polismyndigheten i Västra Götaland, 58).

The ground concept for the police operation was given in a general order dated June 5th, 2001. It has later been explained by police commander Håkan Jaldung as “6+30+2 400+” where 6 stands for the group of dialogue police, 30 for the policemen that would patrol, as it were, in cap and shirt, and the rest for the number of police officers that would secure the summit and be held in reserve if anything would go wrong. The general idea was to hold back the force as much as possible in order not to provoke any troubles. The escalation would be signalled by colour codes – from green, over yellow and orange to red. Only on code red would the police wear full armour (SOU 2002:122 429-431). Just before the summit, on June 14th, both the security police and the regional criminal police intelligence delivered further reports claiming that different kinds of violence would be orchestrated in order to draw attention from the Yä Basta! actions (SOU 2002:122 515-517, Polismyndigheten i Västra Götaland, 66).

4.3.3 Context: legal and organisational (legal system, police organisational structure)

The basic legal structure for all political manifestations in Sweden are the limitations given to the constitutional rights of expression and free assembling. Political manifestations in Sweden can only be dispersed for reasons of traffic and order – the actual formulations in the law are in fact even more con-

strained than that. For instance, a manifestation can not be dispersed only because it has not been notified in advance to the police. When spontaneous demonstrations develop, the police must, if there are no traffic and order issues that are serious enough, give their permission also for these gatherings. It goes without saying that this feature of the law can be used tactically, to avoid the police's right to displace demonstrations far away from hearing and viewing distance of the objects of the protest. This right, as well as the fact that the person responsible for the manifestation permit may also be held responsible for any disturbances during the demonstration, turns the spontaneous demonstration into an attractive alternative (SOU 2002:122 67-73; Regeringens proposition, 9-18, Abrahamsson 211-215; Bull, 208-212; Svensson). The police can also ban demonstrations (and art displays) if previous events have led to disorder or danger, but due to the possibility to assemble without permission, this does not make much of a difference.

At the time of the Gothenburg events, the Swedish police was divided into 21 regional police authorities, with the national police board (rikspolisstyrelsen; RPS) as national HQ with limited authorities. The security police is a part of RPS, while the criminal police is divided between the national criminal police (rikskriminalpolisen) and the regional criminal police (with their own intelligence units, KUT). Events that take up larger resources than what a regional authority can mobilise are labelled "Special Events" (*särskild händelse*), which means that the regional police authority can ask for assistance from other regional authorities and from the national police board. The control however stays with the regional authority, with the national authority only giving assistance (SOU 2002:122 74-77; Polismyndigheten i Västra Götaland, 10-11).

The police law gives the police the right to arrest people for different crimes and to apprehend people that seem to be threatening the general order. Formal preventive arrests are not allowed, but the right to apprehend people on the suspicion of being a threat to the general order can be used to either incarcerate people (for six hours) or to move them away (within certain limits) to a place where they no longer can be a threat to the general order. It goes without saying that this regulation leaves a certain space for ambiguity, since the definition of liability is suspicion of a crime that has not yet been committed (actually four different situations are referred to: breaking of order; immediate risk for the breaking of order; criminal activity and risk for criminal activity) (Swedish, 12-14). According to the law, these regulations can

only be used on an individual level, not on collectives (such as, as it were, all people dressed in black hoods). However, also in this case, some ambiguity can be counted on (SOU 2002:122 84-88; criticism from Göteborgskommittén, 265-266). Naturally, the Swedish law also has regulations against rioting, different kinds of violence as well as procedures for house searches, all of which applied to the Gothenburg events (SOU 2002:122 88-94).

Legally the legal concept *särskilda händelser*, which may be translated as “Special Events” (SE) was first defined in 1989 (RPSFS 1989:773). The concept is currently regulated in RPSFS 2006:14 from the national police board. The regulation, which is to be understood as “advice”, states that a SE can be either an event that is known beforehand and that may cause either public disturbances or crimes, or a public occasion that is extensive enough to make special organisation of police forces necessary. This means that the category could include anything from a terrorist attack to a music concert, basically anything out of the ordinary (RPSFS 2006:14 §5). There is also another, complementary concept, *polisär rikssäkerhet* (national police matter), which indicates that the event demands co-operation between Swedish police districts or Swedish and foreign police authorities (RPSFS 2006:14 §6). Thirdly, there is a functional category: *nationell förstärkningsorganisation* (national support organisation), which includes particular units from the three Swedish metropolitan regions (Stockholm, Västra Götaland [including Gothenburg] and Scania [including Malmö]). These units have a certain training called *särskild polistaktik* (SPT: special police tactics; formerly *ingripande mot folkmassa*; IMF (action against mass of people)). These three concepts all prescribe certain ways of organising the leadership and handling the forces, but also, in a very general way, of documentation.

As already mentioned, the collaboration between the regional and the national police authorities was uneasy from the outset. The problems concerned both overall planning, and the question about the life guard protection (SOU 2002:122 295). The highest responsible in the regional planning board referred to negative experiences from the planning before the European Football Championship in 1992, and therefore wanted to keep the control in regional hands (SOU 2002:122 297). One year and a half before the EC-meeting, on January 21st, 2000, the national police board founded a co-operation group under the national head of the order police. This group was mainly responsible for the reinforcements (SOU 2002:122 307-311;

Polisen i Västra Götaland, 25-28). The security police invited their colleagues at the regional police department for a series of informal meetings, that way circumventing the policy of the regional police department (SOU 2002:122 316). The security police has later argued that the regional police was mostly interested in getting hold of the sources (read: informers) used by the security police, in order to build their own intelligence (SOU 2002:122 318). In the Command Staff (*kommenderingsstab*), the security police had no place, something which the regional police motivated with its impression that the Command Staff at the EC meeting in Cologne in spring 1999 was “crowded” (SOU 2002:122 320). The regional police has in its turn complained that it did not see much result from the voluminous security police force at place in Gothenburg (about 300 officers) (SOU 2002:122, 322).

4.3.4 Context: society, media, local residents

See the introduction.

4.3.5 The intervention proper: tactics

Relating to the intelligence that had been delivered, which seemed to point out a risk of large, orchestrated and violent attacks against the summit, the scouting groups (~~spanare~~ Kilo) had largely concentrated their attention on the Convergence Centre. All signs of activity were read according to this sort of understanding. For instance, one of the police officers that visited the building, later said that according to her understanding she “could not say that all young people [in the building] would throw stones on the police, but they had that kind of clothing and that kind of age” (SOU 2002:122 519-20). Also, teachers in the Chemical department at the Convergence Centre – situated in a school – who were closing down their class rooms for the summer, were interpreted by the police as activists building bombs and chemical weapons (Abrahamsson, 150-152). Already on Wednesday, June 13th, there was a general understanding among the police officers within the dialogue group – who belonged to the scouting groups and were used as scouts for the regional criminal intelligence office – that the whole building had been taken over by “those forces” (SOU 2002:122 520). After that, two incidents created a critical situation: Scouts from the security police claimed that small

stones had been carried into the building (allegedly to be used as slingshot ammunition) and when a police bus drove into the school yard it was surrounded by chanting activists until it left. Instead of notifying the contacts that the dialogue group had made within the activist networks, the police decided to do a full-scale house search. Although the search was postponed until late in the morning the next day, the contacts within the networks were still not informed. The information network that had been created in the building was interpreted as an illegal activist staff of almost military dimensions and according to the intelligence officers, “AFA” (militant antifascists) were even planning actions against the Gothenburg airport, where the US president would arrive on Thursday to take part in the summit (SOU 2002:122 522-527; Abrahamsson, 67-68).

In the morning it was decided that the Convergence Centre would be completely encircled by police squads in full gear – in order to make it impossible to bring any “weapons” outside the school area. Altogether about 300 officers were used for this operation, while around 600 inhabitants were in the school or at the school yard at the time. Formally, it was decided that the inhabitants of the school would be permitted to leave the area after visitation, but this information was never generally spread. The operation started at about 10.30 AM. Later in the day the police encirclement was replaced by a wall of sea containers, and a negotiation was started around noon between the dialogue group and the contacts from the Monday meetings (Oskarsson, 154-158; Abrahamsson, 59-65). As Oskarsson points out, the police on the one hand used the dialogue group to try to get information on events outside the actual demonstrations, on the other hand, when things happened outside the demonstrations, argued that the mandate of the dialogue group was only the demonstrations (Oskarsson, 159).

It has been confirmed that slingshots were fired from the school yard during the encirclement and small barricades were built on the school yard. Around 15-20 persons were involved in these activities. Outside the school yard, police commands including mounted police during a number of incidents had to fence off stone- and bottle-throwing activists from the demonstrations that gathered outside the school to protest against the police operation. It is also clear that especially mounted police and dog handler groups attacked peaceful protesters. At around noon, the police force involved had increased to 469 officers. As a result of the negotiations, a couple of hundred inhabitants of the

school late in the afternoon formed a line on the school yard, preparing to leave the school in a peaceful way. For some reason, this line, pictures of which were cabled from a helicopter above the school yard to the command staff, was interpreted as preparation for a violent attack. An order was issued from the juridical staff that *Ya Basta!* and the militant antifascists, who formed the first two columns, should be arrested for preparation to rioting. This led to a sudden termination of the negotiations. A breakout attempt by *Ya Basta!* (who pressed towards the police line with their protective gear) led to a further decision to declare that the situation now had deteriorated into full riot. This led to the decision, referred to above, to “ride down” the line of peaceful protesters. This tactic provoked a violent response where stones (from an ongoing renovation of the school yard that had left cobble stones out in the open) and bottles as well as slingshots were fired at both mounted and foot police. The clash was however very brief and ended in most of the inhabitants – only a few of which had taken part in the riot, no-one was ever convicted for it – taking refuge in the school building which, as referred to above, was emptied only late in the evening after further negotiations (SOU 2002:122 535-566). Since the operation meant that *Ya Basta!* lost most of its equipment, during the rest of the summit that organisation could no longer, through non-violent, symbolic actions, work against violent escalation.

Another important police action at the same time, was the raid against the alleged “sambandscentralen” (the connection central), which had been established by Göteborgsaktionen as a way to avoid attacks from the extreme right, and preventive arrests tactics from the police. The staff of the central was later convicted as leaders for the violent confrontations during the encirclement of the Convergence Centre. At the same time, a vehicle for the conveners to avoid violent confrontations had been taken away (SOU 2002:122 579-582). On the other hand the confrontations seemed to have re-enforced those tendencies within the police force that wanted to use para-military tactics.

At the same time it was alleged that the broken confidence between the police and the protest networks had increased the risk for escalation (Oskarsson, 189-190; SOU 2002:122 582-584; cf. Polismyndigheten i Västra Götaland, 25-26). The language and the rumours were even further escalated in the intelligence reports for the next day culminating in a report on Saturday afternoon, when an informer was cited as having seen “three German, or Dutch activists, on the second floor. According to the witness, they are armed and have said that they will shoot a police officer.” This information motivat-

ed an extremely violent raid by the national anti-terrorist team at peaceful youth in another rented school, Schillerska Gymnasiet. The young people were beaten, sexually harassed and made subject of racist slurs. (SOU 2002:122 643-649; 654-656).

During the demonstrations, police in protective gear as well as mounted police was held in the background, while scouting teams blended with the protesters (in some cases wearing motor cycle masks, even carrying stones) (SOU 2002:122, 378). As already referred to, an attempt to do a sack-in operation against a part of the “anti-capitalist” march in the morning on Friday June 15th, was met with a violent response, another such attempt on the major demonstration, in the morning of Saturday, 16th, was avoided by a regrouping of the sequence of demonstrators and by anti-rumour activities by the demonstration conveners; on another occasion, the encircling of a spontaneous demonstration against police violence in the evening of Saturday June 16th, was solved peacefully by the conveners’ staff (and an increasingly sceptic police force on the streets) (see above).

4.3.6 The intervention proper: use of equipment

The Swedish police had already during the planning for the European Football Championship in 1992 decided that it would not use heavy crowd control means; it had neither water cannons nor armoured vehicles. It had tear gas (CS) and stun grenades, but neither was included into its crowd control tactics. Before the Championship, the uniform had been changed, and most of the police officers had during the 1990s started to wear the slightly militarised overall uniforms that had earlier on only been worn by specialist teams (Guvā, 14). The crowd control structure with a couple of thousand “Alfa”- trained policemen for stationary purposes, and the “Delta division” of about 250 officers for mobile tactics, was already in place, as well as the “Kilo” and “Romeo” teams of plain-clothes scouts. However, basically the crowd control equipment was consisted of sticks and shields. The heavy weapon used by Swedish police for crowd control was a couple of mounted squads, as well as dog handlers’ teams. Vehicles were not in use for crowd control purposes in 2001 – except when they were used as stationary reinforcements of stationary police lines.

About three million SEK (appr. 300,000 Euro) were used for last minute purchases of equipment (Polismyndigheten i Västra Götaland, 4). Other alleged issues, according to the police enquiries after the events, were the outdated and faulty radio system, and the lack of secured vehicles and non-lethal weapons (Polismyndigheten i Västra Götaland, 5; 36-38; 161-162; Riksdagens Revisorer, 15).

4.3.7 The intervention proper: behavioural profile

According to Command Order 200, that was issued as the lead order for the whole operation, restraint should be shown and the dialogue teams should have an important part in the operation. The problem, it was stated, were the “five percent” who were not seen as peaceful (Oskarsson, 138). However, at the same time, internally, it is clear that the main problem for the police, in its own view, were not those activists that were viewed as potentially violent – but the expressly non-violent *Yå Basta!* activists. The main problem was that according to internal investigations, it was manifestly unclear under which legal circumstances the police could intervene against *Yå Basta!* activists. To come around this problem, it was suggested that the police would instead intervene prematurely, under the pretext of intervening against preparations for different crimes (battering, sabotage, vandalism etc). In that case. It would not matter if *Yå Basta!* would not commit any crime during the actual manifestation, what mattered was to make it believable that they were preparing to commit crimes before anything actually had happened. The ideal way to intervene under these circumstances would be the way actually chosen for the action against the Convergence Centre: a blown-up house search (Oskarsson, 153-155; 209-210 n149; Abrahamsson, 224-227). Inter alia, both during the clash at the Kungssportsavenyn square in the morning Friday 15th, and during the clashes around Vasaparken, it is clear that police squads at a certain point also acted without orders from their superiors. At least during the latter event this probably was a factor behind the escalation (as police squads attacked the street party, although the violence that occurred did not originate from there) (SOU 2002:122 628-629, Oskarsson, 186-188). Swedish police tactics are based on the concept of “mission tactics”, which means that the squads are given a mission in fairly broad terms and then have the authority to decide on how to solve it (Polismyndigheten i Västra Götaland, 12). Squads acting on their own can of course be a consequence of this tactic. (For the entire order system, see Polisen i Västra Götaland, 38-51; Rikspolisstyrelsens, 19.)

4.3.8 The intervention proper: dialogue teams

The dialogue concept was only introduced in the last weeks of the planning and had never been the subject of discussion during the visits paid to other summit places during the years before (Oskarsson, 136-137). However, an effort had been made to make sure that the group contained representatives of both genders (Oskarsson, 137). Although participating in the so-called Monday meetings during the weeks immediately preceding the summit, the dialogue team only succeeded in establishing a limited confidence with leading personalities in the two umbrella organisations. Since it soon became clear that the dialogue teams also reported to the criminal intelligence team, the dialogue had a limited scope from the beginning. Although it appears that the dialogue group actually established contacts with all groups, an actual dialogue never was established with the networks of transgressing protesters (Rikspolisstyrelsens, 20). It had probably been very difficult to establish such a dialogue with the militant antifascists anyway, since distrust was mutual, not in the last place because of the weak police handling of the neo-nazi wave of violence in 1999, and a number of militant attempts from antifascist groups to stop neo-nazi marches during recent years. On the other hand, the inability to create a dialogue was the same for the declaration by non-violent *Yå Basta!* It is hard to speculate about the reason for this, but one probable cause is that intelligence reports had a tendency to paint the *Yå Basta!* tactic as just as violent as that of more militant groups. If the dialogue group had managed to establish a dialogue with this group, it could have reached an understanding that could have countered the allegations in the intelligence material and actually supported its de-escalation tactics (SOU 2002:122 588-592; 685-686; cf. Guvā 12). However, dialogue was in its infancy, and had not yet established itself as a self-confident part of police tactics. As one of its members recalls internally the group was referred to, in demeaning terms (SOU 2002:122, 437).

Due to the haphazard planning process, where reinforcements were taken in with very short notice, and given neither appropriate equipment, nor the work duties they were used to, the Gothenburg events were followed by a massive critique from the police unions. The main focus of the critique was that the police leadership had been totally unprepared for the extent of violence that would take place during the summit (see also SOU 2002:122 686-687; Polisen i Västra Götaland, 28-29; 34-36).

4.3.9 The intervention proper: arrest tactics (preventive arrests)

Since Swedish law precludes preventive arrests, the police had to bend other enforcement strategies to achieve the same effect. As already mentioned, the encirclement that followed from the house search order of the Convergence Centre was one such effect, another was the sack-in and displace tactic that that was tested – with catastrophic results – against the “anti-capitalist” march on Friday morning – a copy of the tactic that more successfully, if that is the word, had been used against the demonstration at the Foreign minister’s meeting in Malmö in April. As Oskarsson argues, at some occasions, the tactic of temporary custody/ displacement was also used as a way to be able to identify and take photos of as many protesters as possible, regardless of individual suspicions. This was probably the case at both the encirclement at Järntorget on Saturday evening and the simultaneous violent house search of Schillerska Gymnasiet (Oskarsson, 194-195). Afterwards, this information was used in an advanced computer-aided effort to bring as many as possible before court (nonetheless, most trials were still dependent on police witnesses, with all related problems) (Abrahamsson, 148-149).

4.3.10 The intervention proper: traffic controls used as delaying tactics

In co-operation with the police from Norway, Denmark and Germany, a number of protesters were identified as convicted or suspected for violence in connection with protests (SOU 2002:122 344). On June 7th, the Danish police raided Ungdomens hus in Copenhagen, and confiscated street fighting weapons that it claimed were meant for the EU summit protests (the Danish radicals denied any connections to the preparations for the summit protests). Furthermore five Danes were arrested in an apartment in Gothenburg on June 12th, where flashbombs and butter acid were confiscated (SOU 2002:122 513, Polismyndigheten i Västra Götaland, 63). On the same day four Norwegians were arrested in Gothenburg, while manufacturing demonstration posters. The four young Norwegians were immediately deported (SOU 2002:122 514, Polismyndigheten i Västra Götaland, 64-65). In the night between Friday June 15th and Saturday June 16th two buses with German activists were stopped and 94 German citizens were escorted back to the border over Helsingborg (Polismyndigheten i Västra Götaland 117).

4.3.11 Reactions

The events in Gothenburg resulted in a number of critical reports:

- The national police board (RPS) criticised that the Kungssportsavenyn square had been left without police protection and many of its stores vandalised, and concluded that the operation against the Convergence Centre had created great problems for the whole operation. It also concluded that a completely new tactical concept had to be created, and that both the technical and the organisational conditions had to be worked over.
- The regional police board defended the operation against the Convergence Centre as well as the raids against the five Danes and the communication central, but concurred on the need for an adjustment of the national organisational and technical conditions for major events.
- The national police union presented general complaints from the police officers about their equipment and their education. About one fourth of the police officers claimed to have been injured in one way or another.

After the events, 356 complaints were made from the police officers about work-related injuries. However, of the 143 persons who were treated in hospital for injuries during the events, only 53 were police officers – it is safe to say that the majority of the rest belonged to the protesters (SOU 2002:122, 664).

Altogether 530 persons were arrested during the events. However, 459 of these were arrested inside the Convergence Centre, among whom no one was convicted for actions perpetrated during that event. In other words, this number has more or less no relation at all to the violence that happened during the events. Almost all of those arrested at the Convergence Centre were only arrested because they were on the spot (SOU 2002:122 665). Furthermore, 385 persons were subject to temporary custody – again, a majority of which came from the encirclements before the Fritt Forum tent on Friday and on Järntorget square on Saturday, where no one claims that any crimes had been committed. All in all, therefore, both the number and the composition of those arrested or taken into temporary custody are completely useless for the purpose of arriving at an understanding of which people were involved in the most violent events (SOU 2002:122 666; Polisen i Västra Götaland, 126).

Another kind of statistics concerns crimes, reported or adjudicated. Altogether, 3,143 crimes were reported after the Gothenburg events, the majority, 2,004, committed against police officers. There were also 88 cases of vandalism, 353 cases of battering and 521 cases of breaking of general order reported. In 182 cases, policemen were reported for crimes, including battering, wrongful arrest and sexual harassment – although some cases actually were opened in court, none of these crimes ever led to a conviction, although it is clear that crimes were committed (SOU 2002:122 570; 614; 630; 666; Polisen i Västra Götaland, 127; Chibogu, 78-79; Adler). Until December 2001, 160 people had also been held under arrest, among whom 59 with charges (*anhållna/häktade*) (Polisen i Västra Götaland 129-130). Altogether 78 people were brought before court in Sweden, with 66 convicted. There were also nine convictions in other countries, out of 22 cases (five convicted in Germany, two in Denmark, one each in Norway and the Netherlands) (Sammanfattning). This statistic also has its problems, since it, e.g. according to the Swedish Helsinki Committee (currently Civil Rights Defenders) is not at all clear that all convicted were in fact guilty of the crimes (the much lower conviction rate in the foreign cases also points in that direction) (Bull, 227-229; Swedish 15-16).

According to an earlier investigation, of 59 of those convicted for crimes: 41 were unmasked when arrested (and, for what is known, also before); 41 were never before arrested, 6 sentenced for minor crimes, mostly graffiti, 6 sentenced for rioting or for violence against the police, 4 for minor political crimes. Only 2 had earlier on been sentenced to prison. The average age was 21 (in 2001), 8 out of the 59 were women. Eleven were minors (6 were 17; 5 were 16) (Wijk, 15-17). Only twenty percent of them were found in court to have hit either a person or a vehicle (Wijk, 18). The average sentence (all 59) was nonetheless nine months imprisonment (Wijk, 21).

4.3.12 Follow up

The report of the Gothenburg committee led to the development of a common national tactical concept for policing crowds (*särskild polistaktik* or Special Police Tactics SPT). The basis for the reform was a move away from previous large formations of armoured police officers. Instead, protection was to be sought in specially prepared vehicles (lightly or heavily armed). Instead of charges against masses of people, the focus would be on arresting people

who were committing crimes. Lead words for the new, “mobile”, tactic were legality, flexibility, resolution of conflicts and security for the individual police officer. That also meant that, without changing the division between 21 police authorities on the county level, the national responsibility was emphasised through standardised education and a regular national reinforcement organisation – which not only included, as before, special storm teams, but also dialogue and specialised higher officers. The concept was informed by research which identified the critical manner in which interactions between demonstrators and police governed escalation of disorder. The primary role of dialogue police is to act as a communication link between demonstrators and police commanders with the goal of facilitating protesters’ legitimate intentions, identifying potential risks to public order and avoiding confrontation. The report also emphasised development of equipment, such as better radio equipment and OC-gas for personal protection (Riksdagens Revisorer; Granskning).

In 2006, the Swedish National Police Board started a three year national project to evaluate and further develop Special Police Tactics and to strengthen the link between practice and science with regard to public order policing. As part of the project, peer review evaluation teams (Adang & Brown, 2009) composed of experienced commanders from different counties observed public order policing operations in real time to identify good practices and learning points. The results of these reviews were disseminated through national seminars and training.

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Saskia Bierman

United Kingdom: G-20 summit, London, April 2009

5.1 G-20 background

The G-20 was established in 1999 to bring together major advanced and emerging economies to stabilize the global financial market (g20.org). Every year a summit is held where the finance ministers and central bank governors of 19 countries with the largest economies worldwide discuss measures to promote the financial stability of the world and to achieve a sustainable economic growth and development. The last G-20 summits have been held in Washington in 2008, and in London and Pittsburgh in 2009. The summit in London was met with major disturbances accompanying protests.

In December 2008 the Metropolitan Police Service was asked to begin planning the police operation for the G-20 summit that would take place in London in April 2009. This meant that the police had only about four months to prepare the operation where the safety of world leaders, including the President of the United States, had to be assured. This presented a challenging timescale for planning an operation of this magnitude. The police operation received the name Operation Glencoe (Thomas, 2009). The principal objective for the police operation was providing and preventing disruption to the summit. Before the summit, press briefings were released to the media by the Metropolitan Police. In the briefings the police stated their concerns that the G-20 summit would create some difficult public order challenges. The media took it in a particular way and talked up the potential for violence and started reporting that “the police are up for it” (HL, 2009).

On April 1st there were ten protests on seven sites in London, including the main summit venue; the Excel Centre. There were four police operations: the security operation at The Excel Centre, the Stop-the-War march in central London, the Bank of England protest and the Climate Camp protest. The first two went without major incidents; at the last two and especially at the Bank of England protest, violent confrontations occurred between protesters and police.

5.1.1 Bank of England

On April 1st the G-20 Meltdown protest took place outside the Bank of England. This protest was not officially notified to the police (HMIC, 2009). Based on the available intelligence, police believed there would be four separate processions that would meet and proceed to the Bank of England where a street party would follow. Intelligence also indicated that the protest would be the focus for more left wing, autonomous and anarchist groups, but there were no indications of any planned intention to engage in public disorder or violence.

At the arrival of the protesters at four different locations police tried to negotiate with them in order to find out their intentions. The protest started at 11:25 as four planned marches, each led by one of the “Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse”, converged on the Bank of England: the red horse against war approached from Moorgate; the green horse against climate chaos from Liverpool Street station; the silver horse against financial crimes from London Bridge and the black horse against land enclosures and borders from Cannon Street. At 11:35 am the crowd was reported to be compliant. At noon a geographical limit for the protesters was marked when filter cordons were placed. At 12:02 pm flares and bottles were thrown at police. About 4,000 to 5,000 protesters were present at that time at the Bank of England. This amount of protesters was considerably higher than police had expected. The estimates based on the intelligence assessments were that about 1,000 protesters would attend the protest. At 12:20 pm police officers were surrounded at Threadneedle street and one officer was hit on the head. A mannequin of a banker hanging from a lamppost was set on fire. After that police command ordered absolute cordons with discretion. The containment was not communicated to the protesters, who did not know how long it would last and who had insufficient access to food, water and toilets. At 12:45 pm violence was directed at police at the junction of Threadneedle Street and Bartholomew Lane. Protesters within the cordon attacked the police line and managed to break through. Groups of protesters covered their faces and gathered items to throw at the police. A group of protesters on the front line verbally abused officers supported by others behind them, who attacked the police line from the back. After breaking through the cordon the Royal Bank of Scotland was attacked. Windows were smashed and individuals entered the building. The cordon was maintained by the police. One officer suffered a serious injury when he was hit by a piece of wood as rioters fought their way into the

bank. The attack on the RBS was sustained for quite a long time as protesters smashed windows and set fire to the blinds. Others looted office equipment and papers or threw smoke grenades, chairs and eggs. Some protesters climbed on surrounding buildings. Several masked protesters were reported throwing concrete out of a window at police officers; others broke windows and damaged vehicles. At a certain moment a crowd formed outside the containment and began confronting police officers from behind. At about 07:00 pm the police began to disperse the protesters through two defined exit points. After about two hours the process of dispersing was completed. During the disorder at least 34 officers were injured as a result of flying debris, attacks by protesters or crushing in the chaos. Inside the containment one man who was not involved in the protests collapsed and died near the bank. Only later it became known he had been pushed to the ground by riot police (Lewis 2, 2009).

5.1.2 Climate Camp protest at Bishopsgate

The camp took place outside the European Climate Exchange in Bishopsgate and was supposed to last for 24 hours. The Climate Camp was intended to draw attention to the environment and to major carbon emitters, as well as to develop ways to create a zero-carbon society (Wikipedia, 2010). During the preparation of the camp it was difficult for police to establish contact with the protesters (HL, 2009). The Metropolitan Police Services met with representatives of the Climate Camp on the 31st March 2009. The Metropolitan Police stated that the representatives of The Climate Camp refused to give them important information, such as the location of the camp and the amount of people attending. The Climate Camp representatives argued that they were unable to provide such information because they did not know the location of the camp until the day of the protest.

On April 1st the camp started at 12:30 pm in Bishopsgate when pop-up tents were thrown down, blocking the road. There were sound systems, musicians and a food stall and at its peak 4,000 to 5,000 protesters were attending the Camp. The protest was peaceful and good-natured until at around 4.40 pm a group of protesters considered “hard-core” by police joined the Climate Camp and started throwing missiles. At 5.00 pm police with helmets, shields and batons began to surround areas of the camp using section 14 of the Public Order Act 1986 to prevent mass breaches of the peace, damage to property

and public disorder. A Climate Camp liaison volunteer had spoken with the police and indicated the intention of the protesters to stay, but to remain peaceful. At 7.00 pm, as the dispersal of the Bank of England protest began, the protesters at Bishopsgate were contained and were not allowed to leave or enter the site. Protesters within the cordon were pushed back by the police in full protective equipment. The crowd within the containment was predominantly peaceful and only a few protesters acted violently and were charged by the police (HL, 2009). Police were unable to distinguish between violent and non-violent protesters and started hitting the crowd, that had no way out, with batons and shields. There were scuffles with the police in which several protesters were hit and kicked by the police and one policewoman needed medical care. Footage shot that day shows hundreds of protesters with arms in the air chanting “this is not a riot” while police officers push them back with batons and shields (You Tube; This is not a riot). At 10.45 pm the police started dispersing the protesters and finally cleared the area of the last protesters at about 01:00 am.

5.2 The phenomenon

5.2.1 Who is involved on an individual/ group level (locals, travellers, national, international)?

The protest at the Bank of England was different from other protests in that both anti-capitalists and environmentalists attended the protest. Normally these groups are not present at the same protest or demonstration. Because the protest was based on different major subjects different groups came together; groups that would normally not be present at the same protest. Of the real protesters the majority was good-natured and not looking for a fight with the police. Besides the real protesters there were small groups and individuals present at the Bank of England who normally would not attend a protest, but who had read in the media that there would be disturbances and wanted to be part of that. A police officer heard some individuals, mostly male adolescents, ring other people to tell them to come and have a fight with the police.

Of the 72 arrests made on April 1st most were male (82%) and had the British nationality. The average age of the arrested persons is 26.6. The protest presumably did not attract a lot of protesters from outside the UK because of

the NATO summit later that week where more international protesters would be attending.

5.2.2 Age (arrested on April 1st 2009)

Table 4: Percentage of arrested persons in different age groups in 2009

Age of arrested persons	Percentage
14 - 17	3
18 - 20	7
21 - 25	33
26 - 30	29
> 30	28

On the basis of these arrest statistics it can be concluded that more offences were committed by persons in age groups of 21 and older.

Speaking more generally, a phenomenon where football hooligans or other troublemakers plan for violence with the police is not seen in London. More specifically, football hooligans are not seen at other events that they use as a platform to riot. In London three major groupings of offenders in large crowds can be distinguished:

- ☐ Issue related/ idealistic offenders (anarchists, anti-establishment). These are the hardest to deal with, because they are smart and use tactics to play the police.
- ☐ Event-based offenders (e.g. football hooligans). Football hooligans are less of a problem and can be managed well. They are not seen as a group at other events with the intention to cause a riot. Disruption by hooligans is often accompanied by alcohol consumption. Drugs do not play a large role. There is not much drug-related violence in London. Big riots at dance parties are not seen in Britain.
- ☐ Group/ gang related offenders. Two groups meet to fight each other. They only fight the police if the police interrupts the fight or the possibility to fight.

5.2.3 What indications are there for organisation and planning of the groups?

In the week leading up to the G-20 protests, notifications were made by the media reporting a high likelihood of disorder. The BBC “One Show” reported that the march on April 1st was likely to be hostile (HMIC, 2009) and on a popular protester website an article was placed entitled “The summer of Rage starts here” by a member of a group called “London Anarchists” (London anarchists, 2009). From the intelligence obtained by the police there were no indications for planned violence by the protesters. Violent acts came about often as a reaction to restrictions made by the police such as not being able to leave the scene because of the containment. In other instances the acts of violence were used to evoke a reaction by the police that could be used to influence the public opinion. The fact that the number of people being present at the Bank of England that day was four times larger (4,000 instead of 1,000) than police had expected offered opportunities for violence because of the anonymity of the large crowd and the restricted resources of the police.

5.2.4 Who is involved in organising and planning?

The protest at the Bank of England was organized by a radical anti-capitalist, socialist organization that was formed in London in January 2009 prior to the G-20 summit (Wikipedia, 2010). Environmentalists and anti-capitalists used April Fools day to name their protests “Fossil Fools demonstration” and “Financial Fools demonstration”. The organizers communicated the protest through left wing websites. No official notification of the protests at Bishopsgate and The Bank of England had been made in advance to the police. On the day before the protest a legal team of the Climate Camp met with the police. They didn’t give the police information about the location or numbers of people expected to attend. The protesters chose not to have any official organizers, in which case nobody is responsible or chargeable for the protest. Where planning of protests formerly was done in large gatherings now just a few people are involved in the planning. One of them sends a text message to a small number of other organizers to meet at a public location within a few minutes to discuss the protest. This way, police can never be at the location in time or find out about the intentions of the protest.

5.2.5 Are there specific tactics being used by the groups? Violent and non-violent ones

The tactics used by the protesters of the Climate Camp were mostly non-violent. Prior to the actual camp a group of participants had played a game called “capture the flag” in the area on March 27th which was used by the protesters to familiarize themselves with the location. Several tactics were being used at the bank of England. The protesters were very inventive in their tactics as they dressed up as policemen using stolen police uniforms or as bankers trying to gain entry to the banks. They also wanted to use an old bullet-proof army car in which they would be untouchable to the police.

Another tactic of the protesters was to attack police from within the containment and then retreat into the anonymity of the large crowd. The protesters would also split up which made it difficult for the police to act. Police used their shields and batons on the crowd to control the police line, also hitting innocent people. This was then used by the troublemakers to influence the non-violent crowd.

As a reaction to the Evidence Gathering teams and Forward Intelligence teams the protesters created teams that make the gathering of evidence difficult. They use a big sheet to block the sight of the police teams and prevent them from making footage of them. On the other hand they use their mobile phones to make pictures and videos of misbehaving by the police. The media are also used to help create a negative image of the authority and more specifically of the police.

Communication with the groups is difficult, because they use whistles to make any form of dialogue impossible.

5.2.6 Kinds of offences

Below are the offences that people were arrested for on April 1st.

Of the arrests made that day most offences involved violent disorder. Because 11 persons were arrested for wearing a police uniform a large percentage of the offences was for impersonation of a police officer. The “other” offences consisted of possession of drugs, being drunk and disorderly, obstruction of a highway, preventing course of justice, driving offences, refusal to remove face mask and theft of a police baton.

Table 5: Percentage of arrests per offence

Offences	Percentage (N = ?)
Violent disorder	24,6
Impersonation of a police officer	15,1
Assault on police	9,6
Breach of the peace	8,2
Criminal damage	8,2
Offensive weapon	5,4
Arson	4,1
Burglary	4,1
Threatening behaviour	4,1
Possession of weapon	2,7
Affray	2,7
Other	11,0

5.2.7 What are the aims/ goals of the groups?

Climate Camp Protesters want to create awareness for the environment. They hope to accomplish this through exposure. The protest at the Bank of England started with four planned marches, each led by one of the Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse: the red horse against war; the green horse against climate chaos; the silver horse against financial crimes and the black horse against land enclosures and borders. The aim of the protest at the Bank of England was to “create a carnival outside the bank” and to “overthrow capitalism”. Through this the protesters wanted to stop The City from working. When the protesters were stopped in reaching that goal, as happened by the police containing them, some reacted with violence. Other protesters had anarchistic motives to minimize authority, in case of the protest the authority of the police. They wanted to reach this goal by influencing public opinion by making the police act in an aggressive way or trying to make it make a fool of itself. There were also people attending at the Bank of England who had no idealistic motivation and were there only to misbehave and have a fight with the police or join in looting.

5.2.8 What are the targets?

Violence on the day of the protest was targeted at the banks in The City. The violence was not so much directed at the people working at the banks, although they were advised not to come to work that day in expensive cars or dressed-up suits. The protesters also tried to demolish the Royal Bank of Scotland. Other violent acts were directed at the police.

5.2.9 The use of communication channels

Different communication channels were used by the protesters. The protest was announced on several websites to attract as many people as possible (drew3000, 2009). During the event mobile phones were used to make photos of clashes between the police and protesters and these photos were posted on the internet, for example on YouTube or distributed through social networks; such as Facebook. Photos and videos were being sent forward and via text messaging the protesters were able to communicate their strategy, plans or the situation at present. Photos and videos were later used to influence the public opinion about the policing of the protest.

5.2.10 How: the use of weapons?

The use of weapons was not a big part of the rioting that day. Different materials that were available at the scene were used as weapons. A pole was thrown, resulting in one injury. A smoke or flour bomb, bottles and flares, smoke grenades and eggs were thrown at the police. A piece of wood injured one police officer. There was flying debris, and traffic cones and a metal ladder were thrown. (No author, 2009).

5.2.11 Impact of alcohol and drugs

There are no records indicating that drugs and alcohol played a major role in this event. Also from interviews with Police Officers some drug and alcohol use may be very well possible, but it didn't have a big impact on the events of that day.

5.2.12 What is the context in which the incident occurs?

Different events prior to and during the protest have had an influence on how violence came about that day. First, the fact that media had talked up the potential for violence in advance of the protest made that other people attended it: people that were merely there to have a fight with the police. The briefing that was held by the police for the media was represented in a particular way and the media started reporting that “the police were up for it”. They also reported about the possibility that protesters might storm buildings, damage property and bring large areas of London to a standstill. Second, prior to the protest contact between police and the protesters was hard to establish and police did not have a lot of information about the protests, such as the location and the amount of people attending. Third, the weather was very good that day which made it attractive to attend the outdoor protest. Fourth, intelligence suggested that about 1,000 protesters would attend, but at its peak around 5,000 to 6,000 protesters were present. The large amount of people created a situation of anonymity. Fifth, the extreme media exposure of the summit, which made it interesting for some of the protesters to clash with the police to generate footage of the police hitting them. Sixth, the fact that there were other protests on that same day which gave the possibility for protesters at the Bank of England to go to the Climate Camp and disrupt order at that location. This was the reason for containing the Climate Camp. And last, the diverse composition of the crowd. Some protesters had non-violent intentions and others violent. This affected the policing of the protest.

5.2.13 How do the groups use the media?

In reaching their goal of making authority look bad, the protesters use the media. Protesters give the media photos and videos that show police violence directed at the protesters. Another way in which the media is used is by the legal team of the Climate Camp by releasing a video of the protests, which includes footage of a demonstrator being struck on the head by a police riot shield and of another man being punched in the face as the crowd retreats from the police.

5.3 Intervention

Which measures are taken by the police, justice, administration, organisations and others in order to prevent and to control public disorder and violence from individual offenders and of violent groups at mass events? Which interventions are effective in preventing and controlling major riots and disturbances at mass events? Under which circumstances?

5.3.1 Information/ intelligence

Intelligence and information played a large part in the preparation to and policing of April 1st. Police officers of a Public Order Intelligence Unit are concerned with collecting information about protesters that commit unlawful acts and cause public order disruption. The information and intelligence were collected in several reports on which a tactical plan for the policing of that day was made. On April 1st special teams, so called Forward Intelligence Teams, were used to keep an eye on known troublemakers. The police officers on this team know their faces and when they see them in the crowd they will stay with them until the event ends. They will follow them around wherever they go and these protesters will not be able to commit offences without it being noticed by the police.

Forward intelligence teams (FITs) were introduced to provide chief officers with up-to-date information about the movement of crowds and groups within crowds that are likely to be violent or engage in disorder. They are routinely deployed alongside Evidence Gathering Teams (see below). FITs are deployed in units of two or three uniformed officers. They are trained to gather intelligence and information on the changing mood, dynamics, and intent of crowds which is then passed back to the control room or intelligence centre to assist in the appropriate deployment of resources. They keep a record of incidents, people identified and any other information which is later transcribed into an intelligence report. They are expected to withdraw during outbreaks of disorder to be replaced with officers specifically trained and equipped to deal with disorder. One of the tactics employed by FITs is to seek out persons likely to engage in disorder and follow them to monitor their actions. The purpose of this is to deprive the person of the ability to engage in disorder, due to the proximity of police officers. This tactic has been criticised by a number of protest groups as oppressive and constituting

harassment of peaceful protesters (HMIC, 2009b). HMIC concluded that there is currently a lack of clarity around the role and function of FITs. The initial role of FIT officer was to communicate with individuals and groups taking part in public events such as protests and gather information on crowd mood and dynamics to inform command decision-making. The original intention was that FIT officers would act as a link between protesters and the police (in a similar manner as the dialogue police in Sweden). The role of FIT officer has shifted significantly over the past few years. FITs are now often deployed in personal protective equipment and accompanied by photographers.

5.3.2 Risk analysis

Mainly open sources were used to make a risk analysis of the protests surrounding G-20. In the assessment that was made, the safety of world leaders, including the President of the United States, was a central issue. A risk analysis was made that included an event assessment, impact assessment and significant threats, likelihood, impact and control measures (Thomas, 2009).

5.3.3 Context: legal and organisational

There is a three-partner “power-sharing” relationship by which policing is governed in England and Wales:

- 1 The Home Secretary who is accountable to Parliament and determines national priorities and the level of central funding available.
- 2 Chief police officers who are accountable to police authorities and have operational responsibility.
- 3 Police authorities which are accountable to local people and are required to secure the maintenance of an efficient and effective local police force.

Police authorities do not involve themselves in monitoring public order policing operations, to avoid intruding on chief officers’ operational independence.

In policing a protest police have statutory powers and duties including those set out in the Public Order Act 1986, the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, the Criminal Law Act 1967, the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 and common law powers and duties. The use of all police powers should be considered in accordance with the Human Rights Act 1998.

In case of a protest, police in London must not prevent or restrict it and is required to show a degree of tolerance towards peaceful gatherings, even if these cause a level of disruption. Some restrictions are prescribed by law. The police may impose restrictions on the protest provided these restrictions pursue one or more legitimate aims and are necessary.

The Bank of England is located in The City of London and the policing operation would be the responsibility of the London City Police. Because this was a large operation that required experienced staff the command of the operation was with The Metropolitan Police.

Command structure

The policing operation, operation Glencoe, that covered all the protests surrounding the G-20 summit in London was commanded by one Gold Commander, who was accountable and responsible for the strategic plan; a silver commander, who was responsible for the tactical plan and several bronze commanders, who were responsible for a functional or geographic sector. Functional bronzes were concerned with security, protection, escorts, search, firearms, communications and counter terrorism.

Philosophy, basic approach

The safety of the world leaders that were attending the summit was a central aspect in how the police operation came about. For example, the streets that the world leaders would be travelling through had to be open and free of protesters. This affected some of the decisions that were made that day, like a decision to move the protesters to the Bank. Within the restriction that there had to be no additional threat to the world leaders and public order would not be distorted, the policing approach was to give way for the protest.

5.3.4 Context: society, media, local residents

The right to protest is considered an important right in the UK, which makes policing it different from policing a football match. The public sympathises less with football hooligans than with protesters. From this standpoint police had to give way to the protesters to demonstrate freely. On the other hand there were people who work and live in The City that were afraid to leave

their home or workplace. Then there was the media that were used by the protesters who wanted to show any kind of misbehaving by the police. This all meant that police had to be very careful regarding how and when to act.

5.3.5 The intervention proper: tactics

The Metropolitan Police uses three levels in which officers are public order trained. Level 3 officers are trained to police a crowd that is non-violent. These officers were first deployed to control the crowd that attended the protests. When a crowd or individuals starts to physically attack the police the level 3 officers are replaced by level 2 or level 3 officers. Level 3 officers are part of a separate unit that is highly trained to deal with riots. Other units that were deployed on April 1st were the mounted police, police dog teams, Forward Intelligence teams, Evidence Gathering teams. The fire-armed police was on stand-by. The Gold commander designed the strategy to be in accordance with the Human Rights Act 1998. This meant that the policing operation should be proportionate and legal; commanders must be accountable and the plans must be necessary to achieve the strategy. The main tactics for operation Glencoe described in the tactical plan were (Thomas, 2009):

- **Negotiation with organisers of events** (happened on a low scale, police didn't receive much information from the protesters). This can be an effective intervention if the organisers want to participate and police invests in establishing a level of confidence with the protesters. The protest at The Bank of England and The Climate Camp were not officially announced. A legal team of the Climate Camp met with the police the day before the camp, but they were reluctant to give information about numbers of people attending, location and intentions. Because of the lack of information the policing response had to remain flexible.
- **Establishing control**: the locations that had been identified through intelligence as protesting locations had to be secured early by officers. Because officers were present when the protesters started to arrive on the day of the protest the police was able to control the crowd and to lead them to a location that would not cause much disruption to others.
- **The use of shields and batons**: police would use shields and batons on the people in the crowd to make them go backwards or as a reaction to the violent protesters who had provoked the police but had already fled into the

crowd. The use of the edge of a shield to strike demonstrators on the body or face is not part of the ACPO Public Order manual and has never been endorsed nationally (HMIC, 2009).

- **Containment:** full containment was implemented to prevent a breach of the peace and prevent groups from the protest causing disruption across the City of London (Thomas, 2009). A containment can be placed under Common Law. The following criteria should be met for the containment to be lawful and not infringe the right to liberty of the protesters: “the tactic is resorted to in good faith, the tactic is proportionate to the situation which has made the measure necessary and the tactic is enforced no longer than necessary” (HMIC, 2009). When containing a crowd police strive to contain only the group of troublemakers by going into the crowd and locating this group. At the Bank of England this distinction between non-violent and violent individuals or groups was not made. In an interview a bronze commander stated that the only way to control the large crowd was by keeping them in one group. If the crowd had emerged into subgroups police would not have been able to manage the crowd because of the restricted resources. It remains questionable if the criteria mentioned were met. As a result, disturbances could have been co-created by the containment set by the police (HMIC, 2009). Even though many protesters didn’t want to leave the site they did indulge in attacking the police lines. It seems that some people saw this as a game or a challenge to be able to get out and break police lines.
- **Dispersal:** this tactic was only mentioned as an option that could be used to reduce the size of the crowd and make it more manageable. The risk of dispersal is damage and disruption at other locations. On April 1st dispersal was used when the containment came to an end. Small groups of people at a time were allowed to leave the containment to prevent disruption at other locations.

5.3.6 Use of equipment

The police officers policing the protest were equipped with pepper spray, baton and shields. The officers of the Territorial Support Group (level 1 officers) also had Tasers. Pepper spray is not used in a public order setting. At the beginning the officers were dressed in their standard uniform. These are level 3 officers that manage a crowd as long as the people in the crowd go as far as

pushing and shoving. When things start to get more violent these level 3 trained officers are replaced by level 1 en 2 who are in full protective gear with or without NATO helmets, depending on the situation. As soon as the situation returned to non-violent, officers in normal uniform would return. In public order management in Britain no CS gas or water cannons are used to control a crowd.

5.3.7 Behavioural profile

No specific behavioural profile was made for policing the protests surrounding the summit. In their policing officers first start with dialogue and scale up according to the situation and threat.

5.3.8 Arrest tactics

The role of Evidence Gathering Teams (EGTs) is to gather evidence of offences committed during a public event. EGTs are deployed to locations where disorder or violence is anticipated or is taking place. Prior to an event, EGTs will be deployed to obtain evidence, including images of persons attending the event. The footage recorded will be checked against footage of persons committing offences during the event to assist identification for the purposes of potential prosecutions. Post event footage obtained by EGTs is used to demonstrate the event's impact on the local community to the prosecuting court.

During the G-20, Evidence Gathering teams and Forward Intelligence Teams gathered evidence of unlawful acts. After the dispersal began and people were let out of the containment, arrests could be made on the basis of this evidence. In the weeks and months following the protests more arrests could be made using this footage.

5.3.9 Follow up

Following the G-20 events, several investigations were conducted. Of particular relevance are reports by Her majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC

2009 a & b) and by the House of Lords/ House of Commons Joint commissions on Human rights report (Demonstrating respect for human rights? Follow up, 2009). The HMIC also made some comparisons with public order policing outside of England & Wales (specifically in Northern Ireland, Scotland, Spain and Sweden).

The findings of these reports included the following:

- ☐ There is a disconnection between individual officer safety training and public order training.
- ☐ There is a lack of public order command capability.
- ☐ Training and guidance are out of date.
- ☐ Inappropriate use is made of public order powers.
- ☐ There is uncertainty about the governance and accountability mechanisms best suited to support public order policing at both national and local levels.

HMIC concluded that it was time for scrutiny of the policing of protest as a serious and developing part of public order policing. In answering the question “How best should the police as a service adapt to the modern day demands of public order policing?”, HMIC concluded that what they call the traditional British model (with its approachable, impartial, accountable style of policing based on minimal force) is well matched to deal with modern crowd dynamics. It is a model that, at the majority of everyday public events, is deployed successfully across the United Kingdom. According to HMIC, research and practical police experience overwhelmingly support the view that policing styles and tactics have a profound impact on the dynamics of crowds at public events. There is compelling evidence that the most effective means of maintaining peaceful and consensual relations between the police and a dynamic crowd is through:

- 1 a strategic approach to policing which is centred upon the facilitation of peaceful behaviour within a crowd
- 2 a tactical policing response which increases police capability for dialogue and communication with crowd members
- 3 a graded, differentiated and information led approach to police use of force.

HMIC came up with a number of recommendations for the policing of protest in the UK and public order policing in general. These recommenda-

tions deal with issues such as training, the adoption of a set of fundamental principles on the use of force, codification of public order policing, a “no surprises” communication philosophy, the use of containment as a tactic, facilitation of peaceful protest and the use of dialogue, improvement of communication with the media, evidence gathering, stressing the value of post-operation debriefs and external reviews, improving threat and risk assessment in relation to specific public order policing operations and improving briefings.

Significantly, HMIC does not consider that the answer to modernising and strengthening public order policing in the UK lies in introducing more public order legislation to add to the already complex legislative public order framework. Rather, it is considered vital that police officers of all ranks properly understand the existing legal framework of police public order powers and duties.

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Ronald van der Wal

United Kingdom: policing EDL manifestations and demonstrations across England

6.1 Background: a short history of right-wing protest

The UK has a history of racist protest. Already in the second half of the 1950's extreme-right groups received increasing support for their anti-migration propaganda. Because of the right of freedom of speech, groups like the White Defence League were allowed to express their racist arguments and propaganda loudly. In the 1970's and the 1980's it was the National Front (NF) that appeared to have extensive support. This organisation was considered as constituting an important background determinant of many racist attacks and harassment. The party organised street corner meetings in which racism was propagated openly. Racist pamphlets were weekly distributed at the London Brick Lane, market, in an area where many Bengali migrants lived. However, the direct involvement of the NF in racist incidents turned out to be difficult to expose.¹

In 1979 unrest broke out in Southall when the NF organised a march in support of the election campaign. The march was seen as a provocation by the large local minority community. They responded with massive protest. Five thousand people marched the streets the day before the NF march. The day of the march itself 2,756 policemen were present with dogs, horses and even a helicopter to protect a handful of NF supporters. It came to heavy clashes with anti-NF demonstrators in which one person was killed.²

In the 1990's the NF declined as the British National Party began to grow. Large scale right wing protests as in the 1970's were hardly seen on the streets. Yet street violence didn't belong to the past.

The violence by BNP supporters was "organised" on a smaller scale and there are indications that the BNP used right-wing extremist violence as a methodology to "seek institutionalized power".

¹ R. Witte, *Racist violence and the state*, Harlow 1996, pp. 50-51.

² P. Fryer, *Staying power. The history of black people in Britain*, London 1988, p. 397.

The BNP always had a strong anti-immigration agenda. Since the last ten years they see Muslim immigration as the greatest danger threatening the UK.

In the past there were links with football hooligans. In 1991, a security force made up of nationalists drawn from football casual firms was created to defend far-right activists, allegedly in response to a hammer attack at Kensington Library. The force firebombed the headquarters of Communist Party newspaper the *Morning Star* and by 1993 renounced democracy, transforming into Neo-Nazi paramilitary Combat 18. That same year, the BNP banned membership in the group and claimed it was MI5 infiltrated and “police-ran”. Critics of the BNP, such as Human Rights Watch in a 1997 report, have asserted that the party recruits from skinhead groups and that many believe it promotes racist violence.

Meetings of the BNP always provoke a reaction from antifascist groups. On several occasions it came to fierce clashes with antifascist, antiracist groups.

2009 was the year of birth of a new extreme right group that called itself the English Defence League. It attracted great numbers of protesters. In Wales and Scotland the Welsh Defence League and the Scottish Defence League were set up. These organisations have frequent contacts.

6.1.1 The English Defence League: a profile

The English Defence League (EDL) originated in March 2009 from a group named “United Peoples of Luton”. It was a reaction to an anti-British demonstration by Islamic activists in Luton, held during a homecoming parade of the Royal Anglian Regiment troops returning from Afghanistan. Luton has an Islamic population of about 30,000. The town has a history of ethnic tensions. At the homecoming parade in March 2009 only a small group of extremists, according to newspapers not more than 20, appeared on the street holding banners with slogans like “Butchers of Basra” and “Anglian soldiers go to hell”. This protest ignited a huge indignation from both the British public, whites as well as blacks and Asians, and the media. This anti British protest led to the birth of the EDL, which was first heard of in the Luton region.

The main objective of the EDL is to protest Islamic extremism. As they say on their website they represent people who can see the threat of “Islamism” for what it is: “a vile and virulent ideology based on 7th century barbarity, intol-

erance, hatred, subjugation and war.”³ English Defence League supporters maintain that this threat is one that must be stopped at all costs. They stress that they are not against the presence of Muslims in Britain in general, but only against Muslim-extremism.

The EDL wants to re-establish “what Britain was”. They demonstrate for British culture and are afraid of the Islamification of the UK. They are very supportive of British military efforts abroad.

The EDL uses street-based marches against Muslim extremism as their main tactic to attract attention for their objectives. Since March 2009 they have organised a growing number of demonstrations all over England. As demonstration sites they choose iconic English sites where English symbols are present. Most of the cities have a square where there is a symbol of English/ British history: a statue of St. George or a specific English hero or some historic building. Other objects associated with their demonstrations symbolise the threat of Islam, such as the building site of a new mosque in Dudley and a demonstration on 9/ 11 near the mosque in Harrow. In March 2010 there was a demonstration to support the visit of the Dutch politician Geert Wilders to the British Parliament.

Each month there are two or three demonstrations. Sometimes they are organised on the same day.

The group states that its aim is to demonstrate peacefully in English cities, but conflicts with the UAF (see below) and other opponents have led to street violence and arrests, resulting in some EDL marches being banned. Journalists that have covered EDL marches have received death threats. Four specialist national police units involved in policing hooliganism, extreme violence, and terrorism are investigating the EDL.

The EDL has a national leadership. Regional and local leaders organise the EDL demonstrations. The EDL is a movement: there is no membership structure. According to the leadership there are no political aims within the EDL and there are no ties with the BNP. Several respondents have their doubts about this a-political stance and claim tight informal ties with the BNP exist.

3 Official EDL website: www.englishdefenceleague.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=124&Itemid=130.

The EDL leadership counters the accusations of racism and fascism. On BBC Newsnight, a late-night news programme, they demonstratively burned a swastika-flag, just to prove that they are no Nazi's and that they have no links with fascism. According to these leaders, the fact that the EDL is constantly depicted as a fascist or Muslim-hating organisation is due to anti-racist organisations like the Antifa, the Unite Against Fascism (UAF) and to some extreme right wing organisations like Combat 18 and Blood and Honour. The EDL sees these organisations as "agent provocateurs" that have instigated trouble and gave the EDL a bad reputation. The "state controlled political elite media machine" is also blamed for negative publicity.⁴

The EDL presents itself as a grass roots social movement that represents every walk of life, every race, every creed and every colour; from working class to middle class England. It stresses that this diversity is its strength. Its supporters "represent a culturally rich, patriotic and nation-loving populace".

Both the media as well as respondents from the police forces state that a considerable part of the support of the EDL consists of so called football risk supporters. Football supporters took the initiative to create the EDL in Luton in March 2009. The initial trouble caused by the EDL was ignited by these hooligans. Because of their behaviour during national and international football matches and tournaments their passports were withdrawn so they couldn't travel abroad to support the English national team. Staying at home they organised protests. Since then this has become a tradition, which finally resulted in the origin of the EDL.

It is difficult to describe the group. It varies from 16 year-old teenagers to adults in their forties. They are predominantly male. Females are hardly seen within its ranks. The politic affiliation is mainly right wing. The electoral preference is BNP.

Within the EDL, members have a common goal, which is the battle against Islamic extremism. Outside the EDL members have different interests when they support their own football club. Prior to a demonstration in Stoke in January 2010 there were fights among two rival factions related to different football clubs. It appeared they had scores to settle. Once the demonstration started and they came together as the EDL they put all differences aside and were united again.⁵

4 www.englishdefenceleague.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=124&Itemid=130.

5 Interview West Midlands Police, 12-5-2010.

However, in interviews with several news programmes and in clips on YouTube the supporters state that it is only Muslim extremism that they are against. In general the EDL has a xenophobic character. Fear for the future of Britain, is openly expressed. “Paki’s take over their houses and jobs and are after their women.” Some of the people interviewed think that when the Muslim population grows even further it will claim independence like Scotland or Wales.⁶

The EDL has become quite organised and effective in its protest. The mainstream message is: “We don’t support Islamic extremism.” This view evokes sympathy, even among women and children. In Dudley the EDL turned up with 60 stewards and radio communication equipment. The stewards did their best to contain the hardcore football individuals within the group.

The EDL has its own legal advisors so they understand what their possibilities are. When they come to town they know exactly what they can and what they cannot do. They even challenge police officers. There is an urge within the hardcore ideologists of the EDL to be seen as more legitimate and to be more professional.

6.1.2 Unite Against Fascism (UAF)

Unite Against Fascism UAF stands at the front of anti-fascist and anti-racist protest. UAF was formed in 2003 in response to electoral successes by the British National Party (BNP). It was a coalition of several organisations and movements that included members of the Anti-Nazi League, the National Assembly Against Racism, the Trades Union Congress (TUC) and leading British unions such as the Transport and General Workers’ Union (T&G) (now Unite) and UNISON. First it waged battle with the BNP. It warns for the in their view alarming rise of racism and fascism in Britain. On their website it is stated: “Over the last decade, racism and Islam phobia in society have grown. As a result, we have seen an increase in racist violence and attacks on multiculturalism. This has culminated in the rise of far right and fascist organisations, in particular the BNP and the EDL.”

6 <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=np09fgMgpN4&feature=related>.

UAF sees the EDL as racists and fascists. They describe the EDL as an organisation of racist thugs with links to the BNP. According to the UAF the EDL has targeted Muslims and mosques, whipping up hatred, division and violence wherever it has been allowed to march. EDL supporters stabbed a man in the evening after the EDL demonstration in Bolton in March 2010. EDL supporters ran riot in Stoke-on-Trent earlier in the year, attacking the local Asian community and police.

The UAF has a mixed ethnic composition. Most of the protesters are male in the age range between 18 and 30. Among them are many young Asian Muslims. Sometimes they are extreme in their views. Their political affiliation is mostly (far) left wing. The majority of the supporters consists of people who are simply opposed to right wing extremism. But according to the respondents the UAF also attracts the same kind of extremists as the EDL; people who deliberately seek a confrontation with the opposing party. The UAF gets its money partly from student organisations, unions and local councils. Just as the EDL, the UAF states that it wants to demonstrate peacefully. The demonstrations are nationally organised. In the case of Bolton the UAF had organised a large scale counter-protest. There was a supportive contingent from the trade union. Coaches were hired and there were 37 pick-up points all over the country. The fact that people are coming from all over the country – both from the EDL as well as from the UAF – gives these demonstrations the status of a national event.

6.1.3 Right to protest

Article 11 of the British Human Rights Act allows people peacefully to demonstrate their rights to protest. Even when both rival parties want to protest on the same site this can't be prohibited. Only demonstrations on private land can be prohibited. On public land there are hardly any legal obstructions. The British police has to facilitate the protest or demonstration. The local authorities play a minor role.⁷

⁷ This is what several respondents tell.

Only the Home Secretary can ban a protest. In the short history of the EDL this has happened only once. The march was announced for September 19th 2009 in Luton. On advise of the Borough Council, the Bedfordshire police and an organisation called Hope not Hate, the march was banned. This happened only after Hope not Hate organised a petition. Within hours after the first call a staggering 12,636 letters had been sent. That figure climbed to more than 14,000 which was reason enough for the Home Secretary to ban the march. As a precautionary measure, all marches were banned in the town for the next three months.

The ban, granted under the Public Order Act, prohibited “any procession or march involving members or supporters of, but not limited to, the English Defence League, UK Casuals United, March For England and United People of Luton” from marching in the town without having made a formal application to Luton Borough Council.

6.1.4 Policing of protest

The English police sees itself as very impartial. The police have an obligation to reasonably facilitate EDL protests and to keep the two rival factions apart. They also have the obligation not to unnecessarily frustrate the demonstration. That includes not to put on unnecessary or prescriptive conditions on the protest. What the police can do is to police the protestors as a community and engage them before the event, making them very clear they are and are not permitted to do. When both the EDL and the UAF want to demonstrate on the same site the police only allow them to march within a certain distance of each other.

6.1.5 Structural debrief

The policing of EDL demonstrations is debriefed on a national level under the direction of the National Policing Improvement Agency (NPIA). The purpose of these debriefings is to identify good practice in relation to all policing operations so that this can be disseminated nationally to support and guide those forces who have not yet policed an EDL demonstration. Out of the debriefings come proposals for a national database containing contact information and details of commanders who have previously policed EDL

demonstrations and for the creation of a buddy system for forces. With the buddy system, forces that were the last to experience policing an EDL demonstration assist and support the next force in their planning for an EDL event. Now there is a network of EDL experts, who share information. For example, when there is an upcoming EDL meeting in a specific force, the force will immediately contact the force that had the last meeting in its area. Usually the silver commander will travel to meet up with his colleague who was in command of that operation. He will also contact the NPIA and the National Public Order Intelligence Unit. This network contains a lot of information and prevents forces from reinventing the wheel. Each force can make use of the experiences and the knowledge of other processes. For instance North Yorkshire has a very good community approach, so other forces can learn from these experiences to prevent disorder in their area.

6.2 The phenomenon

6.2.1 Greater Manchester police

In the Manchester Area there were two demonstrations. The first was held on October 10th 2009 in Manchester. The second was held on March 20th 2010 in Bolton, a suburb 12 miles from Manchester city centre. In Manchester the EDL protest attracted a crowd of 3,000, in Bolton there were 4,000 protesters. According to the police respondent there was no particular reason why the EDL wanted to protest in Bolton. In Manchester it came to clashes with the police and with UAF-protesters. The police arrested 55 protesters. Almost sixty percent of them belonged to the EDL.

6.2.2 West Midlands police

The EDL protested in Birmingham on September 7th 2009 and in Dudley on April 3rd 2010. In Birmingham there were clashes between the EDL and the UAF. Ninety arrests were made. In April 2010 it came to Dudley to protest against the building of a new “18 million pound super mosque”. About 2,000 people attended this demonstration. The image of the demonstration in Birmingham in September 2009 shows an EDL that was very disorganised. The EDL indicated that they wanted to protest in Birmingham

on September 5th 2009 (2 days before the march). West Midlands Police anticipated a counterdemonstration by UAF and affiliated groups. Plans published on the EDL website indicated suggested routes to the assembly point and suggested that police would escort the EDL supporters to the assembly location. This had not been agreed with the police. On September 7th members of both protest groups began to arrive in the City earlier than anticipated. They would not negotiate with police and then became the target of counter protesters, resulting in sporadic clashes and incidents of general disorder and anti-social behaviour. Police separated the protest groups using cordons and came under attack from both protest groups, who threw bricks and bottles. At about 6.30 pm, EDL protesters boarded buses and the remaining UAF protesters began to disperse. In total 90 arrest were made, away from the city centre in connection with damage to buses transporting the protesters.

In April 2010 they came to Dudley to protest against the building of a new "18 million pound super mosque". About 2.000 people attended this demonstration. The UAF succeeded in mobilising almost the same amount of protesters. They protested more than a mile away from the EDL protesting area.

During this protest things had changed compared to the Birmingham march. Two elements within the EDL were visible. On the one hand about 75% of the group supported the EDL ideology. On the other hand there were several hundred football risk supporters, which was noticeable in the first stage of the protest. The police had arranged that the EDL demonstrators formed up about a mile from the protest area. Two thousand people gathered over there.

At the EDL protesting area in Dudley, the majority of the group was near the stage, listening orderly to the speeches and seriously taking part in the protest,. Another group of around 300 were bouncing around the fence, trying to break out. They were not interested in the British national anthem being played, nor in the different speeches. They were just looking for a way to break through the fences and find their way to the UAF protesting area. One of the respondents who polices a great part of the football matches in the West Midlands area (there are six football clubs), recognised a lot of these hooligans. The demonstration lasted one and a half hour, in which there were significant skirmishes among rival factions of hooligans.

In Dudley the UAF did not organise a counter protest. Instead of this they organised a multi-faith festival which they announced two days before the EDL protest. This festival was on the same day as the EDL protest. Preparations for this event had already begun at an earlier stage. The UAF joined forces

with Dudley community groups in an event to celebrate the multi-faith, multi-racial and multi cultural town. The counter campaign attracted hundreds of people protesting against the EDL Live music, bands and DJs organised by Love Music Hate Racism performed throughout the day. There were also a number of speakers including the Bishop of Dudley, a spokesman from Dudley Interfaith Dorsum, a spokesman from UNISON and the chair of Dudley Muslim Association. However there was a large group of about 400 local Muslim youth who reacted to misinformation and tried to find the EDL members to take revenge. The police prevented them from clashing with the EDL supporters.

6.2.3 Staffordshire Police

In January 2010 there was an EDL rally in Stoke-on-Trent. About 1,500 EDL supporters were at the rally in Hanley on Saturday to protest Islamic extremism. Up to 300 members from the UAF gathered on the other side of Hanley centre. More than 600 policemen were deployed. After gathering outside the pub, the protesters walked 200 yards round the corner to Stoke Town Hall. Four officers were injured and vehicles were damaged when EDL supporters broke through police cordons. Two of the officers needed hospital treatment. This was one of the most violent demonstrations. EDL supporters violently opposed the police.

6.2.4 Bedfordshire Police

When the EDL march in Luton was banned by the Home Secretary in September 2009 UAF supporters attacked the police.

6.2.5 Characteristics of the protesters

If there are violent clashes: which persons and/ or groups are involved?

In Birmingham at the September 2009 march pockets of the EDL protesters, mainly consisting of hardcore football supporters were constantly trying to get nearer to the UAF protesting area and vice versa. They would not negotiate with police and then became the target of counter protesters, resulting

in sporadic clashes and incidents of general disorder and anti-social behaviour. Police separated the protest groups using cordons and came under attack from both protest groups, who threw bricks and bottles.

In Dudley a similar group of around 300 were bouncing around the fence, trying to break away. They were not interested in the British national anthem being played, nor in the different speeches. They were just looking for a way to break through the fences and find their way to the UAF protesting area. The demonstration lasted one and a half hour, in which there were significant skirmishes among rival factions of hooligans.

In Manchester and Bolton the same behaviour was seen. Small groups of EDL and UAF protesters were constantly looking for weak spots in the police line and tried to get closer to each other.

Can you describe them according to age, gender, education, political affiliation?

It is difficult to describe the EDL protesters. In general they vary from teenagers in the age of 16 and 17 to very mature adults. Most of the time they are not older than forty. They are predominantly male. During the Dudley march 80% of the EDL protesters was male. The EDL protesters come from all over the country. In Dudley supporters arrived from Dover, which is more than 480 kilometres away and from Edinburgh.

Among the EDL protesters are many known football supporters. Because of the robust policing against football hooligans there is almost no violence inside stadiums. There are now only pockets of disorder in the lower leagues. This robust policing together with the safety requirements in and around the stadiums that the mayor football clubs have to fulfil, leave less room for the hooligans to misbehave. Those that do misbehave are banned and are prevented from going to the stadiums and cause disorder. They are looking for other opportunities and find one within the EDL. These football supporters have decided that they don't like political Islam. It appears that they have expanded their interest from football to "politics". They make a real fuzz about the fact that they seek to protest peacefully against islamic extremism. Police feel they are using a different strategy. They turn up in a city centre in a typically English football thug outfit, with shaven heads and tattoos and say things that are anti-Islam. Their philosophy is "we'll come to town and do something that is just within the law: protesting peacefully". But they know that they are

provocative and that they upset all the locals, whites, coloured and Muslims alike. That's the kind of game they play. So the EDL is a by-product of the measures to reduce football violence. The homecoming parade in Luton was the motor in this development.

Despite the behaviour of the hardcore football supporters, the EDL stresses that they are not racists or fascists. According to the police the way they act and express themselves attracts these typical hooligans and extremist right wing supporters. In Dudley a small group was masked, wearing burka's as a mean of protest.

UAF

In general the support is more mixed in age and gender than the EDL. The protest attracts many people who are concerned about growing racism. The protest in Dudley attracted a large group of young Muslim lads, 16 to 30 years old, a small group wearing baclava's that came to the protest only to fight with the EDL.

Among them are many young Asian Muslims. Some of them are extreme in their views. Their politic affiliation is mostly (far) left wing. The majority of the supporters consists of people who are simply opposed to right wing extremism. But according to the respondents the UAF also attracts the same kind of extremists as the EDL; people who deliberately look for a confrontation with the opposing party. The UAF gets its money partly from student organisations, unions and local councils.

Are the crimes they commit organised?

During the demonstrations mainly public order crimes are committed. Police respondents say it is hard to say whether or not these offences are planned in advance. Maybe this happened in the early days of the EDL, but there is no evidence of planned violence. They are aiming at peaceful demonstrations and when there is violence it is mostly spontaneous.

In Manchester and Dudley, at one moment there was a coordinated attempt to break out of the protesting area. This attempt was organised on the spot. Especially the football supporters are constantly testing the line, looking for a weak point. There was a breakout and video footage shows that this was planned by two persons, well known football hooligans who had seen an opportunity to break through the fences and the police cordon. They were using

their mobile phones, giving directions to a larger group, consisting mostly of football hooligans. Other public order offences, theft or vandalism are mainly spontaneous opportunity crimes. One respondent calls these actions “spontaneously pre-planned”. Over all this is typical football behaviour, looking for the weak spot, breaking out and fighting with the rival faction.

6.2.6 Outcome

What is the context of the clashes?

The context is simple. The protest of the EDL is directed against Muslim-extremism. This is the main objective. Although several respondents think that it is not only extremism they are against. Their main goal is to free Britain from all Muslims.

The protest of the UAF is directed against racism and in this case against the EDL. Where there is an EDL demonstration there is always a UAF (counter)demonstration.

Tensions between these two groups are almost inevitable. When chanting and shouting starts, the behaviour of the crowd on both sides becomes more tense. They get more aggravated and try to fight. The police is there to separate both parties. Each of them tries to break through the police cordon to get at the other party. In those situations the police also becomes involved in these clashes: “We’re in the middle.” Things are thrown at the police.

When in Luton the EDL did not turn up because the meeting was banned by the Home Secretary, the UAF supporters turned against the police. There was no one else to fight with.

What kind of offences do they commit?

The offences are mainly public order offences. Breaking the peace; obstructing police-officers.

What aims and goals do the offenders have?

There are no doubts that some of the protesters on both sides have legitimate aims and goals. The majority wants to protest peacefully. But some of those present have intentions to create disorder and cause violence. What happened during some of the demonstrations was that EDL protestors broke through

the police cordons, started running up and down the streets and indiscriminately picked on Asian youth.

6.2.7 Tactics

A significant number of people just come to protest: shouting and singing to draw attention to their message. But some protesters – especially the football supporters – have a different way of protesting.

The main tactic of this part of the EDL support is to look for weaknesses in the police line.

They also spread misinformation about their intentions, so they try to mislead the police. Misinformation is also used to stir up the crowd, to manipulate thugs, to mislead communities and to stir up violence. A couple of times rumours were spread that women were raped by Muslims. They also mislead the police, by telling them that protesters would all take the same route to the protest, but actually they came from several directions.

This tactic is deployed by the UAF as well. In Dudley there was misinformation that the EDL had broken into a mosque and damaged the interior. In Bolton the UAF used this same tactic when two teenagers were arrested 100 yards from a mosque breaking into a car. One of them had a knife. This burglary was manipulated as two persons with a knife trying to break into a mosque. Because of all the media attention the police had to respond very quickly to say that this was not the right information.

Until April 2009 the EDL tactic was to hold protest marches and protest meetings on a spot that was announced several weeks or days in advance. Recently a change of tactics was seen as a small group of EDL supporters was able to climb the roof of the building that will become the new Dudley mosque. The police was not informed about this demonstration. The group used a PA system just to show the community what it is like when they are confronted with the weekly Muslim prayers.

The rooftop tactic is a non-violent tactic. It differs from the mass demonstrations.

What communication channels do the offenders use?

There is a lot of communication via the internet. In these messages the

demonstrations are announced and prepared. The information is on their websites, on Facebook and other social networks. Sometimes flyers are used. These flyers are distributed nationally.

Communication with the public is mainly based on visible representation through demonstrations.

During the demonstrations they use mobile phones and sound systems to communicate and to amplify the speeches by their leaders. The use of these systems is negotiated with the police. Discriminating remarks or speeches are forbidden and may lead to arrest. In Bolton the police took the PA-system from the EDL, because it was used to spread misinformation with the intention to stir up the crowd. This could have caused problems.

EDL have shown that they can mobilise their support quickly. During the rooftop demonstration at the mosque in Dudley two EDL members were arrested. Within half an hour there were 80 to 100 EDL members, some of them masked, outside the police station where the arrested were in custody. The next day when those arrested had to appear in court there were about 60 people outside the courthouse. It was an unusual situation, as this had never happened in a football context.

Do they use weapons?

Weapons are hardly ever used. Only bricks and bottles are used as missiles. On none of the occasions were knives or firearms used. As a precaution sometimes search operations are organised. In Manchester the protesters who came by rail had to pass a metal arch. The West Midlands Police had a standard search operation in the protest area one day before the protest. They looked for weapon caches, building sites and bottle containers. Bricks and other objects that could be used as missiles were removed, refuse bottle containers were removed or sealed.

Is there any influence of alcohol or drugs?

As far as the EDL is concerned it's mainly alcohol. They usually muster in pubs before the demonstration. There they have a drink. It is typical for the football culture. Strong intelligence from the Dudley march indicated that members of the EDL were distributing cocaine, but there was no hard evidence of this.

Within the UAF, alcohol is not an issue. The Muslim protesters do not consume alcohol because of their religion. Drugs are not a problem either.

From where do you get the information?

From the moment a demonstration is announced the police starts gathering intelligence from various sources. First there is the UK Football Policing Unit. They have informants who get their information from the football world. Secondly there is the National Public Order Intelligence Unit. Thirdly the police get information from the organisers, the EDL and the UAF. Lastly the police get information from the community, gathered by the policemen on the beat and community relations officers. They are the eyes and ears of the force.

Once the EDL announces a protest, information is (very slowly) released two or three weeks before the event. The main information only becomes available two to three days before the demonstrations. It gives an indication of the intentions of the EDL. This is also the moment to decide which tactics and policing style is appropriate.

The Manchester Police set up a large community operation across the whole of the police area with the community relations officers from each division and key police officers from outside Greater Manchester where there are large Muslim-communities like Blackburn, Burnley and Bradford, West Midlands and Liverpool. As one respondent tells: "I got intel-reports from my own people every week and the last week before the demonstration every single day from everybody. Even if they had nothing to say I wanted to know, so I knew there was nothing going on at that time and at that particular spot."

Other police forces are involved because the police know that the protesters – especially hooligans – come from all over the country. In Bolton the football officers from those forces were on the spot on the day of the demonstration.

A lot of information comes from social media: internet, twitter, et cetera. The police monitor the relevant websites on a daily basis. There is always a covert inquiry. Especially beforehand when pre-emptive arrests are made.

There is also direct contact with the organisers, that will provide information. Also, information is gathered from within the community by the police officers on the street who use their community network. The police build on

the relationship with the community. It is not something they have to develop, it is already there.

Besides the EDL and the UAF there is a third party and that's the community. So actually there are three groups to manage. Within the community there is the Muslim community and depending on where the protest is, there is also the "white" community. The community is considered to be really important, because after the protest police have to work with and within that community again. So a lot of time, efforts and resources are put into making sure that contacts, engagement and communication are up to par. Police try to keep the community optimally informed. On the days leading up to the event police use their own police-website, Twitter, YouTube and local papers. On the day itself the same media are used and communication, under the direction of the chief police officer (GD) in the control room, is constant. In this way police try to avoid false information being spread or people being manipulated by one of the demonstrating parties.

On the day of the demonstration the community relation officers are within the local communities, so they can react immediately to tensions or unrest.

6.3 Intervention

6.3.1 Legal and constitutional context

What rules and regulations apply for handling of special events?

In the UK it is a democratic right that people can protest wherever they want to. Protesters don't need a permit for a demonstration. So if they want to come to Bolton or Birmingham it's very difficult to stop them. There is no legislation by which the police can ban a protest, only when it's on private property. Only the home secretary can ban a demonstration. The organisers of the protest are legally obliged to tell the police what their intentions are. They have to notice the police 28 days in advance of the meeting.

There is a slight difference between demonstrations and marches. The police can ban a march but they can't prohibit a demonstration. The difference is not always clear. A march has a beginning and an end point. A demonstration takes place on one specific site. The question is how the protesters get to the demonstration site. So it's a play of words. The police escort the protesters

from the muster point to the protest ground and then it is not considered to be a march.

The local authorities are hardly involved in the protest. It's mainly the police. The local authority is only there to keep good relations with the local communities.

It's the job of the police to facilitate these demonstrations and to keep the opposing parties apart. To handle these events there is the Public Order Act and the Human Rights Act. There are a number of other regulations police can use:

- ☐ The Public Order Act allows the police to look at the conditions that are applied to assemblies. You can apply conditions to the number of protesters and to the duration of the protest.
- ☐ The police can determine the time of protest, but here the same problems occur.
- ☐ The police can forbid the use of alcohol, but then again it is difficult to enforce this measure (what if a tin of lager is seen in the crowd?)
- ☐ The police can close down public houses but the question is if this is wise. If a demonstration is organised in the city centre like in Birmingham and Dudley and the police decides to close down all the pubs in the vicinity of the demonstration site there is a risk that the protesters will spread all over the city centre. Normally the EDL protesters muster in pubs. This means that they are concentrated in one or two places, where it is easier for the police to contain them. In this case arrangements can be made with the pub owners.
- ☐ When there is intelligence about the likelihood of people carrying weapons there is a legal possibility to define a geographic area and search the persons who enter that area. It's called a Section 60 search. These searches are rarely executed.

As all respondents say, the reality of policing is very difficult. It is one thing to impose these measures but the question is how to enforce them. For instance when 3,000 people are allowed to the protest and they come with 3,001 or 4,000 there is not much you can do about it. Therefore it's better to negotiate. And that only works if you have sensible negotiation going on.

There is a legal guide for the staff. In it the legal boundaries for the day are described. It tells the officers what is allowed and what is not. If people cross these boundaries they are arrested. During the briefings all the police-

men involved are told about these legal regulations, to be sure that everybody acts lawfully.

Uncertainties about the legal procedures

After the G-20 protests in London in 2009 Policing, in which one activist died after a violent confrontation with the police, policing became less robust. Because of all the (legal) criticism and the recommendations that were made towards public order policing, the police service ran scared. Police commanders were regressing and a little less liberal in the way they were policing. This reflected on the tactics on the ground, during a couple of months. Commanders were misinformed. They thought they had insufficient legal means. The National Police Improvement Agency had a lot of work to do with commanders to provide training with respect to legislation. Commanders asked for more legislation, but legislation is not the problem according to our respondents. There is enough legislation. It is just a matter of having the knowledge of what you can do with the legal means you have available, how you can handle individuals.

During the first EDL meetings there were some legal complications on the side of the police. An outcome of the national debrief was that effective use was made of Force Legal Advisors who supported the planning phase. On several occasions a senior Crown Prosecution Service Lawyer was deployed to the Silver Command Room on the day of the event who was able to give advice throughout the day.

The organisational structure of the police

The Gold, Silver and Bronze command structure is applied to almost all these demonstrations. The Gold Commander is in overall control of resources at the incident. He is not on site, but at a distant control room, called Gold Command, where he formulates the strategy for dealing with the incident.

The Silver Commander is the tactical commander who manages the strategic direction from Gold and makes them into sets of actions that are completed by Bronze. The Silver Commander builds the tactical plan that will deliver the Gold strategy. He is not located at the scene normally as he needs to be able to take a step back and review all the different Bronze resourcing.

Bronze Commanders directly controls the resources at the incident and will be found with his/ her staff working at the scene.

There is only one gold commander and one silver commander. But there

can be lots of bronze commanders. The town center is broken up into small area's, with a bronze commander for each area. Further on there is a bronze commander for separate policing themes like the contacts with the EDL, with the UAF, for custody, for crimes, for media, for complaints, for CCTV, for the community and for intelligence.

The Silver commander is in the control room. The police makes effective use of CCTV: of the existing cameras and in case there are blind spots mobile cameras are used.

On the ground police frequently work with Police Support Units (PSU's) who are trained and equipped to deal with public disorder. These consist of one inspector, three sergeants and eighteen constables. During some of the protests up to 26 PSU's were present.

6.3.2 Influence from the rest of the society

What role do the mass media, citizens, the local inhabitants, et cetera play?

The media

In general the media are quite positive about the way the police handles these events. What came out of the debriefings is that you have to involve the media at an early stage. This is strategically important. Contextualising the police briefing to the media also proved beneficial as did identifying a police individual as Bronze Media. Here too, there is an open and transparent approach. The media, both nationally and regionally, are told what the police intends to do, so they are involved from the beginning to the end of the protest.

In Manchester, Bolton, Birmingham and Dudley the police organised a press conference the day before the protest. They had contact with the press during the protest and at the end of the day. They answered questions and told them their tactical plan. The questions from journalists were about the costs, the numbers of participants and the violence that was used. Also, they were asked why the police could not stop these demonstrations. It's important to brief the officers on the ground regarding engagement with and awareness of the media, including awareness of the UK Press Card. This has led to good results. There was positive feedback from the media regarding the behaviour of police officers towards them. The respondents think that this frankness con-

tributes to a positive reaction from the media. After the Dudley demonstration some journalists spontaneously gave information and footage to the police.

It is a trend that people use mobile phones to put images and footage of protests on YouTube. This can be an advantage because this footage can be used as evidence.

Some respondents think the media are losing interest for the EDL demonstrations because of the high frequency of these protests. A couple of months ago these protests were an issue in the national news. Now there is only local coverage.

Role of the citizens

The police minimizes the risks for the local communities. It's important that the police takes the lead. They have to facilitate the protest and are informed about the intentions of the protesting parties. Therefore it's very important to cooperate with the local communities. Before and during these demonstrations the police is constantly in contact with the local communities, especially with the Asian and Muslim communities. The police use their regular contacts with local community leaders.

A general procedure is to keep the local youth engaged during a demonstration to prevent them from coming to the town centre. Most of the times the local authorities are involved. They also have their networks. Social workers and youth workers keep the youth engaged. It is an overall preventative approach. Sometimes local companies facilitate this approach and offer transport or tickets for entertainment.

At the day of the protest in Manchester and Dudley the police ran a community operation in addition to the public order operation. Policemen were watching the communities. The mobile teams were joined by special mediators. Police cars were ready to respond instantaneously to any incident and when there were concerns about groups of Asian youths police cars were sent in straight away with a mediator. These mediators were community people.

Youth services organised activities, like football matches and played movies to keep the youth away from the protesting site. In most cases there are links with national prevention work. This program is financed by the government and used to prevent youngsters from engaging in extremism.

Do you regard co-operation with the rest of the society to be without conflicts? (combined with) Is there in your view acceptance in society for the actions of the police?

In general the reaction from the community is very positive. However, the big risk for the police service is the relation with the community. The basic idea about policing in the UK is policing with consent. It is all about trust and confidence in the communities. The big fear that the police have is that policing these events can damage this relationship because they are thought to be biased towards one of the protesting parties. The police try desperately hard not to have an opinion. Fact is that the police are acting in an environment where the tensions are already high. This is the biggest worry of the police.

There is a growing concern among businesses. They do not like the EDL coming to the city centres. They fear damage will be done to their properties and that because of a demonstration people will stay away and will not go shopping. That was what happened in Birmingham during the September 2009 demonstration. Businessmen and traders contacted the police about the fact that the EDL was coming. The police keeps these businessmen fully informed about the time and location of the demonstrations. What the police is doing is minimising the impact for local citizens, businessmen and inhabitants alike.

There is also another aspect. The policing of EDL demonstrations is a costly affair, not only in direct financial terms but also in manpower. When there is a demonstration, normal police work is hampered. It is the British society that has to pay for this. So criticism is growing.

Do you regard the cooperation between the different police authorities to run without conflicts?

Yes.

Do you think the police could have done more to avoid a violent outcome?

In Birmingham they could have done more, if they had had enough policemen earlier on the spot. However this was not the case and the protesters started drifting through the city centre.

On all other occasions the respondents think that they had done everything within their powers to prevent a conflict.

Do you think there are other, potentially better ways, to solve the conflict other than with police actions?

None of the respondents think that there are other ways to solve the conflict. Private security companies cannot handle these kind of risky situations. The EDL has its own stewards. This works better, but police is still needed to keep the rivalling parties apart. The police is responsible for the public order.

6.3.3 Police behaviour

How does the police handle crime investigations on the spot?

Part of the policing strategy before and during a demonstration is a crime and criminal justice strategy. Once a demonstration is announced, crime investigations start to enable the police to arrest potential troublemakers preventively. This method works quite well.

The police uses Automatic Number Plate Recognition ANPR, this system gives them the possibility to put in information about the supporters of the EDL. This information is about the personal history of these individuals, but also about unpaid fines or small crimes. During a demonstration the police pulls up an ANPR ring around the town and as soon as one of the registered individuals drives into the zone he will be intercepted and arrested.

During the demonstrations Evidence Gathering Teams are used. They operate with camera's that register the moves of the different supporters during the event. They are fully trained uniformed officers that work with video cameras. They start videoing the people from the moment they arrive. This footage can later be used as evidence. This material is also used to make arrests after the event.

Then there are Forward Intelligence Teams, who are out on the streets. Their task is to communicate with the protesters, ask them where they are from, what they are doing, where they are going. They have to build up a relation with both rivalling parties. The intelligence they gather is directly used by the Silver commander. They do not have camera's. They just have to communicate with the crowd.

Arrests on the spot are made only when absolutely necessary. Once you start arresting people you start depleting your resources. So there is very focused strategy towards arresting people. Arrests on the spot are always made by uniformed police. When public order offences occur people get arrested. The offender is isolated and arrested. All evidence is directly documented.

West Midlands Police use a comprehensive investigation strategy, which includes pro-active arrests of potential thugs. On the day itself the police only arrested persons who had a visibly negative influence on the crowd dynamics. In Dudley 9 persons were arrested on the spot. In Birmingham more than 60 persons were arrested afterwards, based on video footage. Most of them were EDL. In Dudley the majority of the arrests belonged to the UAF.

How does the police handle risk analysis?

Risk analyses are made in advance of the event, but also on the spot. Based on the intelligence that is gathered by the teams mentioned above. Information is shared between the different police forces.

How is the information handled in operative situations (and in advance)?

In operative situations the information is handled by the Silver commander in the control room. He decides what actions are taken. The control room is connected with the camera's (CCTV and mobile camera's) so the Silver commander has a good view of the demonstration site.

What means of police action were used?

The means that were used were batons, dogs and horses. No CS was used. Part of the tactics is the use of CCTV in which the police work closely with other partners. In addition to existing CCTV, mobile camera's on vehicles and handheld cameras are deployed. The use of body cams is now being tested. There is only one water cannon in the UK. It belongs to the Metropolitan Police and was never used on the streets. PC rain is a trustful ally.

How did the police intervene?

Negotiation

What the police around the country are trying to do is to negotiate with both parties before they come to town. They do this to understand why they want to come to the town, where they want to go and how they intend to do it. Negotiation is important. It's part of the planning and it requires a huge investment in time and manpower. Not only with the EDL but also with the

UAF and with the local Muslim communities in the towns where the protests are being held. It has enabled the police to establish relations with various groups, building consistent relationships through negotiations and engagement.

This dialogue approach works well. The police tells them (EDL and UAF) they will facilitate the peaceful protest and is clear about its approach. There are no surprises. The police tells the protesters what they are going to do during the protest, what they will tolerate and what not. It's called a "no surprises" approach. If the protesters go beyond the right of peaceful protest they will be subject to arrest.⁸ Police tell protestors at what time they can turn up, what route they can walk etc. So the EDL knows what the police are about.

One respondent says that the EDL has become quite structured in their approach. They appear to be very compliant with the police. It proved valuable to appoint an individual officer, with the necessary experience and confidence, to engage with a representative from the EDL and counter demonstration groups. Both the EDL and the UAF were generally positive about the way the police handled the protests. Although this depended on how many arrests we made. The media were also positive.

However, recent intelligence indicates that the EDL may disengage from negotiation with the police. They become less inclined to talk to the police. The reason they do not want to negotiate with the police is that if they have to comply with all the police measures it's no longer the event they had in mind. The absence of these contacts makes it harder to police these protests.

The EDL and the UAF have their own legal advisors. Some demonstrations were filmed by the EDL, to study the behaviour of the police.

Another complication is that the people police speak with don't necessarily speak for the entire organisation of the EDL or the UAF. Maybe the people that seriously want to promote the EDL ideology want to comply but they don't have control over the bigger group, who want to cause violence.

Negotiation is not only important for the relation with the EDL and the UAF, but also for the local (ethnic) communities. When you are on good terms with the local (ethnic) communities and when you have their trust and

8 This is also one of the outcomes of the HMIC report.

confidence, you can convince them it is better to stay away from the EDL demonstrations. That works even for hardcore Muslim elements.

Keeping the protesting parties apart

The main tactic that the police use is keeping both parties, EDL and UAF, apart. In Manchester and Bolton police allowed them to demonstrate together on the same spot. The effect of this strategy was positive. There were no clashes between the groups. Not that they did not try to fight with each other, but they did not succeed. Some critics said that this strategy meant asking for trouble, but they were wrong. It was a context considered decision. According to the police, this strategy provided the best opportunity to manage the event. There were approximately 3,000 or 4,000 people that were difficult to manage. The squares were large enough for both groups to demonstrate at the same time and still be kept separate.

In Manchester the police kept the parties apart: it was a human barrier. In Bolton they used chest high barriers that are normally used at concerts. These barriers were fifteen feet apart. Each group had its own side of the square. They were shouting at each other and trying to break out.

The main problem was the way to the square. The EDL mustered on a location a few hundred yards away. They were not contained, but the police encircled them and escorted them to the protesting site. When they had finished their protest they were walked out and escorted to public transport.

In Bolton the situation was more difficult. There were lots of local white youth, supporters of the EDL, who had gathered in the pubs near the protesting site. They wanted to walk through the town centre and the Asian neighbourhood. That would have caused a big fight. We already had coaches standby. So we had a word with the organisers, put them in the coaches and dropped them in the city square where the protest was.

In Birmingham the main tactic was keeping the rivalling parties apart in separate streets and squares where they couldn't see each other. But then they tried to break out to find the other group. The police arranged with the EDL to pick up the protesters at the train station and escort them to the protesting site. In Birmingham coaches were used. Even then they used every other opportunity to go independently to the protesting sites, on foot, with public transport, making it difficult to handle. There were various flashpoints. In Birmingham there were some other events on the same day. There was a Royal Air Force

remembrance at a war memorial. The police had to keep those two events apart. “We did not want the shouting of hooligans or the anti-war slogans of the UAF too close to the memorial. That was extremely complicated.”

To improve this in Dudley police negotiated with the EDL leaders and pointed out one particular point where they mustered. From there they were allowed to walk to the protest-area which was one mile away. Police did not call it a march, but in a way it was. The protesters were escorted by the police. The group had the idea that they were allowed to march through the town and most of the supporters came with busses to the muster site. This worked well because police had a lot of control over the group. A unexpected problem was that the coaches that brought the protesters to the meeting point in Dudley turned up late. The organisers wanted to wait until everybody was there. But the crowd was already anxious and wanted to move off to the protesting ground. So police gave their EDL contact a loud hailer and asked him to tell his people what he wanted them to do.

On the site of the demonstration West Midlands Police copied the tactics that were used in Bolton, where both parties were at the same protesting site. They were in sight of each other. They were separated by barriers. There is always a caveat with fencing because not only will it restrict the activities of the protesters which can cause extra tension, it also restricts the movements of the police. Fences can even be used as weapons against the police.

Once they were at the demonstration site the protesters were contained. Groups of EDL supporters constantly tried to break out. After the demonstration the majority of the coaches went home empty.

Another example is the demonstration in Harrow in September 2009. When the EDL wanted to protest on September 11th 2009 at the Harrow Mosque in London, the UAF announced a demonstration on the same site. The police allowed both groups to demonstrate in the vicinity of the mosque. Both groups were 60 metres apart and at the same distance from the mosque.

It is important to take the ground early. Not in great numbers but in numbers that can get out when you need them. This did not happen in Birmingham and police completely lost control.

When the protest starts at 12 o'clock, police must be there with a sufficient number of people at 8 o'clock. They are present near the pubs where

the protesters muster, on the road to the protesting site and on the protesting site itself. These policemen must be highly visible. They speak with the community (that is part of their assignment); they are the eyes and ears of the police.

The British police has three levels. Code one is normal uniform. Code two is an intermediate level where officers will wear public order clothing: protective suits and protective pants. For the rest they wear a normal police helmet and a fluorescent jacket, so they look like normal policemen. Code three is full riot gear, which is deployed when the police come under missile attacks or when there are other threats of violence. In Birmingham and Dudley code two was deployed.

In Birmingham, but also in the other cases described, code two officers were kept in reserve and on the sides. When anything happens these officers are brought in to the streets. On the whole, police tactics are as low key as possible. The police adapt their approach according to crowd dynamics. That is what happened in Thames Valley area. The police started with community policing tactics, but they had to bring in Code 2 officers when things started to get ugly between two parties. That is the moment the police has to show their strength.

Thames Valley police intend not to put in the Code 2 officers as long as the situation allows for it. Because of the safety risk approach this was not necessary. Intelligence told them that there was no risk of extreme violent clashes and so the police could act on a low profile. In the past they put in Code 2 officers immediately, but that was no success. Normally dressed officers are assigned to watch the pub or the route.

Significant use is made of the Counter Terrorist Units (CTU) because domestic extremism is considered a form of terrorism. Intelligence Units are also used to gather information. There is an officer from the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) present who takes the national perspective into account.

Can you describe the behavioural profile of the police?

During the day the approach is mainly low key. The style of policing can be best described as: keeping things as normal as possible, building upon the neighbourhood policing footprint. A good understanding of crowd dynamics

and how the dress code of officers deployed onto the ground could adversely affect this dynamic is important.

In Manchester, Bolton, Dudley and Birmingham the police were instructed to act friendly, engaging in a fair but firm way. They were told to use “reasonable” force. Before the protest the officers were briefed for about 20 minutes. In Birmingham and Dudley they were informed about the background of both protesting parties, about the command structure, tactics, police behaviour, seeking dialogue and water facilities (the police have to provide the protesters with water, In Birmingham the police gave them plastic bottles that were later thrown back at them).

They were also warned not to do “anything their mother would be ashamed of when she saw them on the telly that night”. Officers were instructed to behave friendly: smile, give polite answers, be positive, and thus give a positive image of police. During the protest police made use of personal radio and email to keep all officers informed. The overall strategic intention was to facilitate the protest. Policemen were instructed that both parties were there to present their views.

It is important to keep police involvement low key, and to only exercise it proportionately. A high police presence can lead to violence against the police. In these heavily policed situations people almost feel the need to fight back at the police presence. This was evident at the end of the Birmingham protest and in several other places in the country. What police do now is to put as many officers on the street as needed, but not too soon. What happens at the end of the protest is that when police know that one side is definitely dispersed, they scale down, because otherwise they could be the focus of attention.

The main opinion among respondents is that British police do not use European mainland distancing tactics but rather use “close policing”. There is a difference in police culture. The British police does not carry firearms and the tactics are different.

[Did you deploy dialogue groups, what was their role.](#)

Yes, see here before.

6.3.4 Community relations

An EDL demonstration has a great impact on the local (ethnic) community. Therefore it is important to communicate and to use the existing community engagement structures. This included using the PREVENT-strategy: a partnership of local authorities, police, education institutions, and others are at the heart of stopping people supporting violent extremists or becoming violent themselves.. The Government has produced detailed guidance to assist those organisations in their work. This includes countering violent extremism and identifying and supporting those individuals at risk across a range of key sectors, including in prisons, among youth offenders, and through community and police led projects.⁹

Further, the Local Authority cohesion team was mobilised and the existing community partners were fully engaged. This included enlisting Imams and actively visiting at prayer times, especially on a Friday to engage with the local ethnic community. In response, the local community was extremely positive and supportive of their local police commander and the value, trust and confidence this brought was very powerful. A key theme throughout this engagement strategy was that the police were represented by a senior officer who delivered a consistent message.

A key issue when engaging with the local community was to inform them what the police were dealing with. This included a factual update on the background of the EDL and also the availability of police powers to deal with the intended demonstrations. West Yorkshire Police had prepared PowerPoint presentations which could be delivered to the local community and also had a leaflet, standardising the police message, prepared. which was distributed. This was something that the force had learnt from following the 7/7 terrorist bombings.

Nottinghamshire Police adopted a similar approach and incorporated key aspects of information regarding the human rights of individuals. It was also highlighted that an explanation of human rights to community groups can help support the police when individuals assert that a demonstration should be “banned”. This reinforces the fact that whilst people have a right to disagree with a protest, others have a right to protest.

⁹ Home office, *The Prevent Strategy: A guide for local partners*, London 2008.

The investments in the local communities prior to a demonstration required a lot of time. But this investment repaid itself. There was a significant value in knowing and understanding the local community, together with being informed about any local tensions or other influences. This included active engagement with all sections of the community including youth groups and being aware of any potential trigger factors. According to our respondents, the valuable time spent in achieving community engagement and cohesion should not be underestimated as it contributed significantly towards the maintenance of an effective Community Impact Assessment (CIA). The main purpose of this last instrument is to enable a dynamic assessment of community tension, as the levels will constantly change as local, regional, national and even international events have their impact on communities. A CIA is a means of assessing a state of tension on the basis of which decisions can be made concerning the deployment of resources.

What kind of arrest tactics do you apply?

Arrests on the spot are mostly avoided. Only when the police see that a person or a group of persons is stirring up the crowd they decide to remove this person from the crowd, to avoid havoc. This happened in Birmingham and Dudley. To avoid any unnecessary confusion among the rest of the crowd the arrest teams are dressed in normal uniform. No plain cloth policemen were used in these demonstrations. As one respondent tells:

“You send a team in. Part of the tactics is the use of CCTV, which gives you the opportunity to zoom in on the crowd and pick out the potential troublemakers who stir up groups within the crowd. You can distinguish certain groups. In the EDL it's football groups. Within the UAF these groups of youngsters are mostly community based.”

With directions from the control room a team is sent in to arrest that person. In Dudley the effect of such an arrest was that a group of about 50 persons that were around this person dissolved, because they had lost their leader. In many less urgent situations evidence is gathered and the person is arrested after the demonstration.

What has the police done after the incident?

In all cases the police operation is debriefed on a command level. All aspects are judged: cooperation with police-partners and cooperation with the community.

What is important is the communication with the organisers and with the community leaders, the location of the public order equipment, making sure there is no sensitive material in the vehicles in case the vehicles get raided.

Most of the time when a protest ends there is a risk that the opposing groups get in contact with each other on their way home. In the cases mentioned there were no confrontations. The police escorted the demonstrators as they left the protesting site and kept both groups apart.

In Manchester the police was alert. They knew that some EDL protesters live near Muslim areas and there was a firm police presence during the evening after the protest.

Anything you would like to add?

Political situation

There is a link with the actual political situation. It depends on how the new government will act, whether the EDL will come to the streets as frequently as they do now. It depends on how they react on immigration issues. Now there is a lot of distress in the inner cities. One of the problems is housing. Most of the time people have to wait a long time, before they get a house. Sometimes foreigners get priority. This works in favour of the EDL.

The regularity of protests is growing, as is the support for the EDL. As we know, the EDL is mainly self funding.

Costs

Such a demonstration is a very challenging experience, there are only a few weeks (mostly five or six) for preparation. It is a lot of work and a huge investment in time and manpower, making plans and scenarios, looking for risks and rehearsing the plans.

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Discussion and conclusions

7.1 Discussion: collective violence around public events

In none of the three countries involved in the study was collective violence around dance events mentioned as an issue (it was not mentioned spontaneously, nor in response to specific questions). Only in North Rhine-Westphalia the Love parades were mentioned, but mainly in connection with crowd management issues and in relation to individual (mostly alcohol-related) acts of violence.

In each of the three countries violent perpetrators manifested themselves at different types of events. Events accompanied most often by collective violence are high risk football matches and demonstrations where both sides of the political spectrum (extreme right and extreme left) are represented. In England, football hooligans from different parts of England show up at manifestations and demonstrations of the extreme right EDL. In Gothenburg, local football hooligans had joined neo-Nazis to attack left wing activists. In North Rhine-Westphalia connections between football hooligans and right wing groups were mentioned only with regard to Dortmund. In Gelsenkirchen on the other hand, there were connections between football hooligans and rockers. The Metropolitan police in London indicated that football hooligans do not collectively commit violent acts outside of a football context.

In several countries mention was made of involvement of unspecified perpetrators of violence without ideological motivation, such as around the G-20 summit in London, May 1 demonstrations in Berlin and UAF actions in England. Another phenomenon was the involvement of migrant youth in collective violence, often directed towards the police. This was reported from areas with a high proportion of migrants in Malmö and Stockholm, during carnival in Cologne where migrant youths provoked confrontations and around EDL-demonstrations where migrant youths aligned or threatened to align with counter demonstrations or counter actions.

Among football hooligans and perpetrators of violence around festive events as a Love Parade and May Day, use of alcohol is common (although the more experienced hooligans that plan violence tend to avoid the use of alcohol). This is not the case in relation to violent demonstrations or violence committed by migrant youth. In none of the three countries mention is made of a connection between collective violence and the use of drugs.

Detailed data on perpetrators of violence are scarce. Over 90% are males, the average age is between 20 and 25 years. Even though the events themselves may be highly planned and organised, there are very few examples of collective violence being planned or organised. In all three countries collective violence seems to occur when opportunities arise or in response to police interventions. Confrontations between rival groups of hooligans are an exception to this, as are some confrontations between right wing and left wing groups. In all three countries mention is made of planned attacks and violent actions in these contexts. Part of the opportunistic nature of collective violence is the more or less spontaneous synchronisation or coordination that can arise between experienced perpetrators of violence on the basis of joint previous experiences. On some occasions, individuals are well prepared and act in creative ways, gathering information on police deployment and tactics. Only football hooligan groups sometimes deliberately set up meetings with rival groups with the express purpose to engage in violent confrontation. In North Rhine-Westphalia mention was made of a development from hooligan groups as perpetrators of violence towards much more heterogeneous ultra groups that do not seek violent confrontation, but under circumstances can act in violent ways. On some occasions preparations for violence can be observed when fireworks or objects such as sticks are carried or hidden beforehand, yet in most cases objects at hand are used opportunistically. More rarely objects such as teargas canisters, knives, catapults or bottles filled with liquids are taken along. In North Rhine-Westphalia attention was drawn towards so called passive weaponry such as the wearing of teeth protection, protective clothing or gloves filled with sand.

Targets of violence were on the one hand rivals or opponents (football hooligans or right-left confrontations) and on the other hand police. The police becomes a target especially when there is no other opponent available or when police take up position in between rival groups to keep them separate. In Germany, mention was made of the fact that violence against the police

and other public services seems to become more frequent in response to police interventions, especially in relation to the use of alcohol and during festive events such as the Love Parade. Sometimes individual officers (rather than police lines) are targeted.

Especially left wing activists use a broad array of tactics, including:

- ☐ carrying out observations on rival groups or the police
- ☐ dividing into subgroups
- ☐ the use of symbols or flags to steer subgroups and actions
- ☐ rapid movement in subgroups to tie down or distract police units
- ☐ acting as one (black)block
- ☐ initiating actions to provoke a police intervention
- ☐ blocking streets or intersections
- ☐ acting from the cover of a crowd
- ☐ refusing to communicate with police
- ☐ influencing media
- ☐ publicly identifying plainclothes police officers (by publishing their pictures on the internet or spreading them via MMS. Sometimes these pictures are printed and distributed on site, sometimes plainclothes officers are pointed out with signs).

In North Rhine-Westphalia mention was made of the fact that similar tactics are being used more and more by right wing activists too, including acting as a black block. Hooligans at EDL-events are often specifically looking for weak spots in the police measures to exploit these. They actively spread false information to mislead the police and others (e.g. about the route to be taken) or to provoke violence (e.g. by spreading the rumour that a female was raped by a Muslim).

The EDL has become more organised and effective in its actions that are in principle non-violent. They use stewards, legal advisors and communication equipment and know exactly what they can and cannot do. They want to be more professional and to be seen as the legitimate resistance to Islamic extremism, keeping the hooligans in check via the stewards.

7.2 Discussion: the management of public events

In the countries included in this study, the management of public events, especially where this concerns dealing with risks of collective violence, is much less a multidisciplinary affair than it is in the Netherlands. As a result, the role of e.g. local authorities is limited compared to that of police, who play a more prominent role. Deployment of large numbers of police officers around events is a regular occurrence.

The study also shows that in the countries concerned, there does not exist a “risk model” that is considered to be really satisfactory. This is related to several factors:

- ☐ the quality of the available intelligence, which is often seen as not fully adequate
- ☐ the by definition dynamic nature of public events
- ☐ the overwhelming number of potentially relevant factors to be included in such a model
- ☐ the absence of a theoretical perspective to distinguish between what is and is not relevant for a given event.

As a result, a rather haphazard approach is used where risks are identified (usually in terms of their likelihood and severity) and intelligence on “known” risks (e.g. known hooligans) is gathered as far as possible.

From the interviews in the three countries, several commonalities in what our respondents see as “good practices” in the management of public events can be identified. It is generally seen as good practice to avoid unnecessary frictions and to facilitate the legitimate activities and intentions of participants as far as possible. In addition, monitoring and observing events in real time is considered important to identify potential problems and to deal with them from an early stage onwards. This involves communicating with participants and informing them to learn what affects them, to avoid misunderstandings about measures being taken and to gain compliance. Intelligence is seen as a very important means to identify groups of known troublemakers looking for confrontations. For their risk-perception, it should be clear to them (and others) which effective measures will be taken if they transgress these limits. By getting to know them, their anonymity to authorities is reduced. It is considered good practice in the management of public order to avoid taking

measures that create or emphasise an us vs. them situation as much as possible. Interacting and communicating are important tactical tools in this respect. When violence does occur, it is considered good practice to act in a timely fashion rather than wait for situations to escalate and get out of hand and to do this in a focused and targeted way, aimed specifically at those individuals transgressing limits. On the other hand it is recognised that the opportunistic nature of much of collective violence puts a limit on the usefulness of intelligence: once violence escalates, the number of available options runs out quickly. Because of the uncertainties involved, preparations involving a variety of “what-if scenarios” are considered essential.

Despite the differences between the three countries (e.g. with regard to the legal situation and the way in which the police is organised) some clear trends can be discerned in the three countries in relation to the policing of public events:

- 1 Where a need for change is felt, this is not for changes in legislation or new powers. Instead, there is a need for a better understanding and use of existing legislation.
- 2 Where a need for change is felt, this is not for new weaponry. As far as equipment is concerned, other types of needs are formulated or implemented (see below under 3). So-called innovative less-lethal weapons are not innovative at all, because 1) they essentially represent already existing technology that is not yet developed sufficiently to be used operationally, and 2) they are intrinsically linked to outdated concepts of riot control.
- 3 Where a need for change is felt with regard to equipment, this is related to 1) equipment for a better personal protection of police officers 2) equipment to improve communication with and between police officers 3) equipment to improve possibilities for communication with participants at crowd events 4) equipment to improve possibilities for information gathering 5) equipment to improve possibilities for evidence gathering or 6) equipment that helps to increase flexibility.
- 4 There is a general trend towards increasing flexibility where the police as a whole or different units can switch easily between different approaches and can easily move about.
- 5 There is a general trend to increasingly incorporate current scientific understanding into the policing of public events (e.g. SPT-project in Sweden, HMIC report in the UK).

- 6 There is a general trend to give increasing attention to evidence gathering to increase the “quality” of arrests and to enhance possibilities for successful prosecution (e.g. evidence gathering teams in the UK, intelligence and intervention teams in Germany) and to prefer a perpetrator-focused approach over a collective approach with mass detentions or containments.
- 7 There is a general trend to lend increasing attention to debriefings after “problematic” events, the identification of good practices and the exchange of learning points between forces (e.g. national debriefings in the UK, use of peer review in Sweden).
- 8 There is a general trend towards the use of a friendly and firm strategic approach centred upon the facilitation of peaceful behaviour and a graded, differentiated and information led approach which increases police capability for dialogue, communication and low-key, targeted interventions at an early stage. In Sweden the talk is about Special Police Tactics, Berlin developed the strategy of the outstretched hand and the UK prides itself on the British model. “Dialogue units” are formed increasingly (e.g. Germany’s anti-conflict teams, Sweden’s dialogue police, forward intelligence units in the UK, although these latter have gradually taken on a different role).
- 9 There is general agreement about the importance of intelligence about “known” perpetrators, yet there is also general dissatisfaction with the quality of the intelligence and a recognition of the fact that intelligence on “known” perpetrators is insufficient and cannot replace an understanding of sensitivities and crowd dynamics in a given context.

The international trends reflect an increasing awareness of the mechanisms which trigger collective violence and which measures are more effective than others. In this respect, a recent UK study performed by the University of Leeds commissioned by the Cabinet Officer with a view to the 2012 London Olympics (Challenger et al., 2009) is also interesting. It concludes that already a lot is known about crowds and the way in which events should be prepared for and managed: the main challenge is to consistently use and apply this knowledge in practice. The authors conclude that, in the UK, this knowledge has not been captured and articulated in a single guidance document until now. The same is true for the Netherlands.

The authors identify the following key messages for successful crowd management:

- ☐ thorough planning and preparation, using a wide range of “what-if scenarios”
- ☐ adoption of a system-wide approach, where both technical and social factors as well as the relations between them are incorporated
- ☐ coordination between all agencies involved
- ☐ utilisation of personnel who have plentiful first-hand knowledge, skills and experience in planning for and managing crowd events
- ☐ communication with the whole crowd – both audio and visual – particularly in emergency situations
- ☐ leadership and guidance to initiate crowd movement in emergencies
- ☐ acknowledgement that seemingly small problems occurring in combination can have a significant impact on event success.

All three countries have had their experiences where they were surprised, either by the number of individuals turning up or by their motivation or behaviour. The effects of these surprises can be far-reaching, as Hoek van Holland showed as well. This does not mean that the phenomena that gave rise to the escalations were new: in all instances they were not, at least in the sense that the mechanisms were familiar. However, the specific way in which violence was expressed or the kind of individuals involved could surprise police or authorities, due to a lack of information, awareness or alertness. In all countries the big-impact “surprises” have led to changes in the policing of public events in line with the trends identified above.

7.3 Conclusions: the initiation and escalation of collective violence

The choice to focus the international study on collective violence in general and on groups more likely to be involved in collective violence, rather than on a specific type of events (such as dance events similar to the one in Hoek van Holland) turned out to be the right one. In none of the three countries involved in the study was collective violence around dance events mentioned as an issue (it was not mentioned spontaneously, nor in response to specific questions). Only in North Rhine-Westphalia the Love Parades were mentioned, but mainly in connection with crowd management issues and in relation to individual acts of (mostly alcohol-related) acts of violence.

The results of the study confirm the initiation/ escalation model of collective violence that in its first form was based on Dutch data of football and protest events (Adang, 1998, 2010), and can be summarised accordingly. This can now be expanded further. It is important to note that the mechanics of the initiation and escalation of violence are essentially the same for both ideologically and non-ideologically motivated actors. It is also important to realise that factors responsible for the initiation of collective violence are not the same as the factors that lead to the escalation of collective violence (in the sense that the violence continues and more people become involved). The model clearly distinguishes between the two.

7.3.1 The initiation of collective violence

Collective violence always starts or is initiated in one of two ways: either in response to a specific event or trigger or seemingly spontaneously without a clearly identifiable trigger:

- 1 As individual responses to specific elements or frictions in a situation, be it provocations by other fans or third parties, events on the pitch (in the case of a sporting event), measures taken by police, or some other clearly identifiable outside trigger. This type of violence is reactive and theoretically, it is easily linked to familiar aggression theories (e.g. aggression out of frustration, as competition for limited resources or as a response to threats). As with other forms of aggression, males are more likely to react aggressively than females, and adolescents/ young adults (individuals between the ages of 15 and 25) are more likely to react aggressively than individuals from other age groups. Having said that, males from all age groups and females may react aggressively to certain triggers on occasion. The targets of the violence may vary, but they are usually linked with the trigger (except in cases of redirected aggression). It is important to recognise that not every (potential) trigger is followed by violence, and that not on every occasion violent responses by individuals will lead to collective violence.

The results of the study contain many examples where violence started in response to outside triggers, especially police interventions. This is true for May Day in Berlin, the Gothenburg riots, G-20 in London and several incidents in North Rhine-Westphalia.

- 2 Violence may also start in the absence of a clearly identifiable outside trigger. This type of violence is not reactive and may therefore appear to arise spontaneously, where as a matter of fact it can be preplanned or the individuals concerned are highly motivated to commit acts of violence or seek out opportunities to do so. It is performed almost exclusively by male adolescents/ young adult males forming part of a group and directed specifically at similar young males belonging to a rival group. The individuals and groups concerned seem to actively seek out opportunities to confront (representatives of) rival groups. Theoretically, this type of violence can be seen as another expression of the so-called “young male syndrome” (Wilson & Daly, 1985), the tendency of young males to take risks and be violent because they discount the future in favour of short-term gains. The evidence suggests that this tendency is primarily a masculine attribute and is socially facilitated by the presence of peers in pursuit of the same goals. Violent male-male disputes are really concerned with “face,” dominance status, and what Goffman (1959) calls “presentation of self in a highly competitive social milieu”. The involvement of especially (groups of) young males in episodes of collective violence is well documented in the literature and is expressed by respondents in this study as well. It is important to realise that not on all occasions at which young males gather with the intent to commit acts of violence or to start incidents, the violence spreads or escalates. The usual pattern includes a build-up, where the initiatives serve to ~~test~~ the number of “active” individuals that have gathered, the existence of support for the initiatives taken, or the reaction of police and authorities or potential rivals.

The results of the study give clear examples of groups of young males “looking for trouble”, especially incidents in relation to rivalries between (non-ideological) hooligan groups and incidents between ideological protestors from right and left wing groups are a recurring phenomenon in all three countries. The results also show that on occasion (especially around EDL demonstrations where football hooligans are actively involved) the dividing line between ideologically and non-ideologically motivated perpetrators is thin. The rivalry between some of these groups and police can be seen as a special case. In terms of the Dutch study the young males involved in this type of violence would be part of what are called habitual public order offenders (“notoire ordeverstoorers”). It is important to realise that the coordination and synchronicity in behaviour that can often be observed with

regard to these groups of young males is not in itself evidence of detailed preplanning or a tight organisation structure. Shared experiences, a shared identity (see below) and simple behavioural rules may lead to a high level of synchronisation.

The distinction between the two types of violence is not absolute and an obvious overlap is created by the fact that the young male syndrome may also be expressed in response to triggers that may seem trivial to outsiders. Alcohol and drugs can play a role in the initiation of violence in as far as alcohol may lower the threshold to respond aggressively to frustrating events and drugs may be taken with the explicit purpose to reduce fear, lowering the threshold to behave aggressively even if unprovoked.

7.3.2 The escalation of collective violence

Two mechanisms are separately and jointly responsible for the escalation of violence (they can be relevant to each of the aforementioned pathways for the initiation of violence):

- 1 On the one hand, there are the (perceived) opportunities for committing acts of violence in a risk-free manner, with a low likelihood of retaliation, punishment or negative consequences. It is quite clear that even in escalated situations, only a small minority of any group engages in the most risky types of behaviour (i.e. direct physical confrontation with an opponent), while the majority of participants opt for less risky alternatives (shouting, gesturing, running) or do not become involved at all (they just watch or remove themselves from the situation). Even for those being violent, there is a lot more missile throwing than physical fighting, and a lot of redirected aggression at inanimate objects (fences, buses, trains) rather than at individuals that can fight back. There is something contradictory here, as the young male syndrome is characterised by risk-taking behaviour and engaging in violence involves just that. However, within that framework, individuals seem intent on avoiding “unnecessary” risks and on reducing risks. The fact that the young males, when violent, operate in groups is a form of risk-reduction in itself, as is the fact that they avoid or flee from confrontations that they seem unable to win. It has been noted that often, violence became more likely when there was no police present at risk locations. In addition, police are more often avoided

than confronted and – especially for football fans – most confrontations with police occurred only after police had taken some kind of coercive measure. Violent fans and protestors regularly took measures to hide their faces to make recognition more difficult and avoid identification and arrest. It is also clear that violent perpetrators dislike CCTV cameras and prefer to remain anonymous to authorities that could punish them for their behaviour. These risk-reducing attempts to maintain “anonymity” (to authorities, not necessarily to fellow fans or protestors!) are to be distinguished from the so-called de-individuation effect of “anonymity”, for which there is no support (Postmes & Spears, 1998).¹ The evidence for bounded rationality in combination with the relevance of opportunities to be violent with limited risk for escalation provide a link between collective violence and principles of situational crime prevention (Clarke, 1995).

The material presented in this study clearly indicates the opportunistic nature of much of the collective violence around public events and the large role that (perceived) opportunities to behave violently play. In all three countries mention is made of participants that become involved only because of the opportunity present in the situation, be it around May Day in Berlin, the G-20 in London or events in North Rhine-Westphalia. The opportunistic nature of a lot of the violence often makes it impossible to distinguish between ideologically and non-ideologically motivated perpetrators. Whereas experienced hooligans, activists and other perpetrators (habitual public order offenders/ “notoire ordeverstoorders” in terms of the Dutch study) are more adept at exploiting opportunities to behave violently, the more (perceived) opportunities for committing acts of violence in a risk-free manner there are, the more individuals may involve themselves (opportunity public order offenders/ “gelegenheidsordeverstoorders” in terms of the Dutch study).

- 2 The second important escalation mechanism, is the existence of an “us versus them” antagonism. The more antagonistic the relationships between different groups, the higher the frequency of observed violence. This was clearly the case for the relations between rival fan groups and for the relationship between groups of protestors from different ends of the political spectrum, as well as for relationships between certain groups of fans or

¹ According to deindividuation theories, anonymity causes antinormative and disinhibited behaviour.

protestors and police. Stott & Reicher, 1998a, p. 510 claim other studies show that: "... crowd conflict characteristically arises when official agencies such as the police or the army intervene against unofficial mass action ...". Although collective violence is not characteristically triggered by police action, collectively applied coercive police measures can be associated with an escalation of violence. The collective nature of these measures contributes to or exacerbates (or may even create) an "us vs them" perspective that can lead to more explicit ingroup/ outgroup behaviour and to more individuals behaving violently. Theoretically, the elaborated social identity model (ESIM), which states that collective "disorder" is made possible through the shared psychological salience of a common social identity among crowd participants is relevant here (Reicher, 1984, 1996). The defining dimensions of this identity serve to explain the normative limits of collective action, (what people do) and the extent of participation (who does and does not join in) during a crowd event. This "social identity" analysis argues that the dynamics of intergroup interaction are integral to the psychology of widespread "disorder". Stott & Reicher (e.g. 1998b) indicate that when an initially heterogeneous crowd has come to be treated as a homogeneous whole by the police, this has led crowd members to reconceptualise themselves as members of a common category, thus setting up a cycle of tension and escalating conflict.

Again, the material presented in this study clearly indicates the relevance of crowd dynamics in the escalation of collective violence. The Gothenburg riots, the G20 and May Day in Berlin all provide clear examples. It is important to understand that it is especially these crowd dynamics that are responsible for the involvement of larger numbers of individuals in collective violence, especially those individuals that did not initially have the intention to behave violently, do not have prior convictions, so called "opportunity public order offenders" ("gelegenheidsordeverstoorers"). At the same time, on every occasion only a small minority of those present were actively involved in the violence indicating that not every individual is affected in the same way. In this respect, it should be borne in mind that collective violence rarely involves more than 1% of a group being actually violent (in extremely escalated situations up to 10% of one and the same group may be actively participating in the violence), indicating that violence is always the result of a decision making process (either consciously or subconsciously). Although the specific contexts in which collective violence occurs may vary from one place or country

to another, as may the details in which it is expressed, this should not distract from the fact that the underlying mechanisms are the same, both for ideologically and non-ideologically motivated actors. The initiation/ escalation model provides a comprehensive framework to understand *why* and *how* collective violence occurs. Importantly, the model also allows to determine what types of intervention can and will be effective (or counterproductive) in preventing collective violence from occurring or escalating and what type of intervention will not (see below). In fact, thinking through the model results in a whole toolkit of options, based on the four strategic and tactical principles for crowd policing as formulated by Reicher et al. (2004; 2007). The model makes clear why a one-sided focus on habitual offenders or known perpetrators is insufficient, as most of the offenders in an escalated situation will be “unknown” opportunistic offenders. With regard to these individuals, it is important to identify potential areas of friction and to reduce opportunities to behave violently with impunity. Encouraging non-violent norms can be effective with these individuals and will lead to an increased prevalence of self-policing.

The model also helps to understand the importance of preparation and of early and targeted, low key interventions. Because of the general applicability of the model, the resulting toolkit is in principle generally applicable as well. Of course, applying the toolkit will always have to fit the context.

7.4 Conclusions: what lessons for the management of public events may be drawn from the international comparison for the situation in the Netherlands?

For the Dutch situation, the international trends identified above may serve as so many recommendations. They also provide a useful background to avoid looking in the wrong direction in trying to prevent escalating incidents of collective violence (e.g. looking for “new” less-lethal weaponry will prove to be a dead end). They also provide some useful examples for effective management and policing of public events (see below). In this respect the results of the recent Dutch study into public order policing by Adang (2009: “Boven de pet”) are relevant as well. The results of this study clearly showed the need for greater flexibility in policing public events and the importance of preparation, gathering and active use of information as well as consistent and effective communication.

Specific lessons/ examples of good practice from the international study that may be especially relevant for the Netherlands are the following.

- ☐ The preparation for events with increased risk as this takes place in Sweden, where commanders from different levels meet several days (or weeks) prior to the event to discuss the operation and jointly consider several “what-if scenarios” in a session lasting from half a day to a full day.
- ☐ The preparation for specific types of events as this takes place in England with regard to EDL-demonstrations, where a commander will visit one or more forces that previously hosted a similar event to learn from his experiences.
- ☐ The learning and sharing of experiences that takes place in Sweden with the use of peer review evaluations (a methodology originally developed, but not used, in the Netherlands!),² where commanders from different forces make real time observations of the policing of major events and provide structured feedback.
- ☐ The follow-up to events as this takes place in England with regard to EDL demonstrations, where a debriefing takes place at the national level and experiences are shared nationally (coordinated by the NPJA).
- ☐ The way in which specific attention is given to evidence gathering and prosecution in a public order context as is done in the UK (evidence gathering teams) and Germany (intelligence and intervention teams).
- ☐ The use of “dialogue units” as this is done in Germany (anti-conflict teams) and Sweden (dialogue police).
- ☐ The flexible way in which different units can act as this is done in Berlin.
- ☐ Building stronger links between practice and science as this is done within the SPT-project in Sweden with the aim to develop a more evidence-based approach to public order management.

The fact that in none of the countries studied a well-developed risk model was to be found should be a lesson as well: maybe police forces and authorities are looking in the wrong direction when trying to find a practicable model. The quest for an ever more elaborate and refined model that includes all potential risk factors inevitably leads to an unwieldy instrument that is not and will never be used in practice other than as a bureaucratic exercise on paper. Invariably, the “risk analysis models” turn into a long list of real or

² Only in the course of 2009/2010 a pilot was held in the Netherlands where peer reviews were performed around six football matches.

imagined “risk factors” with little structure and little or no theoretical foundation.³ In this respect, the theoretical initiation/ escalation model of collective violence may serve as a practical risk model too. Applying the model to a specific event, the following questions can and should be asked and answered by way of risk analysis in relation to collective violence:

- ☐ What are potential frictions in this event that could lead to irritation or frustration?
- ☐ Is there any information that known groups of young “habitual offender” males intend to attend the event and if so: what are their intentions?
- ☐ In relation to this event: what seem to be opportunities for offending/ violence?
- ☐ What are the social identities of the different (sub)groups attending the event, what are the relationships between these different (sub)groups and between these (sub)groups and police, authorities or organisers and what sensitivities/ antagonisms are involved?

In answering these questions and performing the risk analysis, the specific nature and context of the event should be taken into account, such as infrastructure, types of individuals attending and consumption of alcohol and drugs. When planning safety and security measures, the effects of these measures on the outcome of the risk analysis should be evaluated explicitly to avoid taking measures that are ineffective or counterproductive. As an example: applying measures intended for habitual offenders in an undifferentiated way to all participants/ visitors may well lead to a perception of disproportionality and illegitimacy that can contribute to the initiation or escalation of incidents. Due to the dynamic nature of events and of developing risks, events and participants should be monitored continuously to:

- ☐ identify actual and potential frictions manifesting themselves
- ☐ identify whether known young “habitual offender” males are present and manifest themselves in a way that shows their intention to initiate incidents
- ☐ identify opportunities for offending/ violence and individuals manifesting themselves in a way that shows their intention to take advantage of these opportunities
- ☐ identify the presence of different (sub)groups and their interaction.

3 See for instance the “risk analysis” lists in the EU handbooks on international events and international sports matches with an international dimension.

As may be gathered from the nature of the questions and the items to be monitored, a one-sided focus on habitual offenders should be avoided, as it misses out on several important factors contributing to the risk of an event. In the future, a more opportunity-reducing approach should be included in the management of public events and to this purpose, it is worthwhile investigating the potential of the application of the principles of situational crime prevention to public events. The risk analysis performed before the event should be continued during the event. This requires the involvement of dedicated and competent public order analysts. In none of the countries studied do these exist as such.

As far as the never ending demand for increasing powers to deal with (threats of) public disorder is concerned, a comparative international study commissioned in 2001 by the Dutch Interior Ministry is interesting (Rogier et al., 2002). It looked into administrative powers to prevent disturbances of public order to be able to deal with them more effectively and included the following countries: Belgium, Germany (the state of Hessen), France, Greece, Italy, Austria, Portugal, Spain and Sweden. The rationale for the research was the need authorities felt to be able to preventively detain groups of people disturbing or threatening to disturb public order at an early stage and to incarcerate them for a certain amount of time to prevent escalation of public disorder. Existing legal instruments in the Netherlands did not allow this: the administrative means available allow for short term measures only and criminal law is meant for individuals and not for groups. The conclusion of the study was that in the countries studied, no powers were found that could be of use in the Netherlands.

- 1 In the countries studied local authorities regulate public order during events, manifestations and demonstrations preventively through a system of permissions, orders or prohibitions, usually on the basis of a permit with specific conditions. For the actual maintenance of public order authorities make use of the police. No new powers were found that would be applicable and usable in the Netherlands.
- 2 Around football matches and political summits local authorities maintain public order via a wide array of practical preventive measures. In addition, large numbers of police are used for the actual maintenance of public order. In addition, penal powers, such as searches, seizures and identity controls are used preventively. Some countries limit themselves to practical preventive measures and large-scale police deployments, others also make use of penal powers. In the Netherlands the first approach is chosen and

in this respect no new powers were found that would be applicable and usable in the Netherlands. For the second approach (preventive use of penal powers) the law would have to be changed. Even in that case, penal powers may only be applied on an individual basis. Of the countries investigated, only the Netherlands has created the possibility for collective administrative detention. In Belgium, Hessen and Sweden powers for administrative detention on an individual basis exist. In principle these would be applicable in the Netherlands too. However, given the individual basis and the already existing powers, they would have little added value. The authors do point to the possibilities of a more extended use of CCTV to assist in the maintenance of public order.

Remarkably, the comparative study by Rogier et al. did not include the UK. Football related legislation in the UK is often seen as a kind of benchmark where powers to deal with threats of public disorder are concerned. In that sense, specifically for football, England and Wales have the Football Spectators Act 1989 and the Football (Disorder) Act 2000. Football banning orders were introduced and new offences were created that could be committed by football supporters and outlawed activities such as consuming alcohol in stadiums, indecent and racist chanting, invading the pitch and ticket touting (Pearson & James, 2006). Football Banning orders were introduced in the UK in 1986. Since that time the conditions that can be attached to banning orders have been extended on three occasions. The Football Spectators Act 1989 gave magistrates the power to impose orders that prevented those convicted of football-related offences from leaving the UK when English club sides or the national team were playing abroad. Later, the definition of “football-related” was extended to allow the imposition of more orders, and magistrates were given the power to order that those convicted of football-related offences surrender their passports when designated English and Welsh teams were playing abroad. The Football (Disorder) Act 2000 combined domestic and international orders, allowing banning orders to be imposed even where the conviction was not “football-related” and enabled the police to apply for the imposition of an order on a suspected hooligan “on complaint”. Under this procedure, the police may make an application for a banning order, under the terms of which a person can be forbidden to attend football matches in England and Wales and be required to report to a police station on the occasion of matches outside England and Wales. The application is made by way of complaint to a magistrates’ court. The court must make the order if it is shown

that the person has previously caused or contributed to violence or disorder in the UK or elsewhere and if it is established that there are reasonable grounds for believing that a banning order would help prevent football related violence or disorder. There is also a procedure intended to prevent people from leaving the country while the police seek a banning order on complaint (Football (disorder) (amendment) act 2002 explanatory notes). The banning order “on complaint” has been criticised for infringing the fundamental rights of supporters who have not been convicted of any offence and for being disproportionate (Pearson, 2005; Stott & Pearson, 2006). The new Dutch law introduced in 2010 (known as the “Football law” but actually called *Wet Bestrijding voetbalvandalisme en ernstige overlast*) does not contain similar provisions and is being criticised by some for not being strict enough (Brouwer, 2010).

Although the UK banning orders are generally seen as successful and have been linked with a decline in incidents involving English football fans (especially inside stadiums), incidents outside of football stadiums have continued to occur with some regularity. In addition, as this study indicates, the involvement of hooligans in EDL-demonstrations may represent an unwanted side-effect of the application of banning orders: our respondents indicated that especially individuals subject to football banning orders actually involved themselves in these demonstrations and in the violent clashes surrounding them.

In the light of the results of the international comparison made in this study, it is interesting to look back to the incident that formed the trigger for this study, the violent outburst at the dance party in Hoek van Holland. It can be concluded that where the outcome of this event was exceptional and extreme, the mechanisms that contributed to causing it certainly were not. The mechanisms contained in the initiation/ escalation model were clearly visible in Hoek van Holland. The results of the evaluation study (Muller e.a., 2009) make very clear that events in Hoek van Holland were a textbook example of the young male syndrome expressing itself and finding a suitable opportunity. Young males (average age 20 years) belonging to the Feyenoord Rotterdam “young hard core” hooligans, many of them with previous convictions for violence, gathered with the explicit purpose to instigate incidents. There was a build-up, with small-scale incidents beginning five-and-a-half hours before the eventual collective outburst took place. This outburst only occurred after

an opponent had presented himself in the form of the police, an opponent with which a longstanding antagonistic relationship existed and of which it had been established that it was not present at full strength. In the end, less than 1% of those present at the dance event participated in one form or another in the violent outburst. Not only known hooligans participated in this outburst: after a while others took advantage of the opportunity that existed to attack the police with impunity (that is, until aimed shots were fired and the mounted brigade intervened). The results of the evaluation study also made clear that, already before the event, the police did possess “hard” information about the presence of the young hooligans and their intentions. On the scene, their presence was confirmed. Possible options to act on this information and to take measures were not used, neither before nor during the event. In the course of the whole evening, the behaviour of the young hooligans was not responded to in any way, not even by addressing them. In the end a situation resulted where over twenty officers were attacked by a group of between 150 to 300 individuals and felt the only option open to them was to use their fire-arm. The events in Hoek van Holland clearly show how serious the consequences can be when available knowledge is not used and early options to intervene and influence are not being considered and implemented.

The most important lesson to be drawn from Hoek van Holland and from the international study is therefore that reducing collective violence is not a matter of using new and more effective weapons or new and expanded preventive powers, as has sometimes been claimed. It is to be found in a renewed consciousness of and alertness to what matters in ensuring safety and security around public events: thorough preparation, gathering and using information on habitual offenders, preventing and limiting opportunities to behave violently with impunity, monitoring behaviour of participants, using early, low profile interventions and enforcing tolerance limits that are perceived to be reasonable in a friendly, firm and believable way.

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Summary in Dutch/ Samenvatting in het Nederlands

8.1 Collectief geweld en ordehandhaving bij evenementen: een internationale vergelijking

De gebeurtenissen bij een dance event in Hoek van Holland op 22 augustus 2009 waarbij agenten zich zo bedreigd voelden dat ze uiteindelijk 76 schoten losten, waarvan 13 gericht op een groep geweldplegers, riep de vraag op of er sprake was van een nieuw fenomeen van (dreiging van) grootschalige ordeverstoringen en groepsgeweld tijdens evenementen en/ of grootschalige gebeurtenissen. In opdracht van de minister van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties (BZK) en de burgemeester van Rotterdam is na de strandrellen opdracht gegeven aan het COT en Bureau Beke om na het evaluatieonderzoek een onderzoek te verrichten naar dit fenomeen. Parallel aan dit Nederlandse onderzoek heeft het programma Politie & Wetenschap opdracht gegeven aan het lectoraat Openbare Orde en Gevaarbeheersing van de Politieacademie om een internationaal vergelijkend onderzoek te doen naar collectief geweld en ordehandhaving bij evenementen. Het internationaal vergelijkend onderzoek was verkennend van aard en gericht op beantwoording van de volgende onderzoeksvraag:

Van welke vormen van collectief geweld in relatie tot publieke evenementen is sprake in een aantal met Nederland vergelijkbare landen, hoe gaan autoriteiten in preventie en repressie zin om met (mogelijke) incidenten en welke lessen kunnen ten aanzien daarvan getrokken worden voor Nederland?

Er is voor gekozen om internationaal vergelijkend onderzoek te doen in Duitsland, Groot-Brittannië en Zweden vanwege de culturele nabijheid tot Nederland, de verwachting dat zich recente voor het onderzoek relevante gebeurtenissen hebben voorgedaan en dat daarvan studies beschikbaar zijn, de verwachting dat er bereidheid zou bestaan bij politie-instanties om aan het onderzoek mee te werken en de beschikbaarheid van onderzoekers die de landstaal spreken. Met de expertinterviews onder politiemensen (waar van toepassing aangevuld met documentanalyse) werd geen diepgaande studie van casuïstiek beoogd, maar een inventarisatie van police knowledge met betrek-

king tot collectief geweld en ordehandhaving rond recente gebeurtenissen waarover nog geen formele studies bestaan.

De volgende evenementen zijn nader onderzocht op basis van document-analyse en een enkel aanvullend interview: de jaarlijkse gebeurtenissen op 1 mei in Berlijn (1987-2009), de EU-top in Göteborg van juni 2001 en de G-20 in Londen van april 2009. Via expertinterviews onder politiemensen is onderzoek gedaan naar recente ontwikkelingen in Groot-Brittannië in relatie tot de English Defence League en tegendemonstraties van moslims en naar de openbare-ordehandhaving in de Duitse deelstaat Noordrijn-Westfalen. Doel van dit deel van het onderzoek was om na te gaan hoe de politie zich aanpast aan veranderingen in de samenstelling of de tactieken van groepen die de orde verstoren.

Ieder van de drie landen heeft ervaringen gekend waarbij ze verrast werden, zij het door het aantal individuen dat op een evenement afkwam, zij het door hun motivatie of gedrag. De gevolgen van dergelijke verrassingen kunnen vergaand zijn, zoals ook de gebeurtenissen in Hoek van Holland in Nederland duidelijk maakten. Dat betekent niet dat het fenomeen dat aanleiding was voor de escalaties nieuw was: in alle gevallen was het dat niet en waren de mechanismen in principe bekend. De specifieke uitingsvormen of betrokkenen waren soms nieuw voor politie of autoriteiten als gevolg van een gebrek aan informatie, onvoldoende bewustzijn voor wat relevant is of een gebrek aan alertheid. In alle drie de landen zijn de verrassingen aanleiding geweest om veranderingen door te voeren in de wijze waarop publieke evenementen gemanaged worden.

Terugkijkend op het incident dat de aanleiding was voor dit onderzoek, de geweldsuitbarsting op het dancefeest in Hoek van Holland, kan in het licht van de resultaten van het internationale onderzoek vastgesteld worden dat waar de uitkomst van deze gebeurtenis uitzonderlijk en extreem was, de mechanismen die een rol speelden dat niet waren. De belangrijkste lessen uit Hoek van Holland en uit het internationale onderzoek zijn dan ook vooral gelegen in een hernieuwde bewustwording van waar het steeds om gaat bij het managen van publieke evenementen: een gedegen voorbereiding, het voorkomen en beperken van gelegenheden voor ongestraft geweldgebruik, het monitoren van het gedrag van betrokkenen, het vroegtijdig, kleinschalig interveniëren en het op een geloofwaardige wijze vriendelijk en streng hantieren van tolerantiegrenzen.

8.2 Gebeurtenissen in de onderzochte landen

8.2.1 Duitsland

Berlijn heeft sinds 1987 een geschiedenis van ongeregelde heden ter gelegenheid van feestelijkheden en protesten in verband met de dag van de arbeid op 1 mei. Het geweld komt daarbij niet alleen van politiek georiënteerde activisten. In de loop der jaren zijn verschillende politietactieken en -strategieën ontwikkeld om het geweld te voorkomen en in te perken. Hoewel daarbij vanaf 2003 succes geboekt is met de 'strategie van de uitgestoken hand' en de inzet van onder andere anticonflicteams, ging 1 mei 2009 opnieuw gepaard met ernstige ongeregelde heden. Naar die gebeurtenissen is een onafhankelijke studie verricht vanuit de universiteit van Berlijn, die tot de conclusie kwam dat de gebeurtenissen een complex sociaal geheel betreffen waarbij de politie en de kijk op de wijze waarop de politie optreedt een belangrijke rol spelen.

Grootschalig geweld in Noordrijn-Westfalen vindt vooral plaats rond voetbalwedstrijden (vooral derby's en andere risicowedstrijden) en protestevenementen. Vooral demonstraties waarbij radicale linkse en rechtse groeperingen tegelijkertijd aanwezig zijn of demonstraties met Palestijnse of Koerdische deelnemers gaan relatief vaak gepaard met geweld. Daarnaast treden incidenten op bij feestelijke evenementen zoals de Love Parade (georganiseerd in Essen in 2007 en Dortmund in 2008), carnaval in Keulen en bij ongeorganiseerde evenementen (zoals in het uitgaansgebied in Düsseldorf of op 1 mei nabij Dortmund).

8.2.2 Groot-Brittannië

Nadat een man was overleden tijdens de grootschalige protesten rond de in april 2009 in Londen gehouden G-20-top, ontstond grote commotie. Er verschenen diverse onderzoeksrapporten, met als belangrijkste twee rapporten van de Britse inspectie voor de politie (HMIC) en een rapport van een gezamenlijke commissie van het Britse parlement. Het is duidelijk dat de gebeurtenissen rond de G-20 in Londen lang niet zoveel aandacht hadden gekregen als er geen sprake geweest zou zijn van het overlijden van een niet bij de protesten betrokken Londenaar. Integendeel, dan zou nog steeds (zoals aanvankelijk het geval was) uitsluitend gesproken worden over een succesvol politieoptreden. Toch wordt in diverse rapporten een groot aantal onvolko-

menheden gesignaleerd en de noodzaak van verandering benadrukt. De HMIC concludeerde dat de politie, om zich aan te passen aan de moderne eisen van ordehandhaving, nadrukkelijker gebruik moet maken van wat ze het traditionele Britse model noemen: benaderbaar, onpartijdig, rekenschap aflegend en met minimaal gebruik van geweld. Volgens de inspectie is er overweldigend bewijs voor het feit dat de meest effectieve ordehandhaving gebaseerd is op de volgende principes:

- ☐ een strategische benadering die is gericht op het faciliteren van vreedzaam gedrag;
- ☐ een tactische respons die dialoog en communicatie mogelijk maakt;
- ☐ een graduele, gedifferentieerde en informatiegestuurde benadering van politieel geweldgebruik.

De HMIC kwam met een groot aantal aanbevelingen op het gebied van onder andere training, bewijsgaring, briefing en debriefing. De inspectie constateerde dat het moderniseren en versterken van ordehandhaving niet gebaat is bij introductie van nog meer bevoegdheden bij al complexe wetgeving, maar bij een juist gebruik van bestaande bevoegdheden.

Voor wat betreft de EDL-gerelateerde gebeurtenissen (voorbeelden zijn een confrontatie in Birmingham tussen aanhangers van de EDL en Unite Against Fascism (UAF) waarbij 90 arrestaties werden verricht, een confrontatie tussen EDL-aanhangers en de politie in Manchester waarbij 55 personen werden aangehouden en een gewelddadige confrontatie tussen EDL-aanhangers en de politie in Stoke-on-Trent nadat EDL-aanhangers een politiekordon hadden doorbroken om in de richting van de UAF te kunnen gaan) was een opvallend fenomeen dat de EDL-gelederen vaak versterkt worden door voetbalhooligans die uit verschillende delen van het land aanreizen (de EDL rekruteert actief onder hooligans). Het gaat daarbij vooral om voetbalsupporters die geconfronteerd zijn met *banning orders* en van wie de paspoorten zijn ingenomen, zodat ze niet naar buitenlandse wedstrijden van hun club of het Engelse nationale elftal kunnen reizen. De tegendemonstraties van de UAF oefenen aantrekkingskracht uit op lokaal aanwezige migrantenjongeren. De aanpak is vrijwel geheel in handen van de politie: lokale autoriteiten spelen alleen een rol in de contacten met lokale gemeenschappen. Een EDL-demonstratie heeft een grote impact op lokale (etnische) gemeenschappen en daar moet veel aandacht aan besteed worden. Op nationaal niveau worden debriefings gehouden en worden ervaringen uitgewisseld met betrekking tot de gebeurtenissen rond EDL-demonstraties.

8.2.3 Zweden

Tijdens de Eurotop gehouden in juni 2001 in Göteborg waren er vele demonstraties die probleemloos verliepen en vier grote geweldsincidenten, die plaatsvonden na interventies door de politie. Deze Eurotop is nog steeds een traumatische gebeurtenis voor de Zweedse politie, vooral, maar niet alleen, voor die in Göteborg. De Zweedse politie werd geconfronteerd met een gebeurtenis waaraan ze niet gewend was, met een type actievoerders (en aantallen actievoerders) waaraan ze niet gewend was, in een context (het geweldadige verloop van een aantal toppen in andere landen) die voor veel onzekerheid zorgde. De organisatie van het grootschalige politieoptreden bleek ernstige tekortkomingen te vertonen. De gebeurtenissen zijn uitgebreid onderzocht, waarbij vooral het uitvoerige rapport van het parlementaire Göteborg-comité opvalt. De conclusies van het Göteborg-comité logen er niet om en de bevindingen zijn aanleiding geweest voor een proces van verandering binnen de Zweedse politie. Onderdeel van het veranderingsproces was een verandering in wat genoemd wordt de 'Special Police Tactics', de institutionalisering van dialoogeenheden en de opstart van een driejarig project (in 2006) om de Special Police Tactics meer *evidence based* verder te ontwikkelen en te verbinden met wetenschappelijke inzichten. Als deel van het project werden ~~per~~ review evaluatieteams ingezet, samengesteld uit ervaren commandanten, om het management van publieke evenementen te observeren en goede werkwijzen en leerpunten te identificeren. De resultaten van deze reviews worden verspreid via seminars en trainingen.

8.3 Geweldplegers

In geen van de drie betrokken landen is collectief geweld bij dance events benoemd als item (in Noordrijn-Westfalen zijn de daar georganiseerde Love Parades wel genoemd als risico-evenement, maar vooral in termen van ~~crowd management~~ en in relatie tot individuele, alcoholgerelateerde geweldplegingen). Opvallend is juist dat in de drie betrokken landen notoire geweldplegers zich manifesteren bij per land verschillende typen gebeurtenissen. De gebeurtenissen die relatief het vaakst gepaard gaan met collectief geweld zijn, naast risicowedstrijden in het betaalde voetbal, demonstraties waarbij beide zijden van het politieke spectrum vertegenwoordigd zijn.

In Groot-Brittannië komen voetbalhooligans samen bij manifestaties en

demonstraties van de extreemrechtse EDL. In Göteborg hadden lokale voetbalhooligans zich aangesloten bij neonazi's die linkse activisten aanvielen. In Noordrijn-Westfalen was alleen in Dortmund sprake van verbindingen tussen hooligans en extreem rechtse groeperingen. In Gelsenkirchen was echter sprake van verbindingen tussen voetbalhooligans en rockers. De Metropolitan Police uit Londen geeft aan dat Londense voetbalsupporters zich niet buiten het voetbal om groepsgewijs gewelddadig gedragen.

Naast de betrokkenheid van voetbalhooligans bij collectief geweld was er in diverse landen sprake van betrokkenheid van niet nader gespecificeerde niet-ideologisch gemotiveerde geweldplegers, zoals bij de G-20-protesten in Londen, de 1 meidemonstraties in Berlijn en de acties van de UAF in Engeland.

Een ander fenomeen was de betrokkenheid van migrantenjongeren bij collectief geweld. Daarvan was sprake bij tegen de politie gerichte rellen in wijken met een hoog percentage migranten in Malmö en Stockholm, tijdens carnaval in Keulen, waar migrantenjongeren op zoek gaan naar confrontaties, en rond de demonstraties van de English Defence League, waar migrantenjongeren zich soms aansluiten of dreigen aan te sluiten bij acties tegen de EDL.

Onder voetbalhooligans en geweldplegers rond feestelijke evenementen als de Love Parade en May Day komt alcoholgebruik frequent voor (hoewel juist niet bij de meer ervaren hooligans die geweld plannen), bij demonstraties en onder geweldplegende migrantenjongeren niet. In geen van de drie landen wordt een verband gelegd tussen collectief geweld en mogelijk drugsgebruik.

Over het algemeen zijn er geen meer gedetailleerde gegevens over de geweldplegers bekend dan dat het voor meer dan 90% mannen zijn met een gemiddelde leeftijd tussen 20 en 25 jaar. Waar de gebeurtenissen die het betreft vaak een hoge mate van planning en organisatie kennen, zijn er weinig aanwijzingen dat het geweld zelf gepland of georganiseerd is. In alle drie de landen lijkt het collectieve geweld vooral heel opportunistisch tot stand te komen daar waar de gelegenheid zich voordoet of in reactie op politieoptreden. Een uitzondering daarop vormen de confrontaties tussen rivaliserende groepen voetbalhooligans en die tussen extreemlinkse en extreemrechtse groeperingen. In alle drie landen wordt melding gemaakt van geplande aanvallen en gewelddadige acties. Bij het opportunistische karakter van het geweld hoort ook de min of meer spontane afstemming die tussen ervaren geweldplegers kan ontstaan op basis van eerdere gezamenlijke ervaringen. In sommige ge-

vallen zijn actoren goed voorbereid en treden ze ‘creatief’ op, waarbij ze ook informatie verzamelen over de politieaanpak. Voetbalhooligans zijn eigenlijk de enige groepen die genoemd zijn waarbij sprake kan zijn van enige vorm van afspreken (met rivaliserende groepen) om geweld te plegen. In Noordrijn-Westfalen werd gewezen op een ontwikkeling van hooligangroepen als geweldplegers naar veel heterogenere ultragroepen, die in principe niet uit zijn op geweld, maar gelegenheden tot geweldgebruik wel kunnen aangrijpen. In sommige gevallen – als vuurwerk en (gooi- of slag)voorwerpen worden meegenomen of van tevoren worden verstopt – is sprake van een zekere voorbereiding op geweldpleging, maar in de meeste gevallen wordt op opportunistische wijze gebruikgemaakt van voorwerpen die voorhanden zijn. Incidenteel is sprake van het meenemen van traangasbusjes, messen, katapulten of met vloeistof gevulde petflessen. In Noordrijn-Westfalen wordt ook gewezen op wat genoemd wordt ‘passieve bewapening’ zoals het dragen van mondbescherming, beschermende kleding of handschoenen gevuld met zand.

De doelwitten van geweld waren aan de ene kant rivalen/ opponenten (bij voetbalhooligans en bij links-rechtsconfrontaties) en aan de andere kant de politie. De politie is vooral doelwit als er geen andere opponent is of als de politie een positie tussen rivaliserende groepen inneemt. Vooral in Duitsland wordt melding gemaakt van het feit dat geweld tegen de politie (en tegen hulpverleners) de laatste tijd frequenter lijkt voor te komen in reactie op politieke interventies, vooral in combinatie met alcoholgebruik en bij evenementen zoals de Love Parade. Soms worden daarbij individuele agenten als doelwit gekozen.

Vooral links georiënteerde actiegroepen gebruiken een scala aan tactieken bij het uitvoeren van hun acties, waaronder het observeren van de rivaliserende groep of de politie, het opsplitsen in subgroepen en het uit de anonimiteit halen van politieagenten in burger door foto's van hen op internet te publiceren of via MMS te verspreiden. Soms worden deze foto's ook afgedrukt en ter plekke uitgedeeld of worden agenten in burger aangewezen met behulp van borden. In Noordrijn-Westfalen wordt aangegeven dat ook rechtse activisten steeds vaker van dit soort tactieken gebruikmaken, inclusief het optreden als zwart blok.

De hooligans bij de EDL-demonstraties zijn vaak specifiek op zoek naar zwakheden/ onvolkomenheden in de politiemaatregelen om daar gebruik van te kunnen maken. Ze verspreiden ook actief desinformatie om de politie en anderen op het verkeerde been te zetten (bijvoorbeeld over de te volgen rou-

te) of om geweld uit te lokken (bijvoorbeeld door het gerucht te verspreiden dat een vrouw is verkracht door een moslim).

De EDL is steeds georganiseerder en effectiever geworden in zijn acties, die in principe niet gewelddadig zijn. Men maakt gebruik van stewards, juridisch adviseurs en communicatieapparatuur. Ze weten precies wat ze wel en niet kunnen maken. Men wil professioneler zijn en als legitiem verzet tegen islamitisch extremisme gezien worden, waarbij de voetbalhooligans in toom gehouden worden door de stewards.

8.4 Managen van publieke evenementen: goede werkwijzen en trends

In alle drie de landen speelt de politie een belangrijke rol bij het verzekeren van de twee vormen van veiligheid (vooral bij *security*, maar vaak ook bij *safety*) rond evenementen, zeker waar het gaat om het risico op collectief geweld. Als gevolg daarvan is de rol van bijvoorbeeld lokale autoriteiten zeer beperkt ten opzichte van de rol van de politie. Vaak gaan evenementen gepaard met aanzienlijke politie-inzetten.

Het onderzoek maakt ook zichtbaar dat in geen van de drie landen een bevredigend risicomodel bestaat als gevolg van beperkingen in de beschikbare *intelligence*, de per definitie dynamische aard van publieke evenementen, het overweldigend aantal potentieel relevante factoren dat in zo'n model opgenomen zou moeten worden en de afwezigheid van een theoretisch perspectief om onderscheid te kunnen maken tussen wat wel en niet relevant is voor een specifiek evenement.

Op grond van de in de drie landen gehouden interviews kan een aantal door betrokkenen als 'goed' geïdentificeerde werkwijzen onderscheiden worden waar het gaat om het managen van publieke evenementen. Het wordt algemeen als een goede werkwijze betiteld om onnodige fricties zo veel mogelijk te voorkomen en om de legitieme intenties en activiteiten van deelnemers zo veel mogelijk te faciliteren. Daarnaast is het van belang gebeurtenissen te monitoren en te observeren om het optreden van wrijvingen en spanningen te signaleren om er in een vroegtijdig stadium op in te kunnen spelen. Daarvoor is het nodig te communiceren met betrokkenen en hen te informeren om erachter te komen wat hen beweegt en wat hun intenties zijn, om misverstanden te voorkomen en om hun medewerking te verkrijgen. Met betrekking tot groepen jonge mannen is het van belang hen te identificeren en te leren kennen (goede *intelligence* is belangrijk), om hen in een vroeg-

tijdig stadium te kunnen beïnvloeden en hen duidelijk te maken welke (tolerantie)grenzen gelden. Daarvoor is het nodig rechtstreeks met hen te communiceren. Om hun risicoperceptie te beïnvloeden dient hen (en anderen) duidelijk gemaakt te worden welke effectieve maatregelen genomen zullen worden als zij deze grenzen overschrijden. Door hen te leren kennen wordt hun anonimiteit ten opzichte van autoriteiten gereduceerd.

Het wordt als goede werkwijze beschouwd om in het kader van de openbare-ordehandhaving maatregelen te vermijden die het bestaan of ontstaan van een wij-zij-tegenstelling, die ingroup-outgroupgedrag stimuleert, bevorderen of benadrukken. In dat opzicht zijn interactie en communicatie belangrijke tactische instrumenten. Als er toch sprake is van geweld is het van belang tijdig te reageren, in plaats van af te wachten tot situaties escaleren of uit de hand lopen. Die interventies dienen gedifferentieerd te zijn, duidelijk gericht op diegenen die grensoverschrijdend gedrag vertonen. Anderzijds wordt onderkend dat de opportunistische aard van veel van het collectief geweld beperkingen oplegt aan de bruikbaarheid van intelligence: als geweld eenmaal escaleert, neemt het aantal beschikbare opties om te interveniëren snel af. Vanwege de vele onzekerheden die een rol spelen bij publieke evenementen dient iedere voorbereiding een variëteit aan wat-als-scenario's te omvatten.

Ongeacht de verschillen tussen de drie landen (bijvoorbeeld op het vlak van wetgeving en politieorganisatie) is een aantal duidelijke trends herkenbaar met betrekking tot het managen van publieke evenementen.

- 1 Waar een behoefte aan verandering gevoeld wordt (of werd in het recente verleden), was er geen behoefte aan nieuwe bevoegdheden of wijzigingen in wetgeving. In plaats daarvan was er behoefte aan een beter begrip en gebruik van bestaande bevoegdheden.
- 2 Waar een behoefte aan verandering gevoeld wordt (of werd in het recente verleden), was er geen behoefte aan een uitbreiding van het wapenarsenaal. Voor wat betreft uitrusting werden andere behoeften geformuleerd of wijzigingen doorgevoerd (zie hieronder). Zogenaamde innovatieve minder dodelijke wapens zijn in feite niet innovatief omdat ze 1) gebaseerd zijn op bestaande technologie die niet voldoende ontwikkeld is voor gebruik in de praktijk, en 2) intrinsiek gekoppeld zijn aan gedateerde niet control-concepten.
- 3 Waar een behoefte aan verandering/ aanvulling in uitrusting gevoeld wordt (of werd in het recente verleden), was dat gerelateerd aan 1) persoonlijke bescherming van agenten, 2) communicatieapparatuur politie-onderlinge communicatie, 3) apparatuur voor communicatie met deelne-

mers aan publieke evenementen, 4) apparatuur die bijdraagt aan een verbeterde verzameling van informatie, 5) apparatuur die bijdraagt aan een verbeterde bewijsverzameling of 6) apparatuur/ uitrusting/ voertuigen die bijdragen aan een verhoogde flexibiliteit en mobiliteit.

- 4 Er is een algemene trend in de richting van toenemende flexibiliteit waarbij de politie als geheel of verschillende eenheden eenvoudig kunnen switchen tussen verschillende benaderingen, mobiel zijn en op en af kunnen schalen.
- 5 Er is een algemene trend om in toenemende mate wetenschappelijke inzichten toe te passen bij het management van publieke evenementen (bijvoorbeeld het SPT-project in Zweden, het HMIC-rapport in Groot-Brittannië).
- 6 Er is een algemene trend om meer aandacht te besteden aan bewijsgring om zo de kwaliteit van aanhoudingen te vergroten en de kans op succesvolle vervolging te vergroten (bijvoorbeeld bewijsvergaringsteams in Groot-Brittannië, intelligence- en interventieteams in Duitsland), en de voorkeur te geven aan een ~~da~~gerichte aanpak boven een collectieve aanpak met massa-aanhoudingen of -insluitingen.
- 7 Er is een algemene trend om meer aandacht te besteden aan ~~de~~briefings na 'problematische' gebeurtenissen, het identificeren van ~~goede~~ werkwijzen en de uitwisseling van leerervaringen tussen korpsen (bijvoorbeeld de nationale debriefings in Groot-Brittannië, de peer reviews in Zweden).
- 8 Er is een algemene trend om gebruik te maken van een 'vriendelijke en strenge' strategie gebaseerd op het faciliteren van vreedzaam gedrag en een graduele, gedifferentieerde en informatiegestuurde benadering die mogelijkheden biedt voor dialoog en communicatie met vroegtijdige, gerichte laagprofielinterventies. Zweden ontwikkelde zijn SPT (Special Police Tactics), Berlijn de strategie van de uitgestoken hand en Groot-Brittannië is trots op het 'Britse model'. In toenemende mate worden 'dialogoeenheden' gevormd (bijvoorbeeld anticonflictteams in Duitsland, dialoogpolitie in Zweden en ~~forward~~intelligence-eenheden in Groot-Brittannië, hoewel deze laatste geleidelijk een andere, minder op dialoog gerichte en daardoor bekritiseerde rol op zich genomen hebben).¹
- 9 Er is algemene overeenstemming over het belang van goede intelligence met betrekking tot bekende geweldplegers, net zoals er breed ontevredenheid is over de kwaliteit van de intelligence en er breed onderkend wordt dat intel-

¹ Deze eenheden zijn vergelijkbaar met de sinds 1998 in Amsterdam-Amstelland bestaande 'vredeseenheden'. Amsterdam-Amstelland is nog steeds het enige korps dat over dergelijke eenheden beschikt.

ligence over bekende geweldplegers aangevuld moet worden met een begrip van contextgebonden gevoeligheden en de dynamiek van menigten.

De internationale trends vertegenwoordigen in feite een toenemende bewustwording van de mechanismen die kunnen leiden tot collectief geweld en van de interventies die meer en minder succesvol zijn.

8.5 De initiatie en escalatie van collectief geweld: een model

In de drie betrokken landen manifesteren notoire geweldplegers zich bij per land verschillende typen gebeurtenissen. De gebeurtenissen die relatief het vaakst gepaard gaan met collectief geweld zijn, naast risicowedstrijden in het betaalde voetbal, demonstraties waarbij beide zijden van het politieke spectrum vertegenwoordigd zijn. De resultaten van het onderzoek bevestigen – en kunnen samengevat worden in – het initiatie/ escalatiemodel van collectief geweld dat in zijn oorspronkelijke vorm gebaseerd is op in Nederland rond voetbal- en protestevenementen verzamelde gegevens en dat nu uitgebreid kan worden aan de hand van de internationale gegevens.

De basismechanismen voor het ontstaan en de escalatie van collectief geweld zijn in essentie dezelfde bij ideologisch en niet-ideologisch gemotiveerde geweldplegers. Het is ook van belang te onderkennen dat de factoren die een rol spelen bij het ontstaan van collectief geweld verschillen van de factoren die verantwoordelijk zijn voor de escalatie ervan (waarbij onder escalatie verstaan wordt dat een toenemend aantal mensen betrokken raakt bij geweldpleging). Het model maakt duidelijk onderscheid tussen deze twee typen factoren.

8.5.1 Het ontstaan van collectief geweld

Collectief geweld begint altijd of wordt altijd geïnitieerd op een van twee manieren: in reactie op een specifieke gebeurtenis die als aanleiding fungeert of schijnbaar spontaan, zonder duidelijke aanleiding.

- 1 Geweld kan ontstaan door in eerste instantie individuele reacties na specifieke elementen of wrijvingen in een situatie, zoals uitdagingen of provocaties (bijvoorbeeld door andere supporters), maatregelen die de politie neemt of een andere duidelijk identificeerbare aanleiding.

De resultaten van het onderzoek bevatten vele voorbeelden van geweld dat ontstaat na specifieke aanleidingen, vooral politieke interventies. Dat geldt voor de 1 mei rellen in Berlijn, de rellen in Göteborg, de G-20 in Londen en verschillende incidenten in Noordrijn-Westfalen.

- 2 Geweld kan ook ontstaan zonder dat er een duidelijk aanwijsbare uiterlijke aanleiding voor is. Dit type geweld is niet reactief en kan daardoor spontaan overkomen, hoewel het in feite vaak van tevoren gepland is. Het komt vrijwel uitsluitend voor rekening van groepen jonge mannen (adolescent/ jongvolwassen) en is voornamelijk gericht op vergelijkbare, rivaliserende groepen jonge mannen of al dan niet symbolische vertegenwoordigers daarvan. De betrokken individuen en groepen zoeken actief naar gelegenheden om rivaliserende groepen te confronteren.

De resultaten van het onderzoek bevatten diverse duidelijke voorbeelden van groepen jonge mannen 'op zoek naar problemen', vooral in relatie tot de rivaliteit tussen (niet-ideologisch gemotiveerde) hooligan-groepen en ideologisch gemotiveerde activisten en demonstraties met een extreem rechtse c.q. linkse achtergrond. De resultaten laten ook zien dat in sommige gevallen (vooral rond de EDL) de scheidslijn tussen ideologisch en niet-ideologisch gemotiveerde geweldplegers dun is.

Het onderscheid tussen de twee typen geweld is niet absoluut en een voor de hand liggende overlap is gelegen in de omstandigheid dat het jongemannensyndroom ook tot uitdrukking kan komen in reactie op triggers die voor buitenstaanders onbegrijpelijk of niet waarneembaar zijn ('zinloos geweld'). Alcohol en drugs kunnen een rol spelen bij het ontstaan van geweld voor zover alcohol de drempel kan verlagen om agressief op frustrerende situaties te reageren en drugs gebruikt kunnen worden met het expliciete doel om angsten te verminderen, zodat de drempel om (met of zonder provocatie) geweld te gebruiken verlaagd wordt.

8.5.2 De escalatie van collectief geweld

Twee mechanismen zijn, apart of gezamenlijk, verantwoordelijk voor de escalatie van geweld (deze mechanismen kunnen optreden na beide van de hiervoor behandelde wijzen waarop geweld geïnitieerd kan worden).

- 1 Enerzijds zijn er (gepercipieerde) gelegenheden om risicoloos geweld te plegen en zijn repercussies, straf of negatieve gevolgen onwaarschijnlijk.

De aanwijzingen voor ‘begrensde rationaliteit’ (*bounded rationality*) in combinatie met het belang van gelegenheden om ongestraft geweld te plegen maken de principes van situationele misdaadpreventie (*situational crime prevention*) ook relevant voor collectief geweld.

De gegevens uit dit onderzoek maken de opportunistische aard van veel van het collectieve geweld rond evenementen duidelijk en de belangrijke rol van (gepercipieerde) gelegenheden om ongestraft gewelddadig gedrag te vertonen. In alle drie de onderzochte landen wordt melding gemaakt van het feit dat individuen betrokken raken vanwege de gelegenheden die de situatie biedt. De opportunistische aard van veel van het geweld maakt het vaak onmogelijk ideologisch en niet-ideologisch gemotiveerde geweldplegers/ ordeverstoorers van elkaar te onderscheiden. Ervaren hooligans, extreme activisten en andere notoire ordeverstoorers zijn meer bedreven in het benutten van gelegenheden om geweld te plegen, maar hoe meer (gepercipieerde) gelegenheden er zijn om ongestraft geweld te plegen, hoe meer gelegenheidsordeverstoorers bij het geweld betrokken raken.

- 2 Het tweede belangrijke escalatiemechanisme is het bestaan van een wijk-zij-antagonisme. Hoe antagonistischer de relatie tussen twee verschillende groepen is, des te hoger is de frequentie van geweld tussen hen. Dit is duidelijk het geval voor de relatie tussen rivaliserende supportergroepen en voor de relaties tussen demonstranten van verschillende uiteinden van het politieke spectrum, alsook voor de verhouding tussen sommige groepen demonstranten en de politie. In theoretisch opzicht is het uitgebreide sociale identiteitsmodel (ESIM) hierbij relevant.

Ook hier laat het in deze studie verzamelde materiaal de toepasbaarheid van het model en het belang van deze groepsdynamiek zien voor de escalatie van collectief geweld. De rellen in Göteborg, de G-20 in Londen en 1 mei in Berlijn zijn duidelijke voorbeelden. Het is belangrijk te beseffen dat het juist deze groepsdynamiek is waardoor grotere aantallen individuen bij collectief geweld betrokken raken. Het gaat daarbij om gelegenheidsordeverstoorers die niet gekomen zijn met de intentie om geweld te plegen of de orde te verstoren, die geen antecedenten hebben. Tegelijkertijd blijft het waar dat bij iedere gelegenheid maar een kleine minderheid van de aanwezigen actief gewelddadig was, wat aangeeft dat de groepsdynamiek niet op ieder individu dezelfde uitwerking heeft.

In dit verband is het van belang te beseffen dat bij collectief geweld zelden meer dan 1% van een en dezelfde groep daadwerkelijk gewelddadig is. In sterk geëscaleerde situaties participeert maximaal 10% van een

groep in het geweld. Dat maakt nog eens duidelijk dat geweldgebruik altijd het resultaat is van een (bewust of onbewust verlopend) keuzeproces. Het feit dat de specifieke contexten en details kunnen variëren van plaats tot plaats en van land tot land doet niet af aan de omstandigheid dat de onderliggende mechanismen steeds hetzelfde zijn, zowel voor ideologisch als niet-ideologisch gemotiveerde geweldplegers.

Het initiatie/ escalatiemodel biedt een omvattend kader om te begrijpen waarom en hoe collectief geweld optreedt. Belangrijker nog, met behulp van het model kan vastgesteld worden wat voor soort interventies effectief of juist contraproductief zullen zijn. Het doordenken van het model leidt tot een gevulde gereedschapskist met interventiemogelijkheden. Het model maakt duidelijk waarom een eenzijdige focus op bekende geweldplegers of notoire ordeverstoorders niet voldoet, aangezien de meeste geweldplegers gelegenhedsordeverstoorders zijn en per definitie nog niet bekend zijn. Met betrekking tot dit type geweldplegers is het van belang potentiële wrijvingspunten te identificeren en gelegenheden voor ongestraft geweldgebruik te verminderen. Het bevorderen van niet-gewelddadige normen kan hier effectief zijn en zal leiden tot een toenemende onderlinge sociale controle (self-policing). Het model maakt ook het belang duidelijk van een goede voorbereiding en gerichte, vroegtijdige laagprofielinterventies. Als geweld eenmaal escaleert, neemt het aantal beschikbare opties om te interveniëren snel af. Vanwege de algemene toepasbaarheid van het model is de gereedschapskist die er het resultaat van is in principe ook algemeen toepasbaar. Uiteraard dient het toepassen van instrumenten/ interventies uit de gereedschapskist altijd te passen bij de context.

8.6 Welke lessen kunnen voor Nederland uit het internationale onderzoek worden getrokken?

Voor Nederland kunnen de gesignaleerde internationale trends opgevat worden als even zovele aanbevelingen die kunnen helpen te voorkomen dat in de verkeerde richting gezocht wordt bij pogingen escalerende incidenten van collectief geweld te voorkomen. Dat betekent het volgende:

- ☐ inzetten op flexibiliteit;
- ☐ gebruikmaken van wetenschappelijke inzichten;
- ☐ meer aandacht voor bewijsgaring en vervolging;

- ☐ meer aandacht voor debriefing en het identificeren en uitwisselen van goede werkwijzen;
- ☐ doorontwikkelen en consequent toepassen van een vriendelijke en strenge aanpak.

De volgende concrete lessen en goede werkwijzen kunnen vooral relevant zijn voor Nederland:

- ☐ de wijze waarop de politie in Zweden zich voorbereidt op evenementen met verhoogd risico, waarbij commandanten van verschillende niveaus een aantal dagen of weken van tevoren bij elkaar komen en een dag of een dagdeel besteden aan het bediscussiëren van de aanpak en het gezamenlijk doorwerken van een aantal wat-als-scenario's;
- ☐ de wijze waarop de politie in Engeland zich voorbereidt op EDL-demonstraties, waarbij een commandant het korps bezoekt waar het meest recent een vergelijkbare demonstratie heeft plaatsgevonden om van de ervaringen daar te leren;
- ☐ de manier waarop in Zweden invulling is gegeven aan het leren en delen van ervaringen door middel van peer reviews, waarbij commandanten van verschillende korpsen gestructureerde observaties verrichten bij ordehandhaving en in een vast format feedback geven;²
- ☐ de wijze waarop in Engeland ervaringen met betrekking tot EDL-demonstraties worden verzameld en gedeeld via gecoördineerde nationale debriefings;
- ☐ de wijze waarop invulling gegeven wordt aan bewijsgaring en vervolging voor openbare-ordefeiten in Engeland (bewijsgaringteams) en Duitsland (intelligence- en interventieteams);
- ☐ het gebruik van 'dialogoog/ anticonflict'-eenheden zoals dat gebeurt in Duitsland en Zweden;
- ☐ de flexibele wijze waarop verschillende eenheden opereren zoals in Berlijn;
- ☐ de wijze waarop verbinding gelegd wordt tussen onderzoek en praktijk zoals dat in Zweden gebeurd is binnen het SPT-project met het oog op het ontwikkelen van een meer evidence-based aanpak van public order management.

Het initiatie/ escalatiemodel van collectief geweld kan als een praktisch bruikbaar risicomodel fungeren. Bij toepassing van het model op een specifiek eve-

² Deze methode is aan de Politieacademie in Nederland ontwikkeld en het afgelopen jaar in pilotvorm toegepast rond een aantal voetbalwedstrijden.

nement kunnen en moeten de volgende vragen bij wijze van risicoanalyse van collectief geweld gesteld worden:

- ☐ Wat zijn potentiële wrijvingen die bij dit evenement aanleiding zouden kunnen zijn voor irritaties of frustraties?
- ☐ Is er informatie dat bekende (groepen) notoire ordeverstoorders van plan zijn het evenement te bezoeken en zo ja, wat zijn hun intenties?
- ☐ Specifiek voor dit evenement: wat zijn specifieke gelegenheden voor geweld of ordeverstoringen?
- ☐ Wat zijn de sociale identiteiten van de verschillende (sub)groepen die het evenement bezoeken, wat zijn de relaties tussen deze (sub)groepen en tussen deze (sub)groepen en autoriteiten, politie of organisatoren? Welke spanningen of gevoeligheden brengt dat met zich mee?

Bij het beantwoorden van deze vragen en het uitvoeren van de risicoanalyse moeten het specifieke karakter en de specifieke context van het evenement in ogenschouw worden genomen, zoals infrastructuur, soort bezoekers en gebruik van alcohol of drugs. Bij het plannen van de veiligheidsmaatregelen (safety én security) moeten de effecten van de te nemen maatregelen expliciet op de uitkomst van de risicoanalyse betrokken worden om te voorkomen dat maatregelen genomen worden die niet effectief of contraproductief zijn. Vanwege het dynamische karakter van evenementen en van zich ontwikkelende risico's moeten het evenement en de bezoekers voortdurend gemonitord worden op de volgende aspecten:

- ☐ het tot uiting komen van potentiële of daadwerkelijke wrijving;
- ☐ de aanwezigheid van notoire ordeverstoorders en of zij zich gedragen op een wijze die hun intentie om incidenten te initiëren toont;
- ☐ gelegenheden die zich voordoen om ongestraft de orde te verstoren en/of geweld te plegen en de aanwezigheid van individuen die zich zodanig gedragen dat ze hun intentie om gebruik te maken van deze gelegenheden tonen;
- ☐ de aanwezigheid van opvallende (sub)groepen en hun onderlinge interactie (en hun interactie met politiemensen, beveiligers en derden).

Daarbij dient een eenzijdige focus op notoire ordeverstoorders voorkomen te worden, aangezien daarmee verschillende belangrijke risicofactoren over het hoofd gezien worden. In de toekomst zou een op het verminderen van gelegenheden gerichte benadering meer dan nu het geval is deel moeten uitmaken van het management van publieke evenementen. Daartoe is het de moeite

waard de mogelijkheid van de toepassing van de principes van situationele criminaliteitspreventie nader te onderzoeken. De risicoanalyse die voorafgaand aan het evenement wordt uitgevoerd, dient tijdens het evenement te worden voortgezet. Daarvoor zijn competente openbare-ordeanalisten nodig. In geen van de onderzochte landen bestonden dezen.



Appendix

Questionnaire

Thank you very much for participating in this project. The interviews are part of an international project on violence at major events. The research is carried out by _____ in cooperation with the Police Academy of the Netherlands.

The project focuses on different major events within Europe: the G-20 demonstration in London 2009, the Gothenborg riot of 2001, May Day in Berlin, suburban tensions in Malmö and Stockholm, the general public order situation in the state of North Rhine-Westphalia in Germany and the conflict between the English defence league and counter Muslim protest.

The project does not make qualitative comparisons, but aims to identify possible principles that may be inherent in all of these incidents.

The questions refer to two sections: the first part deals with the characteristics and tactics of offenders. The second part relates to the way that police adapt to this action and to possible changes in the composition and tactics of the offenders.

The individual interviews will serve as a base for a summarising report on _____

The information that you give in this interview will be anonymised and it will not be possible to relate single statements given in the interview to a specific person. Reports of the different countries are eventually summarised in a final report. This will be published in the scientific series of, Politie & Wetenschap ("Police and Science") in English and in Dutch. Politie & Wetenschap is an independent program, initiated and funded by the Netherlands Home Office. Information also in English can be retrieved from [http:// www.politieenwetenschap.nl/](http://www.politieenwetenschap.nl/) .

Subject to your approval we would like to record the conversation. The file will be destroyed once the report is finished.

A Description of the phenomenon

[Instruction to interviewer: This should be specifically phrased in relation to the respective event. General information about the interview is inserted above].

We start by asking you to tell us in your own words about the events that this interview is concerned with. We ask you to use the concepts “activists”, for persons who are acting on behalf of organisations, the protesting public about persons who while not acting on behalf of organisations still are taking part in different kinds of protest, “spectators” for persons who are at the spot without taking any part in the protests, or belonging to any authority. Furthermore, we ask you to tell us about the actors who may be on the spot except the police: the social services, medics and fire department, private security guards, civil night patrols (connected to the social services or municipal youth services), local representatives – political, religious or from the community, and so on, plus next of kin to the different groups mentioned here. Please tell us about the actions of each of these groups (as long as they actually were on the spot). We also ask you to tell us if crimes were committed on the spot. If so: how and where? Persons that commit crimes will from now on be called “offenders”.

- ☐ Characterise the offenders and/ or the groups of offenders.
- ☐ If there are violent clashes: which persons and/ or groups are involved?
- ☐ Can you describe them according to age, gender, education, political affiliations etc.?
- ☐ Background
- ☐ Is there anything that indicates that the crimes committed are organised and planned?
- ☐ If yes: Who is, to your knowledge, in that case involved in the organisation and planning?
- ☐ How do you know this?
- ☐ Where does that information come from?
- ☐ Do you know about other interpretations of the situation (If yes: specify). In that case, how do you value these interpretations?

Outcome

- ☐ What is the context of the clashes? If protests are involved: what are they about? What is your opinion about the reasons for the protests?
- ☐ What aims and goals do the offenders/ groups of offenders have?
- ☐ What are the targets of the offences?
- ☐ Do the offenders use certain tactics? Do they use violent tactics (specify)? Do they use non-violent tactics (unlawful)? If so: specify.
- ☐ What communication channels do the offenders use?
- ☐ Do the offenders use weapons or other kinds of arsenal? (If yes: which kind and how?)
- ☐ What is the influence of alcohol and narcotics?
- ☐ Is there anything of relevance that you want to add that you think could be relevant to an understanding of the initiation or escalation of violence during events?
- ☐ How do you know this?
- ☐ From where do you get the information?

B Means and concepts to handle the phenomenon

This part includes questions about these areas:

- ☐ Legal and organisational context.
- ☐ What rules and regulations apply to the handling of special events? (Rules and regulations about police tactics, local ordinances, possibly dry areas etc.)
- ☐ What was the organisational structure of the police force on the spot?
- ☐ Influence from the rest of the society.
- ☐ What roles do the mass media, citizens, local inhabitants etc. have?
- ☐ Do you regard the cooperation with the rest of the society to be without conflicts? If not: please specify.
- ☐ Is there in your view acceptance in society for the actions of the police? Locally or globally?
- ☐ Do you regard the cooperation between the different police authorities to run smoothly? If not: please specify.
- ☐ Do you think that the police could have done more to avoid a violent outcome?
- ☐ Do you think that there may be other, potentially better ways to solve the conflict other than with police actions? If so, or if not, specify.
- ☐ Police behaviour.

How does the police handle:

- ☐ Crime investigations on the spot?
- ☐ Risk analysis, assessment of the situation
 - How do you value the sources?
 - How is the information handled in operative situations?
 - Are there other judgments of the police information? How do you judge them?
- ☐ What means of police action were used (for example batons, pepper spray, water cannon)?
- ☐ How did the police relate to the events (dialogue, using of force, strategic incapacitation, passively)?
- ☐ Can you describe the behavioural profile that was applied?
- ☐ Did you deploy dialogue groups? If so, what was their role?
- ☐ What was the role of private security guards, civil night patrols, the social services?
- ☐ Arrests: What kinds of arrest tactics do you apply?
- ☐ What has the police done after the incident to prevent similar events, or to be able to handle them?
- ☐ Would you like to add something about what would make your work easier?

Authors

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Elaine B. Brown is currently in the latter stages of her Home Office funded PhD, being undertaken at the University of Liverpool. Her social psychological thesis examines key dynamics of the social identity theory (e.g., categorisation, stereotypes, status and power dynamics) to better understand the intergroup interactions between crowds and police. Extensive field research examining an array of data sources has been conducted between crowd and police throughout Europe; and, extensively at the Euro 2008 football tournament. The aim is to develop principles of good practice policing based on theory and experience; to further strengthen the links between research, theory, policy and practice in the context of policing international football. Elaine holds an M.A. Psychology (2:1 Hons) from the University of St Andrews. She is been involved in EU police co-operation peer review evaluation teams

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